In 2011, Sudan split into two countries. The north of the country remained the Republic of Sudan (often simply referred to as Sudan) and the south became the new state of South Sudan. Although the region is unstable and divided, it is still a key element in China’s Africa policy..

Bassan, Martina

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2. China’s diplomacy in post-partition Sudan and 
South Sudan
Martina Bassan
Sources:
Liu Hongwu and Xiao Yuhua, “Reflections on the security 
situation in the Horn of Africa”, Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 
– Contemporary International Relations, No. 3, 2012,  
pp. 32-38.14 
Zhang Chun, “How can China judge the internal affairs of 
North and South Sudan?”, Dongfang Zaobao – Oriental 
Morning Post, 2 May 2012.15
Yang Zhenfa, “Opportunities and challenges in 
petroleum cooperation between China and South Sudan”,  
Xiya Feizhou – West Asia and Africa, No. 3, 2012,  
pp. 90-106.16
In 2011, Sudan split into two countries. The north of the 
country remained the Republic of Sudan (often simply 
referred to as Sudan) and the south became the new state of 
South Sudan. Although the region is unstable and divided, 
it is still a key element in China’s Africa policy. Yang 
Zhenfa says that because of its large-scale cooperation with 
Beijing on oil, Sudan offers a model for Chinese companies 
operating in Africa, and represents a potential strategic base 
for expansion into other parts of the continent. China sees 
internal instability in the Sudan region, whether economic, 
political, or social, as a potential threat to its interests. So, 
in response to the Darfur conflict, the Chinese government 
appointed a Special Representative on African Affairs in 
May 2007. The first envoy, Liu Guijin, was replaced by 
Zhong Jianhua in 2012. 
South Sudan’s declaration of independence on 9 July 2011 
opened up new opportunities for Chinese engagement in 
the region, but so far it has not advanced China’s position 
in either the new or the old Sudan. The authors analyse the 
new challenges facing China’s diplomacy since the partition 
of Sudan. China has to deal with a political, economic, and 
security landscape that is becoming more and more unstable 
because of South Sudan’s domestic problems, the growth of 
tensions between the two Sudans, and the attitude to the 
two Sudans of other foreign powers, particularly the United 
States.
South Sudan’s risky dependence on oil
Yang Zhenfa and Zhang Chun agree that one of South 
14   Liu Hongwu is director of the Institute for African Studies at Zhejiang 
Normal University. His research is particularly focused on China-
Africa relations and questions of development in Africa. Xiao Yuhua 
is a researcher at the Institute for African Studies at Zhejiang Normal 
University.
15   Zhang Chun is deputy director of the Centre for West Asian and 
African Studies at the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS).
16   Yang Zhenfa is a researcher at the School of International Studies at 
Yunnan University.
Sudan’s main problems is its over-dependence on oil. 
South Sudan inherited more than 80 percent of Sudan’s 
pre-partition oil reserves. Its economy is almost exclusively 
based on oil income: in 2011, 98 percent of taxation revenue 
came from the petroleum sector. But although it is rich in 
resources, South Sudan does not have the infrastructure 
needed to transport and export oil, such as pipelines, ports, 
and so on. All of its exports are controlled by the Republic 
of Sudan, which owns the two main pipelines that enable 
South Sudan’s crude oil to be carried to the Red Sea. This 
extremely unstable situation led to an interruption of trade 
between the two countries that lasted for more than a year, 
from January 2012 to March 2013, because of a dispute over 
oil transit fees.17 This “suicidal act” (自杀式行动, zishashi 
xingdong), in Zhang Chun’s phrase, is thought to have cost 
both sides several billion dollars.18 
Yang points out that the profit margin on international oil 
sales depends on external variables. This means that as long 
as South Sudan’s public revenues are dependent on exports, 
the country and its oil industry’s development will remain 
compromised or under threat. Yang says that the prospects 
for oil exploration in South Sudan are limited. According 
to World Bank statistics, South Sudanese oil production 
reached its peak in 2012, at roughly 527,000 barrels a 
day. If no other wells are discovered, oil production could 
start to decline drastically as early as 2015. Only the 
southern parts of the country have not been targeted for 
