For more about the East-West Center, see http://www.eastwestcenter.org/Ian Storey and Malcolm Cook, Senior Fellow and Visiting Senior Fellow, respectively, at ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore, explain that "In Southeast Asia, what we are witnessing thus far is less a rupture event and more an amplification of the current geopolitical dynamics.

Cook, Malcolm

Storey, Ian

English

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Number 507 | May 13, 2020 EastWestCenter.org/APB Ian Storey and Malcolm Cook, Senior Fellow and VisiƟng Senior Fellow, respecƟvely, at ISEAS‐Yusof Ishak InsƟtute, Singapore, explain that “In Southeast Asia, what we are witnessing thus far is less a rupture event and more an amplificaƟon of the current geopoliƟcal dynamics.” The COVID‐19 outbreak has spawned a plethora of commentaries forecasƟng the geopoliƟcal consequences of the pandemic. For some observers the virus has caused a decisive shiŌ in the balance of influence, with China emerging as the paramount power (especially in the Indo‐Pacific) and America teetering on the brink of losing its status as global hegemon. Other pundits have offered less paradigm‐shiŌing assessments: that COVID‐19 is unlikely to upend the exisƟng internaƟonal order but may catalyze exisƟng global trends. Four months into what is very likely to be a long and wrenching crisis it is, of course, very difficult to make predicƟons. However, we believe that at least in Southeast Asia, what we are witnessing thus far is less a rupture event and more an amplificaƟon of the current geopoliƟcal dynamics. COVID‐19 has led to a sharp deterioraƟon in U.S.‐China relaƟons and this has reinforced negaƟve views of both countries in Southeast Asia and exacerbated regional concerns about escalaƟng superpower rivalry. Same Game Some analysts argue that China is using the pandemic to change the rules of the game in the South China Sea in its favor. During the COVID‐19 crisis China has undertaken a series of acƟviƟes which have Ɵcked up tensions in the contested waters. In February a Chinese warship turned its fire‐control radar on a Philippine Navy ship in the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ); in March a China Coast Guard vessel rammed and sank a Vietnamese fishing boat; in April a Chinese survey ship entered the EEZs of Vietnam and Malaysia; shortly thereaŌer Beijing announced new administraƟon units to govern the Paracels and Spratlys and named 80 geographical features in the South China Sea. During this whole period, both the U.S. and Chinese navies undertook high‐profile exercises in the area, while the U.S. Navy conducted three “freedom of navigaƟon operaƟons” (FONOPs) in the South China Sea (10 March, and 28 and 29 April). To be sure China is no doubt gleeful that the United States and Southeast Asian claimants are preoccupied with tackling the virus. But none of the above incidents are game changers in the South China Sea; they have become rouƟne events and likely would have happened with or without COVID‐19. The United States was expected to increase the frequency of its FONOPs in 2020; China has sunk Southeast Asian fishing vessels before (including a Philippine boat last June); Chinese survey ships were operaƟng off the Vietnamese and Malaysian coast last year; and as expected Hanoi and Manila have protested all of China’s moves to buƩress its jurisdicƟonal claims. A real game changer would have been an announcement by China that it was establishing an Air Defense IdenƟficaƟon Zone (ADIZ) over the Spratlys or indicaƟons that it had started reclamaƟon work at Scarborough Shoal. Nothing has fundamentally changed in the South China Sea: China conƟnues to assert its claims, America responds with more FONOPs, and the Southeast Asian claimants look on with concern and a degree of fatalism.  Same Game, No Winners: COVID-19, U.S.