Legality and Constitutionality of General Acts in Croatian Law and Case Law of the High Administrative Court of the Republic of Croatia

Abstract

Analizira se ocjena zakonitosti općih akata, ponajprije kao oblika kontrole nad radom uprave, a zatim u hrvatskom pravu. U zakonodavstvu i praksi Ustavnog suda Hrvatske pojavila se podjela općenormativnih akata na propise i opće akte. Budući da Ustavni zakon o Ustavnom sudu propisuje da je Ustavni sud nadležan za ocjenu ustavnosti zakona te ustavnosti i zakonitosti drugih propisa, uvriježilo se stajalište da Ustavni sud nije nadležan za ocjenu ustavnosti i zakonitosti svih općih akata. Ustavni sud je stvorio »načelo nužde« te je tako proglašavao opće akte propisima i provodio ocjenu njihove ustavnosti i zakonitosti. Analizira se i kritički preispituje takva praksa Ustavnog suda s obzirom na shvaćanje da su svi opći akti propisi, pa je Ustavni sud oduvijek bio nadležan za ocjenu njihove ustavnosti i zakonitosti. Analizira se uređenje i praksa ocjene zakonitosti općih akata prema Zakonu o upravnim sporovima te se razgraničava nadležnost Ustavnog i Visokog upravnog suda.The paper analyses the legality of bylaws, primarily as a form of control of public administration in general, and then as an institute of the Croatian law in particular. The issue of legality of bylaws has been highly controversial issue of Croatian law. Legislation and case law of the Constitutional Court have divided general normative acts into regulations and bylaws. As the Constitutional Law on the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia has stipulated that the Constitutional Court is in charge of reviewing the harmonisation of laws with the Constitution and of other regulations with laws and the Constitution, there has appeared a conventional opinion that the Constitutional Court is not competent for reviewing the harmonisation of bylaws that are not regulations, with the Constitution and the law. In order to prevent bylaws that must not exist from surviving within the legal system, the Court has created the “principle of necessity”, thus proclaiming bylaws which, according to conventional opinion, are not regulations, to be regulations, and has been reviewing their legality and constitutionality. One can formulate a hypothesis that all bylaws are regulations, thus making the Constitutional Court competent for the review of legality and constitutionality of all general normative acts. The Constitution recognises only regulations, so it can be claimed that all the acts that have abstract characteristics are in fact regulations. Further, the author analyses the regulation of legality of bylaws introduced by the new Law on Administrative Disputes, which is the competence of the High Administrative Court. The competences of the Constitutional Court and the High Administrative Court are clearly delineated. Finally, case law of the High Administrative Court is analysed in some detail