In January 2014, for the first time in its history, the German Federal Constitutional Court submitted several questions to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in Luxembourg and asked for a preliminary ruling. The questions had arisen within the framework of the OMT case, and the issue was whether or not the OMT (“outright monetary transactions”) programme announced by Mario Draghi, the head of the European Central Bank (ECB), is in compliance with the law of the European Union. The OMT programme (which has be-come well-known because Draghi said “what-ever it takes to preserve the euro” when he unveiled it) plays an important role in the stabilization of the euro area. It means that the European System of Central Banks will be empowered to engage in unlimited buying of government bonds issued by certain Member States if and as long as these Member States are simultaneously taking part in a European rescue or reform programme (under the EFSF ot the ESM). Hitherto the OMT has not been implemented. Nonetheless a suit contesting its legality was filed with the Federal Constitutional Court.
The European Court of Justice now had to decide whether or not the activities of the ECB were in compliance with European law. How-ever, the ECJ had to take into account the prior assessment of the Federal Constitutional Court. In its submission the Federal Constitutional Court made it quite clear that it was of the opinion that there has been a violation of European law. But at the same time it did not exclude the possibility that the ECJ set up legal conditions for OMT in order to avoid a violation of European law

Hoffmann, Isabell

Archive of European Integration

flashlight europe OMT is Monetary Policy and Not Economic Policy N°5 – June 2015 Isabell Hoffmann Bertelsmann Stiftung, isabell.hoffmann@bertelsmann-stiftung.de In January 2014, for the first time in its his-tory, the German Federal Constitutional Court submitted several questions to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in Luxembourg and asked for a preliminary ruling. The questions had arisen within the framework of the OMT case, and the issue was whether or not the OMT (“outright monetary transactions”) pro-gramme announced by Mario Draghi, the head of the European Central Bank (ECB), is in compliance with the law of the European Union. The OMT programme (which has be-come well-known because Draghi said “what-ever it takes to preserve the euro” when he unveiled it) plays an important role in the sta-bilization of the euro area. It means that the European System of Central Banks will be empowered to engage in unlimited buying of government bonds issued by certain Member States if and as long as these Member States are simultaneously taking part in a European rescue or reform programme (under the EFSF ot the ESM). Hitherto the OMT has not been implemented. Nonetheless a suit contesting its legality was filed with the Federal Consti-tutional Court.  The European Court of Justice now had to de-cide whether or not the activities of the ECB were in compliance with European law. How-ever, the ECJ had to take into account the prior assessment of the Federal Constitu-tional Court. In its submission the Federal Constitutional Court made it quite clear that it was of the opinion that there has been a vio-lation of European law. But at the same time it did not exclude the possibility that the ECJ set up legal conditions for OMT in order to avoid a violation of European law.  Franz C. Mayer, Professor of European Law at the University of Bielefeld, was Counsel to the Federal Parliament in earlier cases on the Euro in Karlsruhe. He explains the ruling by the European Court of Justice and assesses the possible consequences.  The European Court of Justice confirmed the view of the European Central Bank that if it purchases bonds within the framework of the OMT programme, it is not violating European law. What are the main arguments of the court? And has it issued any guidelines to which the bank will have to adhere? flashlight europe  N°5 – June 2015     OMT is Monetary Policy and Not Economic Policy 2 One of the main objections to the OMT pro-gramme has been that it is actually economic pol-icy. Since this is not one of the ECB’s compe-tences, it would seem to be acting in violation of its powers (an “ultra vires act”). Basically the ECJ agrees with the view taken  by the European Cen-tral Bank, which is that the OMT programme can be assigned to the area of monetary policy. And this is one of the competences of the EU – and thus of the ECB. The argument centres on the assertion that the purpose of the OMT pro-gramme is to ensure the consistency and proper transmission of monetary policy. If the objectives of monetary policy decision-making are no longer transmitted and indeed disregarded in parts of the euro currency area, it will have a negative ef-fect on the ECB’s ability to promote price stability. The ECJ admits that there is an indirect economic policy impact of such a programme, but this is not relevant for the competence issue. Furthermore, the ECJ considers “selectivity,” that is, the fact that only some of the Member States are covered by the OMT programme, i.e. crisis-ridden states which have sought refuge under the ESM um-brella, to be legally defensible if, that is, the dis-ruption of the monetary policy transmission mechanism emanates from only a few Member States.  