4 pp.As U.S. government support to agriculture declines, understanding the economic impacts of agricultural trade and how markets and competition are affected will take on added importance for farmers, agribusinesses, policy makers, and agricultural leaders. This publication discusses why there is international trade, the fallacy of lost jobs and the perception of America's lost industrial competitiveness

Fairchild, Gary F.

Harris, Harold M.

McCorkle, Dean

Rosson, C. Parr

Taylor, Timothy G.

Texas A&M University

Agricultural Trade and
the U.S. Economy
Timothy G. Taylor, Gary F. Fairchild, Harold M. Harris, Jr. and Parr Rosson* 
Introduction
As U.S. government support to agriculture declines, understanding the econom-
ic impacts of agricultural trade and how markets and competition are affected
will take on added importance for farmers, agribusinesses, policy makers, and
agricultural leaders. With a 1996 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of $7.6 trillion
and a per capita GDP of $28,700, the United States is the world’s largest econo-
my and a major market for both domestic and foreign producers of goods and ser-
vices. In 1996, U.S. exports totaled $582 billion (7.7% of GDP) while U.S. imports
totaled $790 billion (10.4% of GDP). International trade accounted for 18 percent
of U.S. GDP in 1996 compared to 12 percent in 1994. In fact, the United States is
now more dependent on international trade than at any time since 1880-1914
when 16 percent of GDP was generated by merchandise trade. Major export com-
modities include: capital goods, automobiles, industrial supplies and raw materi-
als, consumer goods, and agricultural products.
While agriculture accounts for 2% of U.S. GDP and 2.8% of the labor force, it
represents 10.4% of total exports ($60.4 billion), 4.3% of total imports ($33.6 bil-
lion), and generated a $26.8 billion trade surplus in 1996.
Agricultural trade contributes employment, income, and economic activity to
the U.S. economy. Estimated trade-impact multipliers for 1996 indicate that to
produce one million dollars of agricultural exports required 15 workers. Each dol-
lar of agricultural export sales generated an additional $1.32 of economic activity.
Agricultural exports required the employment of 859,000 workers and generated
$140 billion in business activity (Edmondson).
Imports also generate jobs and create economic activity. Leading imports
include: crude oil and refined petroleum products, machinery, automobiles, con-
sumer goods, industrial raw materials, and food and beverages.
Despite the contributions of international trade, some still believe that the U.S.
should not participate in an open international trading system. Calls for
increased protection and isolationism are heard in some quarters.
Reverting to a closed economy is not economically rational in
today’s global marketplace. The notion of “made in America” has
become a myth, with “assembled in” becoming a more appro-
priate term (Reich).  
Trade policies are a mix of economics and politics, and
much of the public information about the potential impacts of
these policies comes through news media, which tends to
focus on negative issues. The complexities surrounding the eco-
nomic impacts of trade are often improperly perceived, or
viewed from a narrow perspective.
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*Professor, University of Florida; Professor, University of Florida; Extension Agricultural Economist, Clemson
University; Professor and Extension Economist, Texas Agricultural Extension Service, The Texas A&M
University System.
Why There is International Trade
By its very name, international trade is per-
ceived as something different than merely doing
business with firms in other countries.
Discussions in the media about trade policies, or
attempts to settle trade disputes, cause interna-
tional trade to be perceived as us versus them,
where one country gains only if another country
loses. In fact, international trade is not funda-
mentally different from the inter-regional trade
among states in the U.S. Perceptions about inter-
national trade persist, partly because the losses
from trade are concentrated and often highly
publicized, while the gains from trade are less
visible and are spread broadly, going virtually
unnoticed. Such perceptions also persist because
economists have not done a particularly good
job of explaining why international trade exists,
and what benefits it conveys.
One way to understand why trade occurs and
what benefits it brings, is that nations do not
engage in international trade, but rather the
individual consumers and businesses within
nations do. When an individual in the U.S. buys
a Japanese-manufactured stereo component, he
or she has engaged in international trade. This
participation occurs indirectly through the
power of consumer preferences and the compet-
itive pressure faced by the retailers to satisfy
them. When a manufacturing firm buys some of
its inputs from foreign sources, it also engages in
international trade.
Over two hundred years ago, Adam Smith in
An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the
Wealth of Nations, argued that competition in
combination with individuals freely pursuing
their own self interest, or profit motive for busi-
nesses and the pursuit of satisfaction by con-
sumers, would result in the efficient use of eco-
nomic resources, allowing society as a whole to
achieve its highest standard of living “as if guid-
ed by an Invisible Hand.” Unfettered competi-
tion has its drawbacks. However, the power of
competition and individual choice are the core
of American economic philosophy and the pri-
mary forces that have enabled U.S. citizens to
achieve a high standard of living. Competition
and individual choice are also why there is
international trade.
With rare exceptions, consumers are faced
with incomes that constrain the amount of mate-
rial goods and services they can buy. To satisfy
