Phosphorus is an essential source with significance use in agriculture. Phosphorus is lost in the human intensified global cycle and it is important to remove phosphorus from water body. However, important and potential sources for phosphorus product which is suitable and effective for fertilizer use may be ignored due to over emphasize on the pollution prevention. This work aims to identify the potential of phosphorus recovery from solid organic waste in Sweden. Based on the result of Material Flow Analysis of phosphorus, solid food waste is identified the main solid waste fractions containing phosphorus substances of phosphorus in Sweden. From the case study and comparison of three alternatives, the possibility of recovery of phosphorus from household solid food waste is analyzed. A SWOT analyst is applied to provide a best solution for phosphorus recovery from food waste. The key drivers, the system boundaries for the phosphorus recovery and collection, storage, transport and use of the phosphorus are also discussed.

Schroeder, Christopher H.

English

Lu, Xiaoxia

Academic Archive On-line (KTH, Sweden)

Feasibility Study: Phosphorus Recovery from Household Solid Organic Waste

Duke Law Scholarship Repository

FOREWORD_FMT.DOC 07/02/02 10:02 AMFOREWORD: THE LAW OF POLITICSCHRISTOPHER H. SCHROEDER*Figuring out an acceptable relationship between law and politics has beenone of the perennial preoccupations of both politicians and lawyers, and of po-litical scientists and legal scholars as well.  In a country in which it has long beenthe case that “scarcely any political question arises . . . that is not resolved,sooner or later, into a judicial question,” the way this question is answered hasramifications for many issues vital to the health of our society.1Viewed through a conventional lens, the relational issues of greatest con-cern about these two activities, politics and law, involve politics’ influence onlaw: how much is politics influencing law, whether that is a good thing, whetherthat influence can be avoided and whether the political preferences of thejudges rather than some quasi-autonomous methodology of legal reasoning de-termine legal outcomes.One recurring worry is that politics will have too much influence on legaloutcomes.  A central ambition of the rule of law has been to insulate legal deci-sions from political pressures.  Creating the social expectations that courts oflaw ought to make decisions without regard to the social status or politicalpower of the litigants was one of the great developments in the history of An-glo-Saxon jurisprudence.2  Law “ought to ignore the social status of individualsand also to ignore their political role, unless their ability to perform that role it-self requires some legal exemption.”3This is a commitment that is never quite fulfilled, however.  In the pastthirty years, we have witnessed a number of high-profile battles over SupremeCourt nominees, in which traditional political battle lines were drawn up overthe nomination, leaving plenty of room for the inference that the leaders in ourpolitical parties thought there was something political at stake in the decisionsabout whom to place on the highest court in the land.  The high water mark inthe politicization of Supreme Court nominations, if that is the appropriate im-age, was the 1986 nomination of Robert Bork.4  Soon thereafter, ClarenceThomas’s nomination put the politically volatile issues of race and gender poli-Copyright © 2002 by Christopher H. Schroeder      This article is also available at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/65LCPForeword.      * Professor of Law and Public Policy Studies, Duke University.1. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE,  I DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 280 (Vintage Edition 1945, reprinted1990).2. For a selective rendition of the story of this accomplishment, see DON HERZOG, HAPPYSLAVES 110-47 (1989).3. Id. at 132.4. See MARK GITENSTEIN, MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE (1992) (recounting the political battles of theBork nomination, while also showing that issues of legal principle were also central to the fight overthat nomination).FOREWORD_FMT.DOC 07/02/02  10:02 AM2 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 65: No. 3tics at center stage in another confirmation battle.  Subsequent to Justice Tho-mas’s confirmation on a nearly straight party line vote of 52-48,5 the politicalrhetoric surrounding Supreme Court nominations has been somewhat toneddown, but few doubt that the political parties consistently favor candidates withdistinctly different outlooks on hotly disputed social issues, including affirma-tive action, a woman’s right to choose, school vouchers, the separation ofchurch and state, and the scope of federal power.A major reason that political parties—and all people who care about publicpolicy—are intensely interested in who sits on the Supreme Court is, of course,that legal decisions can have great influence on the effectuation or frustration ofpolitical objectives.  Many an important political question does not just become“resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question;” the judicial answer can go along way to resolving the political question, either by taking some previouslyavailable policy option off the table, or by altering the ease with which optionscan be achieved or even by altering the political status quo itself.The importance of law in our society, combined with the commitment tostrive for a legal system that is at least to a degree insulated from politics,clearly makes the influence of politics on law worthy of continual scrutiny.  No-ticing the capacity of law to influence politics and policymaking also suggeststhat scrutinizing the relationship between the two activities from the oppositeperspective also merits some of our time.  