Outcomes of armed conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq indicate that the U.S. has been
unprepared to fully address the panoply of problems related to establishment of social
and economic stability, security and governance in the aftermath of war. How the war
against terrorism should be fought is an issue beyond the scope of this article. However,
if U.S. policy makers are to succeed in obtaining stability, security and good
governance in these nations and in other parts of the world where significant
development assistance is provided to highly unstable nations, they should learn lessons
from past U.S. colonial experience, and from the experience of other nations. Such
context include U.S. colonial administration of the Philippines after the Spanish-
American War, the administration of the British Empire in India, the occupations of
Germany and Japan after World War II and European colonization of Africa. Lessons
from these cases, good and bad, may be examined in attempt to identify elements of
what we term “smart practice” neo-colonial administration. No claim is made here that
the U.S. is operating as a colonial power in Iraq. Rather, our argument is that lessons
may be learned from colonial experience that are applicable to Iraq and other high
security risk nations where development and reconstruction is badly needed