their individual needs, consumers attempt to
obtain the products they want most, at the best
price. When purchasing a television, attention is
primarily given to product quality,  reliability,
and price, not where the product was made.
When purchasing clothing, characteristics, such
as fit, style, perhaps the designer’s or manufac-
turer’s name, and of course price, are much
more important than where the product was
made. And if consumers want cantaloupe in
December, they are more interested in its taste
and price than in where it was grown.
Evidence supporting the minor role that coun-
try of origin plays in purchase decisions
abounds. While brand names and prices are
prominently displayed in any retail store, one is
not likely to see information on country of ori-
gin prominently displayed. The reason for this is
simply that retailers provide consumers with the
information they want in making purchase deci-
sions, and this information does not generally
include country of origin. Yet when decisions
based on such information are made, and the
goods or services purchased are foreign-made,
consumers have participated in international
trade.
Even if consumers wished to buy American, it
would be difficult to accomplish.
“Of the $10,000 paid to GM, about $3,000
goes to South Korea for routine labor and
assembly operations, $1,850 to Japan for
advanced components, $700 to Germany for
styling and design engineering, $400 to
Taiwan, Singapore and Japan for small compo-
nents, $250 to Britain for advertising and mar-
keting, and about $50 to Ireland and
Barbados for data processing. The rest—less
that $4,000—goes to strategists in Detroit,
lawyers and bankers in New York, lobbyists in
Washington, insurance and health care work-
ers all over the country and to General Motors
stockholders all over the world.” (Reich).
This  example also explains why there is trade
from the perspective of producers. Faced with
the realities of the market place, and the con-
sumer’s demand for quality at the lowest price,
the competitive pressures of rival firms force
businesses to pursue cost-efficient business
strategies. While such strategies entail many
facets of production engineering and manage-
ment organization, they also entail obtaining fac-
tors of production and other business- and mar-
keting-related services at the lowest possible
cost. When assembly by, or  materials from, for-
eign firms or subsidiaries are cheaper, business-
es have no choice but to pursue these lower-cost
opportunities. Competition from rival firms,
domestic and foreign, make such decisions nec-
essary for businesses if they are to meet market
demands and survive.
The Fallacy of  Lost  Jobs
Few issues have commanded more media
attention, or created more debate, than the
impact of  international trade on American jobs.
At the heart of this debate is the perception that
liberalizing trade with developing countries,
such as Mexico, Central America, or Asia leads
to the loss of American jobs, particularly  in
labor-intensive industries, such as clothing,
manufacturing assembly, and labor-intensive
agricultural products such as fresh fruits and
vegetables. To a certain extent, the perceptions
that jobs in certain industries are likely to be
eliminated because of trade liberalization are
true. However, these perceptions fail to distin-
guish between the general level of employment
in the economy  and employment in specific
industries. Growing out of these incomplete per-
ceptions is the “lost jobs fallacy” of international
trade.
Protective trade measures, such as tariffs,
quotas, or voluntary export restraints (VERs),
designed to protect domestic jobs, are not with-
out cost. Kreinin estimated that the VER placed
on Japanese automobiles in 1982 saved approxi-
mately 22,000 jobs in the U.S. with an average
salary of $30,000. However, the cost to U.S. tax-
payers for each job saved was estimated to be
$180,000. Thus, there was an actual social cost
(net or deadweight loss) to the U.S. economy of
roughly $150,000 per job saved.
Two important points need to be made. First,
because there is an additional transfer of
resources from the rest of the U.S. economy to a
particular industry in order to save specific jobs,
there will be fewer jobs created in other sectors,
and perhaps even some jobs eliminated. Second,
from a government policy perspective, even if
the automobile industry was not protected, up
to $150,000 per worker could be spent on job
search and retraining before reaching the cost 
of job protection. If such retraining and reloca-
tion could be done for less, a net economic gain
would be realized relative to the cost of protec-
tion.
Protection also implies less trade, therefore
less exports and fewer jobs in the trade sector.
Trade liberalization leads to increases in imports
in certain sectors of the economy and increases
in exports in other areas. Again, these increases
in exports create jobs.
U.S. employment in export-related activities is
significant. There were 7.2 million export-relat-
ed jobs in the U.S., accounting for about 7% of
the total work force in 1990. Within the manu-
facturing sector, 17% of total employment is
related to export activities and these jobs earn
approximately 17% more than similar non-
export-related activities (Aguilar). Comparable
figures are available for the agricultural sector.
There are two key elements of the “lost jobs
fallacy.” The first suggests that liberalized trade
leads to a loss of domestic jobs. In fact, the
exact opposite can be true. Trade liberalization
can lead to increased domestic employment. It
is important to distinguish between  the loss of
specific jobs  and the general level of employ-
ment. Trade liberalization can result in the elim-
ination of jobs in specific sectors of the econo-
my, as those who are potentially affected will
quickly point out. In the short run, it is possible
that job losses in labor-intensive sectors may not
be offset by gains in capital-intensive sectors,