The ECB links OMT purchases to participation in economic adjustment programmes (which in ef-fect are austerity and consolidation pro-grammes). However, the ECJ does not believe that this has robbed it of its independence. The ECJ emphasizes the fact that independence also signifies the ability to base one’s actions “in a wholly independent manner” on certain precondi-tions.  Another complaint is that the ECB has in fact been engaged in banned monetary financing, de facto financing government expenditure. When all is said and done, by purchasing government bonds it is in the final analysis providing financial support for the budgets of the states concerned, which thus no longer have any incentive to exer-cise budget discipline. In this context it needs to be remembered that the treaties permit the ECB to purchase government bonds on the secondary market, but not on the primary market. The ECJ makes it quite clear that it is not permissible to circumvent the ban on purchases on the primary market and to cook the books and makes a num-ber of constraints in this regard. In particular mar-ket participants and the Member States should not always be able to assume that the ECB will immediately purchase certain government bonds on the secondary market, there must not be a certainty that bonds will be purchased. In its reference the Federal Constitutional Court emphasized the fact that it was expect-ing the European Central Bank to be given certain guidelines and constraints. Has the ECJ met these expectations?  To a large extent at any rate. The ECJ makes it very clear that the OMT programme can operate only as long as there are in fact problems con-cerning the transmission of monetary policy. Fur-thermore, as I said, the ban on monetary financ-ing must not be circumvented. The ECJ has sub-jected the OMT programme to a proportionality test in order to evaluate both its suitability and its necessity. The express renunciation of a debt cut, which the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) was asking for, is not mentioned by the ECJ, though. But the ECJ makes a point of emphasiz-ing that the concept of the treaties is to have a central bank which, whether one likes it or not, has the duty to make certain decisions that can incur certain financial risks for the bank. Much has been written about the fact that the courts have conflicting views. What issues are at the heart of this conflict, and do you be-lieve that it has now been defused?  One needs to draw certain distinctions. In as much as we are talking about the legality of the ECB’s activities with regard to OMT, the question has been answered, at least as far as the ECJ is concerned. With this, there is a chance that the FCC will not allow the conflict to escalate in this area. This would also help to defuse the issue of “quantitative easing” (QE), another ECB purchas-ing programme which has a different structure and a different background. A suit contesting the legality of this programme has now been filed with the Federal Constitutional Court in Karls-ruhe. flashlight europe  N°5 – June 2015     OMT is Monetary Policy and Not Economic Policy 3 However, the fundamental point of conflict be-tween the courts has not gone away. This is due to the fact that the FCC believes that it has a right to monitor the limits of EU competences and in certain cases to contest the primacy of European law when it is in conflict with the Basic Law. In its reference to the ECJ the FCC in fact developed two lines of argument. On the one hand it asked whether the activities of the ECB were within its mandate and EU competences. The ECJ’s une-quivocal answer to this was “Yes.” At the same time it emphasized that this dictum based on Eu-ropean law was binding for the court concerned, which is the FCC. But on the other hand even in its reference the FCC stated that after receiving a ruling from the ECJ it still intended to ascertain whether the activities of the ECB were in any way inimical to German constitutional identity. The reasoning on this point is rather convoluted, and personally I do not find it particularly convincing. Here is the argument: The purchases within the framework of the OMT programme would largely be made by the national central banks. The argu-ment seems to be that the OMT program could lead to significant losses of the Bundesbank, the German Central Bank, which in turn could cripple the federal budget. This would render elections to Parliament meaningless to German voters, since a crippled budget deprives Parliament of any room for maneuver. This in turn would have an impact on the very core of democracy in Ger-many, which cannot be changed by a constitu-tional amendment, so that in the final analysis the OMT programme would harm German constitu-tional identity. I think this line of argument is ra-ther hypothetical. The ECJ addresses the prob-lem in an oblique way by pointing out that there are de facto limits of OMT purchases.  