Studies on the internal organization of the European Parliament (EP) have largely overlooked
the impact of its inter-institutional context. Addressing the gap, this paper examines how the
different inter-institutional balance of power under the consultation and codecision legislative
procedures affects the intra-parliamentary allocation of consultation and codecision reports.
The analysis of reports allocated during 2004-2007 shows that the higher competition for
codecision reports left unchecked by the informal rules of report allocation has produced clear
winners and losers. Disloyal party group members are ‘punished’ by group coordinators in the
allocation of any reports. Furthermore, members of the centre-right party group coalition are
privileged in the allocation of codecision reports, while legislators with outlying special
interests and experts are given systematic access only to drafting consultation reports. Thus,
the main mechanisms driving report allocation appear to be promoting party group cohesion
and majority formation