-China Rivalry, and Southeast Asian Geopolitics By Ian Storey and Malcolm Cook APB Series Founding Editor: Dr. Satu Limaye | APB Series Coordinator: Peter Valente The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the policy or position of the East-West Center or any organization with which the author is affiliated. The East-West Center promotes better relations and understanding among the people and nations of the United States, Asia, and the Pacific through cooperative study, research, and dialogue. Established by the US Congress in 1960, the Center serves as a resource for information and analysis on critical issues of common concern, bringing people together to exchange views, build expertise, and develop policy options. But the outbreak of COVID‐19 among sailors aboard the aircraŌ carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt, and the perceived lack of U.S. leadership during the crisis, have deepened fears in Southeast Asia concerning America’s commitment to the region. At the same Ɵme, Beijing’s bout of asserƟve behavior in the South China Sea is being seen as opportunisƟc and extremely unhelpful at a Ɵme when ASEAN and China are supposed to be negoƟaƟng a Code of Conduct to reduce tensions (those negoƟaƟons are currently on hold due to COVID‐19).  No Winner What is true for the South China Sea is true for Southeast Asia more broadly. In the region, so far neither the United States nor China is a clear geopoliƟcal beneficiary of the pandemic. Instead, Southeast Asia worries that the regional externaliƟes of this superpower rivalry are being exacerbated.  The ISEAS‐Yusof Ishak InsƟtute’s State of Southeast Asia 2020 Survey Report released in January clearly indicates that doubts about China and the United States respecƟvely weighed heavily before COVID‐19 spread from China to Southeast Asia, as did concerns about their rivalry. With regard to China, 72 percent of regional policy elites polled expressed concern about Beijing’s’s growing economic influence, and 85 percent about China’s growing strategic and poliƟcal influence. Two‐thirds had liƩle or no confidence in China’s new, purportedly more inclusive BRI approach, while only one out of every 67 respondents agreed with Beijing’s narraƟve that China is a benevolent power. The spread of COVID‐19 from China to Southeast Asia, abeƩed by memories of the same paƩern for the SARS epidemic in 2003, likely will deepen concerns about China’s influence on and in Southeast Asia. Beijing’s conƟnuing aggression in the South China Sea during the pandemic will hardly convince many of its benevolence regardless of how many medical supplies China donates. Results for the United States in this survey were beƩer than those for China but sƟll bad and discordant with the Trump administraƟon’s rhetoric of heightened engagement. Three‐quarters of those polled agreed that U.S. engagement with Southeast Asia had fallen under the Trump administraƟon. Only one in ten respondents disagreed. Nearly 50 percent of survey respondents expressed liƩle confidence in the United States as a strategic partner, while twice as many viewed China as the leading strategic power in the region compared with the United States. America suffering the highest number of total COVID‐19 infecƟons and deaths globally and the internaƟonal media’s criƟcal coverage of the Trump administraƟon’s pandemic response likely will add to these doubts.  Southeast Asian states want greater internaƟonal cooperaƟon to address the pandemic and its social effects. However, the pandemic has made the U.S.‐China rivalry more virulent, greatly constraining cooperaƟon between the world’s only two superpowers. This will undoubtedly deepen Southeast Asian concerns about the regional implicaƟons of the U.S.‐China rivalry and hurt the image of both powers as well. Currently, the geopoliƟcs of the COVID‐19 pandemic in Southeast Asia look bad for the United States, China and the region itself. Southeast Asian countries are looking beyond the first wave of the pandemic to a more uncertain and daunƟng future. The United States and China individually and through effecƟve cooperaƟon could help reverse this lose‐lose‐lose situaƟon and improve their images in Southeast Asia. "The pandemic has made the U.S.‐China rivalry more virulent, greatly constraining cooperaƟon between the world’s only two superpowers. This will undoubtedly deepen Southeast Asian concerns about the regional implicaƟons of the U.S.‐China rivalry, and hurt the image of both powers as well.”  Ian Storey is a Senior Fellow and Malcolm Cook is a VisiƟng Senior Fellow at the ISEAS‐Yusof Ishak InsƟ‐tute in Singapore.  Ian Storey can be contacted at ijstorey@iseas.edu.sg.  

Same game, no winners : COVID-19, U.S.-China rivalry, and Southeast Asian geopolitics

http://scholarspace.manoa.hawaii.edu/bitstream/10125/67887/1/apb%20no.507.pdf

Same game, no winners : COVID-19, U.S.-China rivalry, and Southeast Asian geopolitics

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