thus creating increased structural unemploy-
ment. However, those who lose their jobs will
find employment elsewhere; if they so desire,
and if they are willing to re-train.  
The second element is the belief that jobs can
be saved through government protection.
Governments can save specific jobs, however,
the cost of doing so can be substantial. As the
previous example demonstrated, the cost of a
job saved may be many times the income it
earns. This net  loss to the economy may pre-
vent the creation of employment and possibly
lead to the elimination of other jobs.   
The Perception of America’s Lost
Industrial Competitiveness
Recent concerns over America’s ability to
compete in the international market place and
fears of a decline in the country’s industrial
base have surfaced. Indeed, some leaders have
warned of a future of hamburger flipping and
sweeping floors in foreign-owned manufacturing
plants, and President Clinton’s administration
has advocated the need for an industrial policy
to ensure key U.S. industries remain competi-
tive.
As a trip to any shopping mall demonstrates,
a vast number of consumer products carry for-
eign names, such as Mitsubishi, Sony, or
Panasonic, or microscopic print notes that it was
made in some Asian or Latin American country.
And even when a product carries an American
brand name, such as RCA or Levi’s, it is still
often manufactured in a foreign county. So the
apparent loss of America’s industrial base takes
on considerable credibility. However, as is the
case with the fallacy of lost jobs, the issue of
America’s lost industrial base is a matter of per-
ception rather than reality.
Recent data indicate that the perception of
America losing its industrial base is incorrect
(Lindsey). During the 1960s, the U.S. was con-
sidered by most to be the industrial giant of the
world. At this time, manufacturing accounted
for about 22% of real gross domestic product
(GDP), with the majority of this output in
defense and consumer related products. Capital
goods—items used to produce other goods and
services, such as airplanes and industrial
machinery—accounted for roughly 28% of GDP.
Moreover, only 20% of capital goods were
exported, amounting to 1.4% of GDP. Currently,
and amid concerns about America losing its
industrial base, manufacturing output has
increased to 23% of real GDP. More importantly,
capital goods now account for 38% of manufac-
turing output, and the proportion of capital
goods exported has increased to 45%, amounting
to about 4% of GDP.   
America is strengthening its industrial base as
a result of liberalized trade. What has changed is
the composition of the manufacturing sector’s
output. The manufacturing share of U.S. con-
sumer goods has declined, being supplanted by
capital goods. Along with this change in manu-
facturing output, the industrial base of the U.S.
has become less visible. In terms of comparative
advantage, the U.S. appears to have an advan-
tage in the production of intermediate goods and
capital goods relative to some labor-intensive
consumer goods.
Conclusions
The U.S. is fortunate in that its climate, natur-
al resource endowments, and technological
knowledge potentially enable it to produce all of
the products needed without trade. However,
without trade, it is doubtful the U.S. would
enjoy the standard of living it does. From a
regional perspective, maple trees could be
grown to produce maple syrup in Florida, and
orange trees could be grown in Vermont to pro-
duce orange juice. Floridians would pay a lot
more for maple syrup and the citizens of
Vermont for orange juice. However, the fact is
that Florida is better at producing orange juice
and Vermont is better at producing maple syrup,
and by doing what each does best, the  produc-
er, the consumer, and the economy benefits
from more efficient utilization of resources and
lower prices.
International trade enables countries to spe-
cialize in what they do best and acquire the
things they have difficulty in producing. By so
doing, resources are more efficiently used on a
global, as well as a domestic basis, and these
efficiencies are passed on in the form of lower
prices and economic growth.
References
Aguilar, L.M. “International Ties.” Chicago Fed
Letter. The Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
October, 1993.
Kreinin, M.E. International Economics: A Policy
Approach, 6th Edition. New York: Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich, Publishers, 1991.
Lindsey, R. “America’s Growing Economic
Lead.” The Wall Street Journal, February 7,
1992.
Reich, R. “The Myth of Made in America.” The
Wall Street Journal, July 5, 1992.
Schluter, G. and W. Edmondson. “U.S.
Agricultural Trade Boosts Overall Economy.
United States Department of Agriculture,
Foreign Agricultural Trade of the United
States, Oct/Nov/Dec, 1996. 
Smith, A. An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes
of the Wealth of Nations, New York: Modern
Library, Inc. Originally published in 1776.
U.S. Department of Agriculture. Foreign
Agricultural Trade of the United States,
Economic Research Service.
U.S. Department of Commerce. U.S. Foreign
Trade Update, Office of Trade and Economic
Analysis.  November 18, 1994.
Produced by AgriLife Communications & Marketing, The Texas A&M System
Extension publications can be found on the Web at: http://AgriLifebookstore.org
Educational programs of the Texas AgriLife Extension Service are open to all citizens without regard to race, color, sex, disability, religion, age or national origin. 
Issued in furtherance of Cooperative Extension Work in Agriculture and Home Economics, Acts of Congress of May 8, 1914, as amended, and June 30, 1914, in
cooperation with the United States Department of Agriculture. Texas AgriLife Extension Service, The Texas A&M System. 
1.5M, Reprint ECO
This publication was contributed by the Southern Extension International Trade Task Force.


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