In research carried out at IIASA, David Fischer compares the 1977 offshore oil well blowout at Platform Bravo, Norway, with the 1979 nuclear plant overheat at Three Mile Island, US. The glaring need emerging from the comparison, in the author's view, is for a smaller part of total resources devoted to accident prevention and a larger part to accident management after an accident has occurred. He says the root of the problem is excessive optimism bred by "professional mindset" that nothing can go wrong.
The Executive Report details the key managerial events that took place after each accident and shows how similar needs were met at various crisis points during the first days of the developing accidents. From this exposition Fischer then draws general conclusions, including these: Major accidents are not unique, and their similarities offer learning possibilities; accident management should be centralized; all participants in accident management should have predetermined roles; and to assure good, flexible design, accident management must be developed through a dialogue among all key participants
