Taxation of Unreported Personal Income

Abstract

Posamezniki pogosto neradi plačujejo davke, zaradi česar ne napovedo (vseh) ustvarjenih dohodkov, vendar pa se ne morejo upreti prikazu svojega bogastva bodisi s posedovanjem vrednih premetov ali visoko porabo. Pomembnejše vrzeli med povečanjem čistega premoženja posameznikov in njihovo porabo ter obdavčenimi in davka prostimi viri določenega časovnega obdobja pogosto ritegnejo pozornost davčnih organov. S pomočjo teh vrzeli davčni organi izračunajo davčne osnove ob upoštevanju povsem preproste ekonomske logike, da je dohodek določenega obdobja posameznikov seštevek njihove porabe in spremembe vrednosti neto premoženja v istem časovnem obdobju. Zaradi poenostavitev je potrošnja včasih izločena iz enačbe in je torej dohodek enak spremembi (povečanju) premoženja v določenem obdobju. V nobenem od teh primerov ne gre za dejanske, ampak zgolj za ocenjene dohodke posameznikov. Če dohodki, ki so ocenjeni na ta način, presegajo obdavčene ali davka proste vire, so lahko obdavčeni. Države, ki so obravnavane v tem članku (Hrvaška, Srbija, Avstrija in Slovenija), sicer uporabljajo enako ekonomsko logiko za ocenjevanje neprijavljenih dohodkov posameznikov, vendar se njihove zakonske ureditve precej razlikujejo, in sicer glede vrste davka, s katerim je obdavčen neprijavljen dohodek (običajna dohodnina ali posebni davek), davčnih stopenj (običajna ali posebna davčna stopnja), določb o zastaralnem obdobju (od tri do deset let), obveznosti davčnih organov, da obnovijo že končan postopek odmere dohodnine, možnosti posameznikov, da dokažejo pravo naravo neprijavljenih dohodkov, in pristojnosti davčnih organov, da javno objavijo osebne podatke posameznikov, ki jim je bil odmerjen davek od nenapovedanih dohodkov. Ta članek predstavi in analizira podobnosti in razlike med zakonodajami izbranih držav.Individuals are often reluctant to pay taxes, so they do not (fully) report the income they earn, but cannot resist publicly showing their wealth, either by possessing valuables or by high spending. Significant gaps between individuals’ increases of net property, their spending and taxed or tax-free sources in a certain period usually attract the attention of tax authorities. They use these gaps to calculate tax bases in tax assessment procedures, taking into account a very simple economic logic that individuals’ income of certain period is the sum of their consumption and a change in their net wealth of the same period. For reasons of simplification, spending is sometimes excluded from the equation and therefore unreported income equals a change (an increase) of individuals’ net wealth of certain period. Neither way are personal incomes ascertained factually but are merely estimated. Whenever incomes, which are estimated in this way, exceed the reported taxed or tax free sources, they can be taxed. Although countries discussed in this article (Croatia, Serbia, Austria and Slovenia) all basically use the same economic logic for estimating individuals’ unreported income, their legislation differs, namely regarding the type of tax which unreported income is taxed with (regular income tax or special tax), the tax rate (standard or special tax rate), the statute of limitations (from three to ten years), the obligation of tax authorities to renew the already completed personal income tax assessment procedure, the possibility of individuals to be able to prove the true nature of unreported income, and the competence of tax authorities to publish personal data of individuals who have had tax levied on their unreported income. This article presents and analyses the similarities and differences of regulations in selected countries

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