Studies on “Neighbourhood Europeanization” have shown that the EU’s capacity to hit across its borders has been limited. Our paper argues that the EU has induced some formal institutional change, which, however, has helped to stabilize rather than change existing regimes. Thus, we do observe the Europeanization of domestic structures of formerly Soviet republics, which, however, appears to have opposite effects of what the EU intends to achieve with its ENP. In order to explore these pathologies of Europeanization, we focus on the EU’s attempts to promote good governance, and in particular the fight against corruption. The Post- Soviet area features some of the most corrupt countries in the world, including the Southern
Caucasus region. High adaptation costs and limited incentives render Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia least likely cases for Europeanization and domestic change. Our comparative study will show that despite high misfit and low pressure for adaptation from above and below, all three have responded to the EU’s demands for good governance introducing similar formal institutional changes. Yet, rather than systematically fighting corruption, incumbent
regimes have instrumentalized the EU selectively implementing anti-corruption policies to cut the power resources of their political opponents