oil exploration, and their exploration potential is uncertain. 
And a solution needs to be found to border disputes and the 
distribution of resources in the disputed areas, particularly 
in the Abyei area.19 If Sudan and South Sudan cannot reach 
an agreement on the disposition and management of the 
border territories, regional stability will remain under 
threat, as will China’s investments and security of supply.
Western intervention and “proxy war” in Sudan
Liu Hongwu and Xiao Yuhua say that the West has taken 
an ambiguous position on the region’s affairs. After South 
Sudan’s independence, the Republic of Sudan lost one 
quarter of its land, one fifth of its population, and the 
majority of its oil resources. In spite of that blow, Liu and 
Xiao say that the West has not yet lifted sanctions on Sudan, 
and has taken South Sudan’s side in the border conflict. The 
writers think that sanctions have worsened the Republic 
of Sudan’s security problems and have strengthened the 
Sudanese government’s authoritarian tendencies.
17   Because of an on-going dispute on transit fees, Khartoum seized 
shipments of South Sudanese oil in December 2011. As a result, Juba 
decided to suspend its oil production and announced its intention to look 
for new export routes. The transportation of oil resumed more than a year 
later and exports resumed. 
18   See AFP, “Soudan: le pétrole du sud traverse le pays” [Sudan: oil 
from the South crosses the country], Le Figaro – Flash Eco, 14 April 
2013, available at http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-eco/2013/04/14/97002-
20130414FILWWW00088-le-petrole-sud-soudanais-par-le-soudan.php. 
19   This oil-rich region is coveted by both states and is currently considered 
part of both Sudan and South Sudan. 
7Liu and Xiao say that the Western powers’ involvement 
must be seen in the context of the “proxy war” strategy 
(代理人战争, dailiren zhanzheng) of the states of the Horn 
of Africa, which are relying on Western intervention to 
conduct indirect wars against their troublesome neighbours. 
Liu and Xiao say that South Sudan is seeking to “create 
opportunities for Western intervention” (在给西方的干涉
制造机会, zai gei xifang de ganshe zhizao jihui) so as to 
put pressure on the government of the Republic of Sudan. 
South Sudan’s armed forces regularly ask the international 
community to prevent humanitarian crisis by backing the 
army’s actions in the region. Liu and Xiao say that this was 
the strategy used at the time of the deadly bombardment of 
the border zones by Sudanese forces.20 This conflict brought 
the situation in Sudan to the attention of the international 
community and set off a heated debate on the need for 
humanitarian intervention.
The influence of the US
Liu and Xiao contend that the US represents the “key 
external factor” (关键外部因素, guanjian waibu yinsu) in 
the region. Zhang Chun says the partition of Sudan, together 
with the ensuing conflicts and tensions, have their roots in 
the peace agreement that ended the Second Sudanese Civil 
War in 2005. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) 
is a set of protocols signed by the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement, representing South Sudan, and the government 
of Sudan. Zhang says the agreement was signed under 
pressure from the US. The CPA is often criticised for its lack 
of clarity on measures that would ensure a peaceful partition. 
But Liu and Xiao go further, criticising the outcome of the 
agreement itself. They say that the original objective of the 
talks was to speed up the unification of Sudan, not bring 
about its partition.
Yang says that the US was responsible for the change in 
objective. The US, he says, is the “main player behind the 
scenes in the independence of South Sudan” (美国是南苏
丹独立的主要幕后推手之一, meiguo shi nan sudan duli de 
zhuyao muhou tuishou zhiyi). The US intervention in the 
partition of Sudan signals a US return to the Sudan region 
where, according to Liu and Xiao, the US has interests 
connected to its anti-terrorist strategy. The US wants to 
strengthen cooperation with regional allies in the Horn of 
Africa and increase military training and logistical support 
for friendly regimes. It wants “to align its development aid 
in Africa with its diplomatic and strategic interests” (其目
的，就是将美对非的发展援助与美外交利益和国家安全整合
在一起, qimudi, jiushi jiang meiduifei de fazhan yuanzhu 
yu meiwaijiao liyi he guojia anquan zhenghe zaiyiqi). To 
this end, South Sudan is today a major recipient of US 
development assistance. In 2010, the US government 
provided $300 million in aid to South Sudan. In 2011, the 
US Department of Commerce adjusted its export policy on 
