Theories of Distributive Justice: Towards a Global Egalitarian Conception. The Basic Structure as Boundary? Justification: Public, Global and Egalitarian. The Feasibility Challenge to Global Egalitarianism.Theories of Distributive Justice: Towards a Global Egalitarian Conception. The Basic Structure as Boundary? Justification: Public, Global and Egalitarian. The Feasibility Challenge to Global Egalitarianism.LUISS PhD Thesi

Kollar, Eszter

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Global justice between justification and feasibility.

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Theories of Distributive Justice: Towards a Global Egalitarian Conception. The Basic Structure as Boundary? Justification: Public, Global and Egalitarian. The Feasibility Challenge to Global Egalitarianism

LIBERA UNIVERSITÁ INTERNAZIONALE DI STUDI SOCIALI GUIDO CARLIPh.D. Program in Political TheoryCycle XXGLOBAL JUSTICEBETWEENJUSTIFICATION AND FEASIBILITYPh.D Thesisby Eszter KollárThesis AdvisorProf. Sebastiano MaffettoneRome, October 2008SUMMARY_____________________________________________________The aim of this dissertation is to address the problem of global poverty and inequality  through  a  philosophical  defense  of  what  I  take  to  be  the  most appealing  normative  view  with  respect  to  these  problems,  namely  global egalitarianism.  In  the  first  chapter  I  outline  the  theoretical  essentials  of  a theory of distributive justice and defend an institutional or practice dependent approach to global egalitarianism. According  to  a  practice-dependent  methodological  commitment, justice is a virtue of social institutions and reasoning about justice starts from existing practices. Principles of justice are thought to be yielded by a suitably characterized  method  of  reasoning,  the  so  called  original  position.  The characterization of the original position, however, importantly depends on the nature and purpose of the social practice in question. First of all, one needs to identify a social  practice and account for its relevant characteristics.  Then, based on these characteristics  that  constitute  the  grounding elements for  a constructivist  argument,  reasoning  about  the  requirements  of  justice  can begin.  It  proceeds by setting up a hypothetical choice situation among the relevant agents whose choice is constrained by the nature and purpose of the 2existing practice. If reasoning from justice starts from existing practices then requirements of justice vary according to the social practice in consideration.Such an institutional  or  practice dependent  approach to  distributive justice  relies  on  the  substantive  claim,  according  to  which  our  present international  order  and  the  institutions  comprising  it  significantly  shape people’s life prospects and have important distributive effects in determining terms of ownership, production and transfer, access to global public goods and life  opportunities  across  the globe.  Insofar  as  these distributive effects  are morally  significant  in  shaping  people’s  life  prospects,  their  normative underpinnings must be made explicit and ought to be subjected to standards of justice,  which  are  moral  constraints  on  the  permissible  inequalities  in  the effects of those global institutions.Among the different essentials of a theory of distributive justice this thesis focuses on the question concerning the appropriate scope or boundary of distributive justice. It aims at convincing the reader that not only domestic institutions of the nation state but also global institutions are relevant domains of distributive justice, albeit the difference that might occur concerning the requirements of justice. While the focus of the thesis is on the scope of justice, other theoretical essentials, such as the grounds of justice and the subject of justice are scrutinized. 3The  idea  that  the  scope  of  distributive  justice  is  global  was  first developed three decades ago. Scholars such as Thomas Scanlon, Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge have argued that the relevant kind of social cooperation that triggers the demand of distributive justice is present in the global context due to the level of interconnectedness brought about by globalization.  The distributive effects of global institutions and practices should, therefore, be morally constrained by a global difference principle worked out through a global original position among free and equal moral persons. This view has become known as the global basic structure view. The global basic structure view has been strongly contested either by charging the thesis of insufficient empirical  grounding of a strong analogy between the domestic and the global institutional contexts, or charged with a flawed  understanding  concerning  the  normatively  relevant  features  of  the basic  structure.  Critics  point  out  that  the  justice-triggering  feature  of  the domestic basic structure is either absent, too weak or irrelevant in the global institutional  context.  