For more about the East-West Center, see http://www.eastwestcenter.org/Drs. Amitendu Palit and Shutaro Sano, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies, and Professor at the National Defense Academy of Japan, respectively, explain that "From the perspectives of both India and Japan, the Free and Open Indo-Pacific should remain a development-focused initiative.

Palit, Amitendu

Sano, Shutaro

English

ScholarSpace at University of Hawai'i at Manoa

Drs Amitendu Palitand Shutaro Sano, Research Fellow at theInstitute of South AsianStudies, and Professorat the National DefenseAcademy of Japan,respectively, explainthat “From theperspectives of bothIndia and Japan, theFree and Open Indo-Pacific should remain adevelopment-focusedinitiative.”  The Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy andUncertainties for India & Japan By Amitendu Palit andShutaro SanoThe Trump administration has signaled its intention to engage closely with the Indo-Pacific bycommitting to new strategic investment initiatives and economic cooperation with Japan, India, Australia,and Mongolia. The concept of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy (FOIP) is not new and wasoriginally coined and reflected in Japan's forein policy strategy under the Abe administration. However,India and Japan continue to face some uncertainties over the nature of their engagement with the UnitedStates' vision of the FOIP. These uncertainties arise from lack of clarity over whether the FOIP wouldfocus more on economic development or aim to develop into a security-oriented strategy for counteringChina; the FOIP’s relation with the other prominent connectivity initiative in the region – China’s Belt andRoad Initiative (BRI); and whether the Trump Administration’s foreign and trade policy emphasis on‘America First’ would prevent the Indo-Pacific region from acquiring an inclusive character.    For both India and Japan, it is important to assess the possibility of the FOIP encouraging strategicreorganization of the region for fostering a stronger security relationship among the so-called “Quad” oflike-minded states (i.e. United States, Japan, India, and Australia) looking to contain China. The imperativearises from the prominence and progress of the BRI, whose cross-continental geography — includingmega cross-border infrastructure projects — makes it capable of creating a global economic center ofgravity in the Indo-Pacific. But BRI’s geopolitics can be destabilizing for the region.   Notwithstanding downsides surrounding BRI such as high debt to China and alleged corruption in deals,many countries are unwilling to be perceived as taking sides between Beijing and Washington. Bothparticipant and non-participant countries are wary of security initiatives in the region like the revival ofthe Australia-India-Japan-US Quadrilateral Strategic Dialogue. Also, expansion of membership of agrouping like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) indicates a need to take evolving securityconditions into account with respect to Central Asia, Afghanistan, and the BRI. Furthermore, the Trumpadministration has explicitly condemned China along with Russia as “revisionist powers,” and has recentlysanctioned Beijing for its purchase of Russian-made Su-35S fighters and S-400 surface-to-air missilesystems. But while the United States might have distinct incentives in making the FOIP a more security-oriented strategy including a hardline approach toward China, there are risks in doing so and competingwith the BRI. Emphasizing a security-oriented framework and urging partners like India and Japan intomore muscular posturing against China would force Beijing to further securitize BRI through efforts likemilitarizing commercial ports. From the perspectives of both India and Japan, the FOIP should remain adevelopment-focused initiative and should also provide a vision for complementing ongoing connectivityprojects like the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC), the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar EconomicCorridor (BCIM), the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), and the Russia-led EurasianEconomic Union (EAEU).  SIA    ACIFIC      ULLETIN    P     BANumber 442| October 10, 2018                                                                EastWestCenter.org/APBThe commercial salience of the FOIP for the United States is evident from President Trump’sarticulation of the notion - both in November 2017 and July 2018 – at major business forums both US-based and regional. Apart from committing strategic investments worth US$113.5 million ininfrastructure development, energy security, and digital connectivity, the United States is looking towork closely with Japan, India, Australia, and Mongolia in infrastructure development under the FOIP.But going by the experience of the BRI, top-down investment commitments are not sufficient forensuring the credibility of the initiative. More and more countries are criticizing the BRI’s purportedmotive of building a China-led global order by impairing strategic autonomy of investment-recipientcountries and forcing some of them into debt traps. FOIP needs to avoid the legitimacy problems of theBRI. While doing so, it must also fashion ways of co-existing with the BRI.  India and Japan would also expect from the FOIP an economic vision for the Indo-Pacific region that ismuch broader than an agenda of disparate infrastructure engagement with a few countries. A free andopen Indo-Pacific should aim for a ‘free and open’ economic geography by articulating an economicarchitecture. Without such a vision, there is the possibility of strategic investments by the United Statesbeing viewed largely as efforts to enhance greater access of American goods and services in the Indo-Pacific markets.  New Delhi and Tokyo have been working with Washington to promote regional infrastructuredevelopment through initiatives like the Trilateral Infrastructure Working Group set up in 2015 toidentify possible collaborative efforts that can help strengthen regional connectivity. Bilaterally, Indiaand Japan have launched the India-Japan Act East Forum and Tokyo and Washington have initiated theStrategic Energy Partnership. The four Quad countries - Australia, India, Japan, and the United States –are discussing a joint regional infrastructure project. The FOIP cannot grow in exclusion of theseprojects; that would leave New Delhi and Tokyo searching for rationale to stay committed to the FOIP.   FOIP’s characterization as an anti-China project with limited economic vision and inclusivity will createchallenges for India and Japan in remaining committed to the US efforts. Both countries are consciousabout the importance of not committing themselves to any initiative that is construed as a distinct anti-China posturing. India has been particularly cautious in this regard, and has stayed away from the latestUS-Japan-Australia infrastructure partnership and has not agreed to elevate the Quad talks to Secretary-level consultations. Specific bilateral issues such as US dissatisfaction over the trade imbalance withJapan and India, and the rising rejection of Indian H-1B applicants by the United States, might also affectIndia and Japan’s involvement in the US-led aspects of FOIP. The different geopolitical approaches ofthe two countries to the region, such as Japan’s enduring reliance on its alliance with the United States,and India’s emphasis on the FOIP’s inclusive character, will also be important determinants, as wouldthe two countries’ respective strategies towards China’s BRI. Notwithstanding hesitations, India andJapan should actively consider contributing to FOIP as it provides the opportunity of enhancing bothgeopolitical and geo-economic cooperation through a regional connectivity agenda. APB Series Founding Editor: Dr. Satu Limaye | APB Series Coordinator: Peter Valente The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the policy or position of the East-West Center or anyorganization with which the author is affiliated.  The East-West Center promotes better relations and understanding among the people and nations of the United States, Asia, and the Pacific throughcooperative study, research, and dialogue. Established by the US Congress in 1960, the Center serves as a resource for information and analysis on criticalissues of common concern, bringing people together to exchange views, build expertise, and develop policy options.  "FOIP’scharacterization as ananti-China projectwith limitedeconomic vision andinclusivity will createchallenges for Indiaand Japan inremaining committedto the US efforts." Dr Amitendu Palit is a Senior Research Fellow and Research Lead (Trade and Economic Policy) at the Institute ofSouth Asian Studies (ISAS), an autonomous research institute at the National University of Singapore. He can becontacted at isasap@nus.edu.sg. Dr Shutaro Sano is Professor, and Deputy Director, Centre for International Exchange,National Defence Academy of Japan. He can be reached at sano-shu@nifty.com. 

The free and open Indo-Pacific strategy and uncertainties for India & Japan

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The free and open Indo-Pacific strategy and uncertainties for India & Japan

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