Burkett, Maxine

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ScholarSpace at University of Hawai'i at Manoa

NewSecurityBeatThe blog of the Wilson Center's Environmental Change and Security ProgramJustice and Contemporary Climate Relocation: AnAddendum to Words of Caution on “Climate Refugees”August 8, 2016 |  By Maxine BurkettThe idea that climate change is causing migration and displacement is entering the mainstream,but experts have warned against using the term “climate refugees” to describe what we’reseeing in small islands, coastal regions, and even conflict zones like Syria.Geoff Dabelko’s 2007 post on climate change and migration was an early and importantclarification of this emerging phenomenon. He noted that the term “refugee” is problematicbecause of limitations under international law. He also noted that migration is multi-causal. Infact, the numerous triggers that collide to spur an individual’s decision to migrate make itdifficult to peg his or her movement to climate change. That difficulty also means that deriving anumber for climate migrants remains elusive. Almost 10 years later, these cautionary words arestill relevant.However, I would argue there are migration and displacement scenarios that are a bit morestraightforward now, that beg concerted effort from the policy community, and that underscorethe importance of recognizing climate change as a unique, unprecedented, and increasinglyformidable trigger.GUEST CONTRIBUTORWhether we helpsmall islandersadapt or circumventthe effects, newpolicies are urgentlyneededIn their comprehensive policy paper, Protecting People Crossing Borders in the Context of ClimateChange, Walter Kälin and Nina Schrepfer identify five scenarios in which climate change maytrigger population movements. They are:1. Sudden onset disasters, such as flooding or storms;2. Slow-onset degradation, such as rising sea levels and salinization of freshwater and arableland;3. The “special case” of slow-onset disasters, specifically the impact of rising seas on low-lying small-island states;4. Governments prohibiting areas for human habituation as they become high risk;5. Violence, armed conflict, or unrest over dwindling resources that seriously disturbs publicorder and triggers migration.Scenarios three and four are particularly relevant given current events. News of the seeminglyinevitable demise of atoll nations like Kiribati and the planned relocation of the Biloxi-Chitimacha-Choctaw tribe of Isle de Jean Charles in Louisiana have highlighted the impacts ofclimate change on island and coastal communities in the present tense. Sea-level rise and coastalflooding that compromise entire communities is not a problem we can relegate to futuregenerations; it is happening now.This is not to say “climate refugees” is an appropriate way to describethese people. There is still no legal basis behind the term, noprotections owed by governments, and a real danger of giving thewrong impression about the situations they face as opposed to themillions displaced by war and persecution in the Middle East and EastAfrica, for example (though elements of this may evince scenario five).It is important to note that many residents of threatened islands in facteschew the “refugee” categorization and resist the inevitability oflosing their lands, home to the bones of their ancestors and the birthplace of the nextgeneration.There is value in emphasizing how complex the drivers of human migration are, as manytreatments of the climate-migration nexus do. There are also pre-existing vulnerabilities that arethe result of human decisions and limited development capacity, which is true in the GlobalNorth and South. But the potential uninhabitability of threatened islands like Kiribati in amatter of decades is not a kind of migration that suffers convincingly from claims of multi-causality – at least not to the point that obscures a climate fingerprint. The specter of completedisplacement that i-Kiribati now face is more clearly a function and consequence of a changingclimate.But it is an argument for working towards some kind of framework that acknowledges thespecial climate-related circumstances faced by small-islanders and those displaced bygovernment climate resilience programs – and the international community’s responsibilities tothem. These are not people wealthy countries are simply tasked with accommodating, they arein part victims of a phenomenon that they have had little hand in creating, which deserves somerecognition, if not reparation. Whether we help small islanders adapt to or circumvent climatechange’s displacement effects – at least for as long as possible – new policies are urgentlyneeded.It is possible theclimate  ngerprintin migration willbecome moreevidentFrom the Arctic to the Pacific Northwest to the Mississippi Delta, the U.S. federal government,with state and local partners, is now considering and indeed facilitating movement from highrisk areas, the fourth scenario outlined by Kälin and Schrepfer. In Louisiana, Isle de JeanCharles is among the first set of communities undergoing planned relocation. Recognizing thesignificant loss of land – a result of rising seas colliding with decades of channelization and oiland gas development – and the increased risk of staying in place as each hurricane seasonapproaches, the Department of Housing and Urban Development has funded the relocation ofisland residents.This is a first for the U.S. government, and a number of questions arise as we contemplate moreand more communities moving to higher ground: How exactly do we conduct this processequitably? How will it be fully funded? How are people relocated in a way that affords themopportunities to thrive? These are not questions for leaders and communities in 2050, but in2016.Disappearing islands and re-locating coastal communities highlightthe increasing weight climate change contributes to displacement andmigration. At the very least, the policy community can carve out thesetwo scenarios as priorities in acknowledging the triggering role ofclimate change. One has important international policy implications,the other mainly domestic (though depending on the country inquestion, re-location may involve international support).It is possible that, as time passes, the climate fingerprint in the remaining scenarios outlined byKälin and Schrepfer, including the most thorny – violent conflict – will also become moreevident. It is quite plausible that the others will always be seen as the result of multiple triggers,but that climate change, once the proverbial straw that broke the camel’s back, will beunderstood to be more like an entire bale of hay.It is critically important not to overstate climate change’s involvement in contemporarypopulation movements, lest we absolve poor leadership and decision-making. But climatechange induces movement that seems to me altogether different from your average multi-causalevent in at least one other way: it is not a static phenomenon; it is dynamic. It is an increase inaverage global temperature with accompanying change – and the rate of change is increasingwith greater speed. In other words, what may seem like a deeply entangled multi-causal eventtoday might soon have quite a strong climate signal.If we recognize the nature and pace of climate change, we might – as Dabelko presciently urgedin 2007 – “translate this larger theoretical and political argument into…specific interventions”that aid those who today face a seemingly inexorable rupture to their way of life.Maxine Burkett is a Wilson Center public policy fellow and professor of law at the William S. RichardsonSchool of Law, University of Hawai‘i.Sources: National Geographic, The New York Times, Think Progress, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.Photo Credit: Bikeman islet, near South Tarawa in the central Pacific, June 2013, courtesy of DavidGray/Reuters.Topics: Arctic, climate change, demography, disaster relief, environment, environmental security, featured,  ooding,Guest Contributor, human rights, humanitarian, international environmental governance, Kiribati, migration,population, risk and resilience, security, U.S., UNFPA

Justice and Contemporary Climate Relocation: An Addendum to Words of Caution on ‘Climate Refugees

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Justice and Contemporary Climate Relocation: An Addendum to Words of Caution on ‘Climate Refugees

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