Executive Summary. France and Germany have fundamentally different
interests concerning the Eurozone. Contrary to
prevailing sentiment, the recent elections in both
countries will therefore not necessarily reignite
the Franco-German motor to bring about the
pending Eurozone reform.
> Although Merkel did not refuse Macron’s recent
Euro reform plans, the ostensible agreement is
owed to the fact that both sides mean different
things when referring to an EU Finance Minister or
a fiscal capacity to stabilize Eurozone economies.
> Disagreement extends to strengthening the
Eurozone’s social dimension and the revived idea
of a European unemployment protection scheme.
By contrast, France and Germany agree on
protecting their labour markets.
> Macron frames problems in innovative ways and
exhibits a cooperative style. Despite differences, a
renewed tandem may therefore be able to reform
the Eurozone if certain conditions are met:
External drivers, such as, the ‘refugee crisis’ and
security concerns may facilitate cross-sectoral
package deals; at the EU level, a rekindling of the
Euro crisis could increase pressure on the tandem
to make concessions; domestically, reform may be
required as a continued ‘muddling through’ could
further strengthen right-wing populists.
> Not in the least, any Franco-German entente will
need to respect the preferences of other member
states, promote the Eurozone’s social dimension,
and strengthen its democratic legitimation
