Institute of Philosophy and Theology of Society of Jesus
Abstract
Vjera i znanje proizvodi su čovjekove želje da nadiđe sebe i temelje se na povjerenju. Postoje dvije usmjerenosti povjerenja: usmjerenost na konkretan pojam (epistemičko povjerenje) i usmjerenost na nešto novo, više (na transcendenciju). Shodno tomu, postoje epistemička i transcendentalna vjera, ali i znanje. U ovom se radu pokušava utvrditi može li se znanje okrenuto transcendenciji nazvati znanjem, kao što se vjera u transcendenciju (eng. faith) može nazvati vjerovanjem (eng. belief). Temelj je analize prikaz odnosa ovih pojmova račvajućim stablom. Proučavanjem stabla autor uviđa da postoje tri vrste autoriteta te da i u povjerenju u njih ima znanja jer se utvrđuje tko je autoritet. Znanje je istinita vjera potkrjepljena obrazloženjem. Istina nije svojstvo stvari u svijetu, već proizvod čovjekove refleksije, dok je obrazloženje činjenje razlike između istine i neistine. Do objektivnosti znanja dovodi prilazak drugomu, a ne branjenje vlastitih uvida. Pozitivistički pristup propušta uvidjeti da je sud o višem, kao znanje o transcendenciji, stalno gibanje k boljemu te da treba biti svrhom svakoga znanja. Međutim, poistovjećivanje znanja o transcendenciji i religijskoga vjerovanja nije primjereno.Belief, faith and knowledge are products of the human desire to transcend oneself and are founded on trust. The directedness of trust is twofold: directedness towards a concrete concept (epistemic trust) and directedness towards something new, something higher (transcendence). Accordingly, we can speak of epistemic and transcendental belief, that is, faith and so too of knowledge. The aim of this paper is to determine whether knowledge directed towards transcendence can be called ’knowledge’ in the strict sense, just as faith in transcendence can be called ’belief’. A depiction of the relationship among the notions in question by means of a branching tree diagram serves as the basis of this analysis. Through a close examination of the diagram the author reaches the conclusion that there are three types of authority on which trust is based, and this implies that trust is also founded on knowledge of a sort, since it is needed to determine who is in authority. Knowledge is a true and substantiated belief. Truth is not an attribute of objects in the world, but a product of our reflection; on the other hand, authentication ensues from the act of distinguishing truth from falsity. Objectivity of knowledge is achieved by approaching others, not by defending one’s insights. The positivistic approach fails to grasp that in judging a higher reality, such as knowledge of transcendence, there is a constant movement towards the better which should be the end of all knowledge. However, the identification of the knowledge of transcendence with religious belief is not feasible and has been refuted