But let me get back to the principles at stake here. Monitoring competences in an “Ultra vires-con-trol” and monitoring identity in an “identity control” can both have deleterious effect on European law if national courts engage in this monitoring. Just imagine if the courts in all of the 28 Member States decided to monitor all sorts of European legal acts. That is a task the ECJ reserves for it-self, in accordance with the founding treaties. This point of conflict is defused in the ECJ’s OMT ruling inasmuch as the ECJ briefly states its point of view – “the ECJ decides” – and does not keep going on about it. That is a pragmatic way of do-ing things.  What impact is all this going to have on the rulings of the Federal Constitutional Court? Karlsruhe still has to decide whether the OMT programme is in compliance with the German Basic Law. This question concerns the future of the FCC’s ideas on how to monitor competences and iden-tity, the Ultra vires-control and identity control. I cannot imagine that the FCC will throw out the ECJ’s affirmative ruling on the ECB’s compe-tences with regard to OMT, even if not everyone in Karlsruhe  is going to agree with everything the ECJ says. It remains to be seen whether in the future, the FCC will retract its monitoring of ultra vires activities and concentrate instead on consti-tutional identity. It is quite conceivable that the FCC claim to have jurisdiction on ultra vires acts will morph into a path for individuals to submit cases of competence violations to the European Court of Justice, which currently is not exactly easy when one thinks of the procedural limita-tions for individuals in that respect in European law. In future the FCC may simply pass such competence cases to Luxembourg and then adopt the rulings of the ECJ. By monitoring con-stitutional identity one would still have a lever with which to protect core provisions of one’s own constitution.  In this particular case we will have to wait and see how the Second Senate of the FCC deals with the preliminary ruling of the ECJ. It is conceivable that after the ECJ ruling the FCC quietly decide to drop the subject of monitoring identity. The op-posite is also conceivable. Perhaps the FCC will convene another huge hearing with all those in-volved and media coverage and experts and all the rest in order to clarify the question of whether the OMT programme can have a detrimental ef-fect on the constitutional identity of the Federal Republic and the principles of democracy.  In this case it is not only the credibility of the OMT programme and its stabilizing effect on the euro which are at stake, but – once again flashlight europe  N°5 – June 2015     OMT is Monetary Policy and Not Economic Policy 4 – the euro rescue policy of the Federal gov-ernment. It emphasizes that the ECB is inde-pendent, and refuses point blank to comment on its policies. Can the Federal Constitutional Court force it to change tack? And what would be the consequences if that happened? Of course one of the criticisms of the two judges who wrote dissenting opinions to the FCC’s ref-erence to the ECJ was that it is not quite clear what the FCC should actually do if it comes to the conclusion that OMT has violated the constitu-tion. Forcing the Federal Government by means of an FCC ruling to file a suit contesting the legal-ity of the OMT programme with the ECJ would not be very meaningful, since the ECJ has just issued a ruling on the legality of the OMT programme. The FCC could certainly stop the Bundesbank from participating in such programmes. But in or-der for this to happen someone would have to demonstrate that the OMT programme violates the constitution, and that is something I cannot imagine. What does the ruling and its impact on Ger-man law signify for future crisis policy as a whole?  It means on the one hand that when they choose instruments in the context of crisis policy the po-litical actors and the ECB will have the same flex-ibility as they have had in the past. This ruling does not deprive them of anything. In particular the ruling does not suggest that the ECJ is critical of the ECB’s “quantitative easing.” But at the same time it is made clear that there are certain legal constraints which must be complied with. Thus the ruling is neither a carte blanche nor a blank cheque, but a reminder of the fact that cer-tain rules in general and procedural and justifica-tion rules in particular have to be obeyed. It em-phasizes that the ECB is not above the law. But most importantly the ECJ ruling with its level-headed tone and its sober statements has not ex-acerbated the risk of a judicial conflict, or a war of judges between the ECJ and the FCC. When one thinks of the Greek crisis and its economic prob-lems, the last thing the EU needs is a legal crisis. The ECJ has proffered its hand to the FCC. The German Constitutional Court should not refuse to shake it.  flashlight europe  V.i.S.d.P. Bertelsmann Stiftung Carl Bertelsmann Straße 256 D-33311 Gütersloh www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de Isabell Hoffmann isabell.hoffmann@bertelsmann-stiftung.de Telefon +49 5241 81 81602 Personal details: Franz C. Mayer, Chair of Public Law, European Law and Public International Law, Comparative Law, Law & Politics, University of Bielefeld. He was Counsel to the German Parliament in the German Con-stitutional Court’s Treaty of Lisbon case and in the Euro case (EFSF/Greek aid measures).  The interview was conducted by: Isabell Hoffmann, Bertelsmann Stiftung, Europe's Future Program  