Recent  theories  of  global  justice  have  become much more sophisticated, both with respect to the empirical underpinnings through lessons from the practices of international law, global institutions and global social  movements;  and  in  their  normative  underpinnings  concerning  the reasons that trigger distributive egalitarian concern.  4The  idea  of  global  justice,  that  is  to  be  defended  throughout  this dissertation, is strongly inspired by John Rawls’ domestic political liberalism, and at the same time aims at challenging his  international thesis. Firstly, it follows  the  Rawlsian  institutional  or  practice  dependent  view  of  justice, according to which principles of justice are to regulate social and political institutions and their distributive effects on people’s life chances. Secondly, it is an egalitarian view, in the broadest sense of the term, according to which inequalities in life chances are to be morally assessed through standards of justice. That is to say, what matters morally is not merely how people fare in absolute terms, but how they fare vis-à-vis each other. Thirdly, it endorses the idea of Rawlsian political justification, according to which, under conditions of pluralism, standards of justice are to be justified on public grounds, starting from commonly shared political ideals. The departure from Rawls consists in a  challenge to  the  domestic scope thesis,  according to which principles  of distributive  justice  apply  to  the  basic  structure  of  a  closed,  self-contained society. Finally, it aims to complement the Rawlsian idea of justification with a moral defense of why public justification is the appropriate justification to offer to others under conditions of pluralism. The idea of global justice supported in this dissertation,  then, is an institutional egalitarian conception of global justice that is justified on public grounds. The conception rests on four fundamental claims: 5i.) A practice  dependent  methodological  commitment  according to which global institutions and practices are the primary subjects of justice; ii.) A  principle  of  global  justice  is  an  egalitarian  principle,  i.e. inequalities  in  the  distributive  effects  of  those  institutions  on people’s life prospects require moral justification; iii.) Justification of a global egalitarian principle of justice must rest on global public grounds; iv.) All persons are equally valid sources of moral claims upon global institutional arrangements.Global  egalitarianism  has  been  subject  to  various  philosophical challenges.  Prominent amongst  them is  the claim that  duties of egalitarian distributive  justice  are  confined  to  members  of  a  nation-state  due  to  the normative  features  underlying the  scheme of  domestic  social  and political institutions,  the  so  called,  basic  structure.  In  the  second  chapter  of  this dissertation I address three different variants of this critique.  The  bounded contribution view assigns special importance to the domestic basic structure on  grounds that  its  members  mutually  contribute  to  the  production of  the relevant social goods. As a result they owe each other fair return on the goods that  they  jointly  produce.  The  bounded  constituency  view maintains  that 6members of a political association owe each other egalitarian concern based on the idea that its members are participants in a legal and political system of self-legislation, and they are co-authors of coercive laws through which they mutually determine each others’ fates. On the bounded cooperation view the institutions of the basic structure are necessary for the development of our moral powers and social capacities that make social cooperation possible. I argue that none of these critiques warrant restricting the scope of justice to the domestic  context.  While  these  underlying  normative  features  might  be relevant reasons that ground distributive duties, they either do not constitute necessary conditions for the application of egalitarian duties, or the morally relevant feature in question can be shown to be equally compelling at  the global level.In the third chapter I  make an inquiry into the appropriate form of justification a  global  egalitarian conception requires.  Global  egalitarianism has been most notably justified through an extension of Rawls’ A Theory of Justice,  by grounding global  principles  of  justice in  comprehensive  liberal commitments.  I  challenge  this  view,  by  demonstrating  that  global egalitarianism,  so  construed,  would  fail  to  appeal  to  a  global  justificatory public, characterized by doctrinal and religious disagreements, and argue that a global egalitarian conception of justice must rest on global public grounds. Drawing on Rawls’ political conception of justice in his Political Liberalism, I 7explain  why the  appropriate  way to  justify  principles  under  conditions  of moral and religious pluralism is reasoning from political ideals embedded in the public culture of a society. Then, I proceed by demonstrating that public justification ought to be taken seriously not only in the domestic case, but even more so in the global case, due to a rich diversity of moral and religious doctrines characterizing the international public sphere. I  then  argue  that  global  egalitarianism must  rest  on  an  egalitarian theory of justification, which I call  justificatory egalitarianism. Justificatory egalitarianism is  a  form of  justification that  treats  people as equally  valid sources  of  moral  claims,  and  does  so  by  taking  people  seriously  in  their plurality  of  moral  views and religious  beliefs.  