Disunity among Indonesian ISIS supporters and the risk of more violence

Abstract

Overview This report looks at the Jakarta attack on 14 January 2016 in the context of rivalry among Indonesian ISIS leaders in Syria and different pro-ISIS groups in Indonesia. The report examines how these rivalries emerged. The Jakarta attack appears to have been carried out by members of a group known as Partisans of the Caliphate (Jamaah Anshar Khilafah, JAK), whose ideological leader is detained cleric Aman Abdurrahman. Aman has fallen out with the top Indonesian in Syria, Bahrumsyah, who commands Katibah Nusantara, the main Indonesian-Malaysian military unit in ISIS. He is close to Bahrumsyah’s rival, Abu Jandal, who heads a dissident unit. Bahrumsyah is the Indonesian with best access to central ISIS leaders and funds, but the fact that official ISIS media claimed credit for the Jakarta attacks may have boosted Abu Jandal’s position. A third Indonesian, Bahrun Naim, has tried to steer clear of that rivalry but has been trying on his own to encourage and fund attacks in Indonesia and elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Because he tried to direct attacks on Java in August and December 2015, he was immediately named as the mastermind of the 14 January plot, but to date, no evidence of his involvement has been uncovered.  Several other groups have pledged loyalty to ISIS and are committed to attacks on its enemies in Indonesia – police, foreigners and Shi’a -- but do not want to submit to Aman Abdurrahman’s leadership. The Indonesian government has responded to the Jakarta attacks by focusing on the need for stronger anti-terrorism legislation and shutting down extremist websites, but much more needs to be done on the prevention side. In particular the prison system – where plots are hatched, travel arranged, and ISIS supporters recruited – needs urgent attention, particularly through more systematic training of prison personnel tasked with direct supervision of extremist inmates