Flashlight Europe N°5–June 2015. OMT is Monetary Policy and Not Economic Policy

flashlight europe 
OMT is Monetary Policy and 
Not Economic Policy 
N°5 – June 2015 
Isabell Hoffmann 
Bertelsmann Stiftung, isabell.hoffmann@bertelsmann-stiftung.de 
In January 2014, for the first time in its his-
tory, the German Federal Constitutional Court 
submitted several questions to the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) in Luxembourg and 
asked for a preliminary ruling. The questions 
had arisen within the framework of the OMT 
case, and the issue was whether or not the 
OMT (“outright monetary transactions”) pro-
gramme announced by Mario Draghi, the 
head of the European Central Bank (ECB), is 
in compliance with the law of the European 
Union. The OMT programme (which has be-
come well-known because Draghi said “what-
ever it takes to preserve the euro” when he 
unveiled it) plays an important role in the sta-
bilization of the euro area. It means that the 
European System of Central Banks will be 
empowered to engage in unlimited buying of 
government bonds issued by certain Member 
States if and as long as these Member States 
are simultaneously taking part in a European 
rescue or reform programme (under the EFSF 
ot the ESM). Hitherto the OMT has not been 
implemented. Nonetheless a suit contesting 
its legality was filed with the Federal Consti-
tutional Court. 
 
The European Court of Justice now had to de-
cide whether or not the activities of the ECB 
were in compliance with European law. How-
ever, the ECJ had to take into account the 
prior assessment of the Federal Constitu-
tional Court. In its submission the Federal 
Constitutional Court made it quite clear that it 
was of the opinion that there has been a vio-
lation of European law. But at the same time 
it did not exclude the possibility that the ECJ 
set up legal conditions for OMT in order to 
avoid a violation of European law. 
 
Franz C. Mayer, Professor of European Law at 
the University of Bielefeld, was Counsel to the 
Federal Parliament in earlier cases on the 
Euro in Karlsruhe. He explains the ruling by 
the European Court of Justice and assesses 
the possible consequences. 
 
The European Court of Justice confirmed the 
view of the European Central Bank that if it 
purchases bonds within the framework of the 
OMT programme, it is not violating European 
law. What are the main arguments of the 
court? And has it issued any guidelines to 
which the bank will have to adhere? 
flashlight europe 
 