20   The author does not give a precise date for the bombardements, but 
he probably refers to either (or both) the bombardment of Jau bombing in 
February 2012 or that of Bentiu in April 2012.
South Sudan, with the aim of encouraging US companies to 
invest in the country.
Even so, the US commitment to South Sudan remains 
limited. Washington favours a “wait and see approach” 
(观望状态, guanwang zhuantai), which seems to contradict 
the US’s stated good intentions and promises. Yang believes 
the US is worried that the Republic of Sudan might benefit 
from American investment in South Sudan’s oil, through 
profits that would accrue from cooperation between the two 
countries. That would explain why US diplomacy towards 
South Sudan “remains complicated and contradictory” 
(外交心态上是复杂和矛盾的, waijiao xintai shang shi 
fuza he maodun de). Yang thinks the US is continually 
“procrastinating” (犹豫不决, youyubujue) about its return to 
Africa. Zhang sees a gap between China’s “genuine support” 
(真诚支持, zhencheng zhichi) for an African solution to the 
tensions and the “empty promises” (空头支票, kongtou 
zhipiao) of the US. Washington talks about its willingness 
to support Africa, 
but in fact it wants 
to duck out of its 
obligations. The 
Western powers 
calls on China 
to assume its 
responsibi l i t ies , 
but the US is the one most to blame for Sudan’s chronic 
instability. 
China’s role in resolving the dispute
China is now the main investor in and purchaser of oil from 
South Sudan. For this reason, China was asked to play the 
role of mediator after tensions rose between the Republic 
of Sudan and South Sudan. But Beijing is wary of taking on 
this role. Zhang Chun says that China has to think about 
its interests in this part of the world. Any intervention by 
Beijing in the relationship between the Republic of Sudan 
and South Sudan could affect China’s image in the region 
as well as contradicting its fundamental principles of being 
responsible in taking action abroad and of non-interference 
in the internal affairs of third states. So, Zhang explains, 
China cannot impose itself as the arbitrator of disputes 
between the two Sudans. Unlike the West, China has never 
set conditionalities on its aid allocation process in Sudan, 
and China’s principle of non-interference remains the 
cornerstone of oil cooperation between China and the two 
Sudans.
In the wider context of the continent as a whole, Liu and 
Xiao say that some African countries hope that China will 
take a more active part in building peace and security 
in Africa. However, the writers do not believe this will 
happen. Beijing’s logistical capacity is limited, since China 
cannot easily deploy troops so far from home. And the 
major powers’ distrust of China significantly limits China’s 
potential space for action. 
China’s principle of non-
interference remains the 
cornerstone of oil cooperation 
between China and the two 
Sudans.
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Even so, Beijing’s political will to resolve the dispute 
between the two countries through consultation and 
dialogue has proved itself effective on several occasions.21 
Liu and Xiao say China must continue to respect the 
principle of non-interference, even as it becomes more 
actively and “constructively” (建设性, jianshexing) involved. 
Zhang Chun agrees, saying that because of China’s limited 
scope for unilateral action, it must support a multilateral 
approach and help provide more flexibility for the United 
Nations and the African Union. The UN is often accused of 
being “paralysed” (瘫痪, tanhuan) and the African Union 
of being “slow” (迟钝, chidun). But China still needs both 
these players and must continue to support them, not only 
in the “microcosm of Africa” that is South Sudan (非洲的
缩影, feizhou de suoying), but also across the rest of the 
continent. 
21   Between 10 and 13 March 2012, a few months after the interruption 
of oil trade between South Sudan and the Republic of Sudan, Ambassador 
Zhong Jianhua, the Chinese government’s special envoy to Africa, 
made two separate visits to the Sudan and South Sudan, with the aim of 
encouraging both parties to solve their differences through dialogue. On 
13 March 2012, the representatives of both countries met in Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia, where they signed a preliminary agreement, which made special 
reference to the demarcation of the border. 


China’s diplomacy in post-partition Sudan and South Sudan

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China’s diplomacy in post-partition Sudan and South Sudan

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