This thesis analyzes the three key failures by the leading external powers in their efforts in 1992-1995 to manage the crisis in Bosnia and impose a settlement. Except for Russia, these leading powers were the so-called NATO quad: Britain, France, Germany, and the United States. when these powers initially intervened, they failed to comprehend the origins and dynamics of the Yugoslav crisis. These powers successively failed to prevent the outbreak of the fighting, then to properly contain it, and finally to achieve a stable and enduring settlement when the chance presented itself in 1995. The thesis concludes that the failures stemmed from incorrect assessments, a lack of political will, and organizational shortcomings. Because of these failures, the Bosnian conflict remains unsettled, and the current stalemate hinges on continuing political-military commitments by the external powers.http://archive.org/details/thewarinbosniana1094532933NANARomanian Ministry of National Defense author.Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