N°5 – June 2015     OMT is Monetary Policy and Not Economic Policy 2 
One of the main objections to the OMT pro-
gramme has been that it is actually economic pol-
icy. Since this is not one of the ECB’s compe-
tences, it would seem to be acting in violation of 
its powers (an “ultra vires act”). Basically the ECJ 
agrees with the view taken  by the European Cen-
tral Bank, which is that the OMT programme can 
be assigned to the area of monetary policy. And 
this is one of the competences of the EU – and 
thus of the ECB. The argument centres on the 
assertion that the purpose of the OMT pro-
gramme is to ensure the consistency and proper 
transmission of monetary policy. If the objectives 
of monetary policy decision-making are no longer 
transmitted and indeed disregarded in parts of 
the euro currency area, it will have a negative ef-
fect on the ECB’s ability to promote price stability. 
The ECJ admits that there is an indirect economic 
policy impact of such a programme, but this is not 
relevant for the competence issue. Furthermore, 
the ECJ considers “selectivity,” that is, the fact 
that only some of the Member States are covered 
by the OMT programme, i.e. crisis-ridden states 
which have sought refuge under the ESM um-
brella, to be legally defensible if, that is, the dis-
ruption of the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism emanates from only a few Member 
States. 
 
The ECB links OMT purchases to participation in 
economic adjustment programmes (which in ef-
fect are austerity and consolidation pro-
grammes). However, the ECJ does not believe 
that this has robbed it of its independence. The 
ECJ emphasizes the fact that independence also 
signifies the ability to base one’s actions “in a 
wholly independent manner” on certain precondi-
tions. 
 
Another complaint is that the ECB has in fact 
been engaged in banned monetary financing, de 
facto financing government expenditure. When 
all is said and done, by purchasing government 
bonds it is in the final analysis providing financial 
support for the budgets of the states concerned, 
which thus no longer have any incentive to exer-
cise budget discipline. In this context it needs to 
be remembered that the treaties permit the ECB 
to purchase government bonds on the secondary 
market, but not on the primary market. The ECJ 
makes it quite clear that it is not permissible to 
circumvent the ban on purchases on the primary 
market and to cook the books and makes a num-
ber of constraints in this regard. In particular mar-
ket participants and the Member States should 
not always be able to assume that the ECB will 
immediately purchase certain government bonds 
on the secondary market, there must not be a 
certainty that bonds will be purchased. 
In its reference the Federal Constitutional 
Court emphasized the fact that it was expect-
ing the European Central Bank to be given 
certain guidelines and constraints. Has the 
ECJ met these expectations? 
 
To a large extent at any rate. The ECJ makes it 
very clear that the OMT programme can operate 
only as long as there are in fact problems con-
cerning the transmission of monetary policy. Fur-
thermore, as I said, the ban on monetary financ-
ing must not be circumvented. The ECJ has sub-
jected the OMT programme to a proportionality 
test in order to evaluate both its suitability and its 
necessity. The express renunciation of a debt cut, 
which the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) 
was asking for, is not mentioned by the ECJ, 
though. But the ECJ makes a point of emphasiz-
ing that the concept of the treaties is to have a 
central bank which, whether one likes it or not, 
has the duty to make certain decisions that can 
incur certain financial risks for the bank. 
Much has been written about the fact that the 
courts have conflicting views. What issues 
are at the heart of this conflict, and do you be-
lieve that it has now been defused? 
 
One needs to draw certain distinctions. In as 
much as we are talking about the legality of the 
ECB’s activities with regard to OMT, the question 
has been answered, at least as far as the ECJ is 
concerned. With this, there is a chance that the 
FCC will not allow the conflict to escalate in this 
area. This would also help to defuse the issue of 
“quantitative easing” (QE), another ECB purchas-
ing programme which has a different structure 
and a different background. A suit contesting the 
legality of this programme has now been filed 
with the Federal Constitutional Court in Karls-
ruhe. 
flashlight europe 
 