On October 11 and 12, 2001, the Pro-gram in Public Law at Duke Law School convened its third annual public lawconference on the topic of the Law of Politics.  Its central idea was to reversethe lens through which politics and law are commonly viewed, and to try to ex-tend our understanding of some of the dimensions of law’s influence on politics.The conference was held in the looming shadow of the events of September11, 2001, but it was also held in the longer, even if less dark, shadow cast by thedecision in Bush v. Gore.6 Nowhere could anyone find a better example of howlaw can directly affect politics.  By effectively halting the recount in Florida, theCourt’s decision cast Florida’s twenty-five electoral votes for George W. Bush,giving him a majority of the electors—and the presidency.  Historians andscholars will long debate whether that result accorded with the “actual” totals ofvotes cast, or with the “actual” intentions of the voters of Florida, but no recon-struction of ballots or voters intentions can ever change the fact that, at the timethe Court rendered its decision, no one knew what the outcome of the recountprocedures would have been, no one knew what Congress would have decidedhad there been a ballot challenge during the special session convened to countthe votes, and all knew that the judicial decision in that case raised the prob-ability of George W. Bush becoming president from something less than onehundred percent to a certainty.5. R.W. Apple, The Thomas Confirmation, NEW YORK TIMES, October 16, 1991, at A1 (41 of 43Republicans voted to confirm; 46 of 57 Democrats voted to reject the nomination).6. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).FOREWORD_FMT.DOC 07/02/02  10:02 AMPage 1:  Summer 2002] FOREWORD 3Sanford Levinson undertakes an analysis of the decision in a paper that wasalso delivered as Duke Law School’s Currie Lecture.7  Convinced that the“opinions offered to justify the decision to halt the Florida recount are griev-ously mistaken as standard-form exercises in legal analysis,”8 Levinson sets outto understand the conditions that produced the result as well as some of its con-sequences.  Using the term “law” to refer to the results of quasi-autonomous le-gal reasoning, Levinson concludes that one lesson from the decision is that“law” is much less important in controlling politics than we might think.  Herethe crucial distinction is between “law” in the sense in which Levinson employsit, and “law” in the sense of the output of legal institutions such as the SupremeCourt.  For Levinson, the lesson that the first kind of law cannot explain Bush v.Gore counts as a reason to try to diminish the influence of law in the lattersense.  With our constitutional culture the institution of the Court has becometoo central to constitutionalism, Levinson claims, and we ought to reclaim forother, non-judicial institutions more important roles in generating constitutionalmeaning.  Others have begun to urge this course of action as well.9Levinson understands Bush v. Gore as something more than justices justvoting to elect their preferred candidate, however.  From an institutional per-spective, Levinson argues, the majority could anticipate that, at worst, the pub-lic would be as divided in its opinion on the outcome as it was at the polls inNovember, when Bush and Gore finished in the functional equivalent of a deadheat.  What is more, the decision would generate many institutional friends: thepresident himself, of course, and the House and Senate Republicans as well,both for the result and for relieving the Congress of having to make the decisivechoices when counting the ballots in January, had the Court not intervened.10“[C]onsiderations of judicial power,” he concludes, “strongly counseled doingexactly what the Court did.”11By focusing some of his attention on the institutional context within whichthe Court acted, Levinson anticipates a topic probed directly by John Ferejohn.Ferejohn first documents the manner in which legal institutions are decidingmore and more legislative-type questions in many governments throughout theworld.  Ferejohn wants to understand better what conditions have produced this“profound power shift,” whereby “courts have been increasingly able and will-ing to limit and regulate the exercise of parliamentary authority by imposingsubstantive limits on the power of legislative institutions . . . have increasingly7. Sanford Levinson, Bush v. Gore and the French Revolution: A Tentative List of Some EarlyLessons, 65 Law & Contemp. Probs. 7 (2002).8. Id. at 104.9. E.g., MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999); MarkTushnet, Non-Judicial Constitutional Review (manuscript on file with the author).10. Levinson, supra note 7, at 121-24.11. Id. at 129.FOREWORD_FMT.DOC 07/02/02  10:02 AM4 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 65: No. 3become places where substantive policy is made [and] . . . have been increas-ingly willing to regulate the conduct of political activity itself.”12Ferejohn argues that institutional factors have an importance that has beenoverlooked in explaining the power shift.  Quite independently of the politicalideologies being pursued, courts tend to increase in their power to constrainlegislatures, shape policy outcomes, and regulate the political process itself tothe degree that the opposing institutions are fragmented and lack the ability tomount a coordinated opposition.  A second reason, related to the first, comesfrom the courts’ willingness to protect a “wide range of values from politicalabuse,” in other words, their ability to protect people’s rights.  Fragmentationcontributes to the inability of the other branches of government to act construc-tively, creating the opening for court initiatives.  The success of those initiativesthen contributes to public receptivity to court leadership on rights, helping tosolidify the power shift.13This last point is largely implicit in Ferejohn’s analysis, which is focused onthe conditions under which the judiciary will be in a position to produce or sup-ply the kinds of “judicialization” of politics which he examines.  