Constitutionalism and Federalism. Does the Supremacy Clause Define the Federal Character of the European Union?

Abstract

Imajući u vidu više od pola stoljeća života Hrvatske u jugoslavenskoj federaciji, s razlogom se pretpostavlja da njeni građani znaju prepoznati one tendencije u složenim državnim zajednicama koje slabe njenu opću političku poziciju i interese. Nedugo nakon ulaska Republike Hrvatske u Europsku uniju legitimno je postaviti pitanje o tome postoje li u koordinatama novog hrvatsko-europskog zajedništva kritična mjesta i slabe karike. Postoji li naime u EU-u mogućnost pojave onog oblika rigidno shvaćenog federalnog odnosa u kojem bi svekolika formalna i faktička prevlast \u27\u27centra nad periferijom\u27\u27 prije ili kasnije bilo kojeg \u27\u27mlađeg člana obitelji\u27\u27 prisilila na odlazak iz \u27\u27velike europske obitelji\u27\u27? Autori propituju ratio klauzule o supremaciji kao instrumenta ustavnopravnog arsenala rješavanja odnosa federalizma i demokracije u svakom asocijativnom projektu, pa tako i ovome na europskoj razini. Komparirajući klauzulu o supremaciji, koja je u Ustavu SAD-a (1789.) bila konstitucionalizirana kao kompromis između velikih i malih država, s nekim europskim rješenjima, autori se pitaju koji je cilj i karakter sličnih formula u europskom kontekstu.Considering over half a century of Croatian existence within the Yugoslav Federation, there are sound reasons to assume that its citizens are able to identify the tendencies in complex state unions aiming to weaken its political position and interests. Soon after the accession of the Republic of Croatia to the European Union it is legitimate to ask a question concerning the potential critical points and weak links in the co-ordinates of the new European partnership with Croatia. In other words, is there a possibility of appearance within the EU of a rigid conception of a federal relationship in which the overall formal and factual predominance "of the centre over the periphery" wood sooner or later pressure any younger members to withdraw from this large Union? The authors consider the ratio of the supremacy clause as an instrument of constitutional and legal arsenal for addressing the relationship between federalism and democracy in any associative project, and hence also in this one at the EU level. Comparing the supremacy clause that was included in the US Constitution (1789) as a compromise between small and large states with some European solutions, the authors are wondering on the objectives and the character of similar formulae against the backdrop of the European context