Treba li pojam slobode tumačiti polazeći s točke gledišta pojedinca ili s točke gledišta zajednice? Ovisno o odgovoru na ovo pitanje mogu se razlikovati »individualističke« i »kolektivističke« ili »komunalističke« političke teorije. Premda se, prema shvaćanju autora teksta, dva navedena poimanja slobode uzajamno nadopunjuju — tekst razmatra njihovo suprotstavljanje u formi dileme radikalni individualizam ili radikalni komunalizam.
Individualističke teorije, koje polaze od pojedinca kao izdvojenog i samostalnog, slobodu shvaćanja kao »negativnu« — omeđenu općim zakonom koji osigurava prava i slobode za svakoga. S druge strane, komunalističke teorije naglašavaju »normativni« karakter slobode, tematizujući specifičan način putem koga akteri unutar društva uopće dolaze do odluke što žele činiti. Smatrajući da su antropološke i epistemološke pretpostavke komunalizma, koji započinje sa Aristotelom, a u modernoj teoriji biva obnovljen od strane Hegela, dakako ispravnije od onih individualističke tradicije (Hobs, Kant, prosvetiteljstvo, romantizam, Nozik...), Wellmer razmatra način na koji se Hegelovi komunistički stavovi obnavljaju kod Marksa i Tokvila. Saglašavajući se sa Tokvilom da sferu »negativne slobode« i pozitivne opće slobode nije moguće jednoznačno razdvojiti, kao i sa stavom da sloboda može postojati tek kao oblik etičkog života odnosno komunalne prakse utjelotvorene u karakter, običaje i moralne osjećaje građana — autor ipak još jednom razmatra radikalnu dilemu individualizam/komunalizam inkarniranu u suprotstavljanju Habermasa i Nozieka.
Razmatrajući odnos »negativne slobode«, »pozitivnih prava« i »opće volje« Wellmer utvrđuje da opredjeljivanje u sporu zavisi i od mogućnosti zasnivanja pojma komunalne ili diskurzivne racionalnosti — koja bi trebalo da zahvati normativnu strukturu »modernog konsenzusa« i pruži normativni sadržaj suvremenih koncepcija slobode. Nasuprot Habermasu, koji mu je inače blizak, Wellmer zaključuje da se Sloboda i Razum u savremenom svijetu ne podudaraju — unatoč tome što je zahtjevanje slobode racionalni zahtjev, a svrha negativne slobode: racionalna, komunalna sloboda.Should the concept of freedom be interpreted from the point of view of the community? Depending on the answer to this question one distinguishes »individualist« and »collectivist« or »communalist« political theories. Although, according to the author\u27s view, the two presented conceptions of freedom complement one another, in the text he analyses their opposition in the form of the dilemma: radical individualism or radical communalism.
Individualist theories, which start off from the detached and independent individual, conceive freedom as »negative« — restricted by the universal law which ensures rights and freedom for everyone. On the other hand, communalist theories emphasize the »normative« character of freedom, thematizing the specific means used by the actors within a society, first of all, in reaching the decision concerning what they wish to do. Regarding the anthropological and episthemologica! presuppositions of communalism, originating with Aristotles, and in modem theory revived by Hegel, as certainly more proper than those of the individualist tradition (Hobbes, Kant, Enlightenment, Romanticism, Nozick...), Wellmer analyses how Hegel’s communalist views are revived in the works of Marx and Toqueville. Agreeing with Toqueville that the spheres of »negative freedom« and positive universal freedom cannot be unambiguously divided, as well as with the view that freedom can exist only as a form of ethical life, in other words, of communal practice embodied in the character, customs and moral feelings of citizens — the author, however, once again analyses the radical dilemma individualism/communalism incarnated in the opposition of Habermas towards Nozick.
Considering the relation among »negative freedom«, »positive rights« and »universal will«, Wellmer establishes that commitment in the dispute depends also on the possibility of thinking out the concept of communal or discursive rationality — which should extend to the normative structure of the »modern consensus« and provide the normative content for contemporary concepts of freedom. In contrast to Habermas, to whom he is otherwise closely related in thought, Wellmer concludes that Freedom and Reason in the contemporary world do not correspond — despite the fact that the demand for freedom is a rational one, and that the aim of negative freedom is — rational, communal freedom