Under  conditions  of  global pluralism, this doctrine requires us to justify the norms underlying a social scheme to others on global public grounds, to reason from broadly shareable global public ideals, thereby offering justification the relevant others cannot reasonably reject.  While this requirement of global public justification is a plausible  conclusion for  normative theorizing,  whether  those  global  public ideals are robust enough to support a global egalitarian conception is a case that still needs to be made. I will limit myself to theoretical speculations about the problem, although a strong scientific proof would require an extensive case study on global public culture, is relevant sources and actors. 8In chapter four I address the, so called, feasibility challenge to global egalitarianism,  according  to  which  the  normative  ideal  it  promotes  or  the institutional scheme it envisions is infeasible. The feasibility challenge for a theory  of  justice  is  the  following.  Certain aspects  of  our  social  world  are relevant in order normative theory to be action guiding, while other aspects of our  social  world  are  exactly  what  we  need  to  be  critically  assessing. Therefore,  a  theorist  needs  to  discern  which  facts  to  account  for  as unchangeable,  hence  as  relevant  feasibility  constraints  on  the  theory,  and which ones to consider as object of critical  assessment and social  change. Some feasibility constraints are related to facts about human psychology and motivation while others are related to facts about our social world, institutions and resources. Given the scope and focus of my dissertation, I address one type of feasibility constraint, the fact of pluralism about moral views, which is likely to constrain the kinds of principles that can be accepted by others and hence the kind of justification that can be given in their support. Feasibility critics  challenge  global  egalitarianism  at  the  level  of  application  and institutional design.  Taking pluralism as a feasibility constraint,  however,  I aim to show that part of the feasibility charges can be already addressed at the level of justification. I argue that public justification is the kind of justification that is able to account for pluralism as a feasibility constraint, and brings a normative political ideal closer to a feasible ideal.9The originality of the thesis advanced here consists in the idea that global egalitarian principles must be justified on global public grounds. While maintaining  that  the  scope  of  justice  must  be  global,  it  challenges  those theories  of  global  justice  that  justify  their  conception  on  cosmopolitan  or comprehensive liberal grounds. Global egalitarian conceptions of justice, in particular  the  ones  that  promote  a  global  difference  principle  have  been developed already in the very first theories of global justice. I believe that these views are on the right track in the normative requirements they promote, however, they are insensitive to the problem of justification under conditions of pluralism. In my view they fail to respond to the fact of global pluralism, a relevant fact which limits the kind of justification that can be offered to global agents of justice. In order for global egalitarianism to be properly egalitarian in  its  justification,  it  must  treat  people  as  equals  by  accounting  for  their different  moral  views  and  systems  of  beliefs.  In  other  words,  global egalitarianism must take global pluralism seriously in the kind of justificatory argument it advances.Working out  the concrete  normative requirements of justice for  the global  institutional  order  is  beyond the  scope  of  this  dissertation.  For  the purpose of this thesis, I limit my inquiry to the philosophical analysis of the reasons  that  ground the  extension of  the  scope  of  justice,  followed by  an account of the appropriate kind of justification global egalitarianism requires 10under conditions of global pluralism, and finally to working out the conditions that need to be met globally for global egalitarianism to be a feasible ideal.11

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Global justice between justification and feasibility.

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Archivio della ricerca- LUISS Libera Università Internazionale degli Studi Sociali Guido Carli di Roma

Archivio della ricerca- LUISS Libera Università Internazionale degli Studi Sociali Guido Carli di Roma