The thesis examines the development of monetary and banking policies during the
apogee of the Brazilian Empire (1850-70). It adopts a political economy approach to
Brazilian monetary history, with the objective of contributing to the debate
surrounding the relative autonomy of the imperial State in relation to the planter class
(fazendeiros). The research has established two major points of historical fact: the
peculiar nature of the gold standard regime in force in Brazil during part of the period,
and the role of the Bank of Brazil therein. The analysis has also extended current
knowledge of two major contemporary events in the financial sphere - the 1860
banking and corporate law and the Souto crisis of 1864. The former is shown to have
been less draconian than claimed by historians while attention is drawn to the hitherto
neglected role of private banks in fuelling the 1864 crisis. The thesis argues that
between 1850 and 1870 the imperial government followed an approach to monetary
and banking policy that could be termed “pragmatically conservative”. This tended to
involve the “hard money” combination of monetary restraint and adherence to the
gold standard, although on crucial occasions - such as during the Souto crisis, and the
Paraguayan War - monetary prudence gave way to expansionist policies, as reasons of
State took precedence over financial rectitude. The research reveals how, in the main,
“hard money” policies were pursued in the period, to the detriment of demands from
the planter class for monetary expansion. This evidence suggests that, at least in the
sphere of money and banking, the imperial State displayed a relative autonomy vis-à-vis
the economic elite