Internet Security: Report on ICANN\u27s Initiatives and on the Discussions in the European Union

Abstract

The Internet is designed as a highly distributed system, with very few single points of control or failure. The computers that interconnect all the networks world-wide are consequently very numerous and widely distributed globally. They are also owned and controlled by many distinct organisations and individuals. Consequently, general co-ordination of the Internet, and a fortiori security, depends on widespread co-operation. One major objective of the distributed architecture of the Internet is precisely that of insulating the networks as a whole from any particular failure. Indeed, as seen, the Internet responded to the 9/11 events very robustly, particularly in the United States and Europe, the loss of a major telecommunications facility adjoining the WTC notwithstanding. But this may not have been the case in more peripheral parts of the Internet; South Africa reported a significant and prolonged outage at the time. However, certain Internet functions are centralised due to the necessity of unique assignments of names, addresses and protocols. These are the functions that are under the auspices of ICANN itself. Accordingly, should there be vulnerabilities and failures in the future, they might occur in these particular areas.