Cornell Clay-ton’s article examines where the demand for such judicialization originates.14Clayton does not see the power shift which Ferejohn identifies as necessarilyantithetical to democratic values, because, in his view, the Court is largely giv-ing the American people what they want.  Opinions by the Rehnquist Courtthat are hotly contested in the legal academy are, in Clayton’s view, “squarelywithin the mainstream of contemporary political values and electoral prefer-ences.”15  In area after area, such as federalism, welfare rights, and abortion, theCourt’s results “track the general direction of the elected branches or demo-cratic opinion more generally.”16  Bush v. Gore itself may have been dramatic,but the result can scarcely be thought radical—in an election in which the twocandidates fought to a statistical dead heat, both candidates had some claim tovictory.Given Clayton’s view that much of the Court’s work is within the politicalmainstream, it is less clear that the judicialization process presents a threat todemocracy.  “Whether the shifting of policymaking into courts . . . is democrati-cally desirable or undesirable may have less to do with the decision-makingprocesses of different institutions than with the substantive policy outcomes in-volved.”17  To the extent it is a threat to democracy, both Ferejohn and Clayton12. John Ferejohn, Judicializing Politics, Politicizing Law, 65 Law & Contemp. Probs. 41, 41(2002).13. Id. at 55-60.14. Cornell Clayton, The Supply and Demand Sides of Judicial Policy-Making (Or, Why Be SoPositive About the Judicialization of Politics?), 65 Law & Contemp. Probs. 69 (2002).15. Id. at 83. Clayton’s article focuses on the American system, while Ferejohn draws on examplesfrom other nations as well.16. Id. at 84.17. Id. at 81.FOREWORD_FMT.DOC 07/02/02  10:02 AMPage 1:  Summer 2002] FOREWORD 5make recommendations as to what the political side of our governance struc-tures might do to reclaim some of the policy-making role.My own contribution to this volume sees a different problem law may beposing for politics.18  Deliberative democracy is one of the most discussed con-temporary political theories.  I argue that its central claim can be understood asthe claim that politics needs to become more like law.  Three central elementsof the rule of law are the aspiration that justice be blind to political or status in-fluence, that decisions be based on reasoned argument, and that only facts andarguments relevant to the decision being made be allowed to play a role in thatargument.  In this vein, John Rawls has argued that the Supreme Court ought tobe the exemplar of the kind of decision processes that should be used to reachpolitical decisions, and other deliberativists like Amy Gutmann and DennisThompson share that conception.  That conception presents an aspirationalmodel of legislative deliberation that is markedly different from the pluralistmodels that played a large role in political theory just forty to fifty years ago.The question of whether this is a sound model has relevance well beyond theacademy, because the obvious inability of elected officials to meet a standard ofprincipled deliberation seems to be a contributing factor in public cynicism to-ward politics.Reacting to the presence of special interest influence in the political arena,deliberative theory argues that politics should adopt these law-like characteris-tics.  I nonetheless argue that deliberative theory serves poorly as a theory ofpolitics. While specific recommendations to make specific decision processesmore deliberative are fair, the attempt to efface the distinctively non-lawlike at-tributes of politics entirely cannot withstand scrutiny.  While this means thatpolitics will remain at least partially non-deliberative in its decisional proce-dures, that result is more justified than equating the two modes of decision-making.Arthur Lupia’s contribution both follows and diverges from my own.19  Lu-pia agrees that the suggestions of deliberativists to incorporate more and morelaw-like precepts into politics will not achieve the ultimate ambition of delibera-tive theory, which is to have the resolution of disputes turn on nothing but “theforce of the better argument.”20  There are, however, means to improve the civiccompetence of citizens, to develop “competence-generating mechanisms [that]advantage the force of the better argument.”21  Drawing on economics and thecognitive sciences, Lupia undertakes to show “why, when, and how one personcan persuade another to change his or her ideas.”22  Understanding this thenpermits one to turn to building mechanisms that improve civic competence, by18. Christopher Schroeder, Deliberative Democracy’s Attempt to Turn Politics Into Law, 65 Law &Contemp. Probs. 95 (2002).19. Arthur Lupia, Deliberation Disconnected: What It Takes to Improve Civic Competence, 65 Law& Contemp. Probs. 133 (2002).20. Id. at 136.21. Id. at 145.22. Id.FOREWORD_FMT.DOC 07/02/02  10:02 AM6 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 65: No. 3creating conditions in which the better argument has an improved chance ofwinning three battles: the battle for attention, the battle for memory, and thebattle at the precipice of choice.23  Lupia’s analysis thus strikes out in a construc-tive direction, and one that deliberative theory may wish to endorse—not be-cause it vindicates their description of politics as law, but because it may showthe way to accomplishing what they ultimately wish, improving the quality ofpublic decisions.The essays in this volume scarcely exhaust the ways in which one might ex-plore the influence that law is having on politics.  They open up many avenuesfor further exploration, while making their own contributions to those efforts.23. Id. at 145-46.

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