Tensions over Iran’s nuclear programme have risen considerably in recent
months. This has been visible in numerous threats of – and much speculation
about – an imminent Israeli (and US) attack on Iran’s nuclear
installations. In this context, the support for the attacks that the countries
of the South Caucasus (and Azerbaijan in particular) could provide has
been the subject of lively debate, as has been the prospect of a Russian
political and military offensive in the Caucasus in response to the attacks
on Iran. It seems that the ongoing war campaign in the media has been
aimed primarily at putting pressure on Iran and the international community
to find a political solution to the Iranian problem. This also applies to
the Caucasus’s involvement in the campaign.
Given the outcome of the Istanbul round of talks on a political solution to
the Iranian issue (14 April), which warrants moderate optimism, the threat
of a conflict now appears more distant and this also indirectly proves the
effectiveness of the campaign. The war of nerves with Iran, however, is already
now actually affecting the stability of the Southern Caucasus. While it
seems that Azerbaijan is not Israel’s partner in the preparations to attacks,
and that there is no real link between the Iranian problem and the ongoing
and planned movements of Russian troops in the Caucasus, the tensions
between Iran and Azerbaijan are indeed high. Moreover, the global image of
the Caucasus is deteriorating, the USA’s position in the region is becoming
more complicated, and Russia’s room for manoeuvre is expanding