N°5 – June 2015     OMT is Monetary Policy and Not Economic Policy 3 
However, the fundamental point of conflict be-
tween the courts has not gone away. This is due 
to the fact that the FCC believes that it has a right 
to monitor the limits of EU competences and in 
certain cases to contest the primacy of European 
law when it is in conflict with the Basic Law. In its 
reference to the ECJ the FCC in fact developed 
two lines of argument. On the one hand it asked 
whether the activities of the ECB were within its 
mandate and EU competences. The ECJ’s une-
quivocal answer to this was “Yes.” At the same 
time it emphasized that this dictum based on Eu-
ropean law was binding for the court concerned, 
which is the FCC. But on the other hand even in 
its reference the FCC stated that after receiving 
a ruling from the ECJ it still intended to ascertain 
whether the activities of the ECB were in any way 
inimical to German constitutional identity. The 
reasoning on this point is rather convoluted, and 
personally I do not find it particularly convincing. 
Here is the argument: The purchases within the 
framework of the OMT programme would largely 
be made by the national central banks. The argu-
ment seems to be that the OMT program could 
lead to significant losses of the Bundesbank, the 
German Central Bank, which in turn could cripple 
the federal budget. This would render elections to 
Parliament meaningless to German voters, since 
a crippled budget deprives Parliament of any 
room for maneuver. This in turn would have an 
impact on the very core of democracy in Ger-
many, which cannot be changed by a constitu-
tional amendment, so that in the final analysis the 
OMT programme would harm German constitu-
tional identity. I think this line of argument is ra-
ther hypothetical. The ECJ addresses the prob-
lem in an oblique way by pointing out that there 
are de facto limits of OMT purchases. 
 
But let me get back to the principles at stake here. 
Monitoring competences in an “Ultra vires-con-
trol” and monitoring identity in an “identity control” 
can both have deleterious effect on European law 
if national courts engage in this monitoring. Just 
imagine if the courts in all of the 28 Member 
States decided to monitor all sorts of European 
legal acts. That is a task the ECJ reserves for it-
self, in accordance with the founding treaties. 
This point of conflict is defused in the ECJ’s OMT 
ruling inasmuch as the ECJ briefly states its point 
of view – “the ECJ decides” – and does not keep 
going on about it. That is a pragmatic way of do-
ing things.  
What impact is all this going to have on the 
rulings of the Federal Constitutional Court? 
Karlsruhe still has to decide whether the OMT 
programme is in compliance with the German 
Basic Law. 
This question concerns the future of the FCC’s 
ideas on how to monitor competences and iden-
tity, the Ultra vires-control and identity control. I 
cannot imagine that the FCC will throw out the 
ECJ’s affirmative ruling on the ECB’s compe-
tences with regard to OMT, even if not everyone 
in Karlsruhe  is going to agree with everything the 
ECJ says. It remains to be seen whether in the 
future, the FCC will retract its monitoring of ultra 
vires activities and concentrate instead on consti-
tutional identity. It is quite conceivable that the 
FCC claim to have jurisdiction on ultra vires acts 
will morph into a path for individuals to submit 
cases of competence violations to the European 
Court of Justice, which currently is not exactly 
easy when one thinks of the procedural limita-
tions for individuals in that respect in European 
law. In future the FCC may simply pass such 
competence cases to Luxembourg and then 
adopt the rulings of the ECJ. By monitoring con-
stitutional identity one would still have a lever with 
which to protect core provisions of one’s own 
constitution. 
 
In this particular case we will have to wait and see 
how the Second Senate of the FCC deals with the 
preliminary ruling of the ECJ. It is conceivable 
that after the ECJ ruling the FCC quietly decide 
to drop the subject of monitoring identity. The op-
posite is also conceivable. Perhaps the FCC will 
convene another huge hearing with all those in-
volved and media coverage and experts and all 
the rest in order to clarify the question of whether 
the OMT programme can have a detrimental ef-
fect on the constitutional identity of the Federal 
Republic and the principles of democracy. 
 
In this case it is not only the credibility of the 
OMT programme and its stabilizing effect on 
the euro which are at stake, but – once again 
flashlight europe 
 
N°5 – June 2015     OMT is Monetary Policy and Not Economic Policy 4 
– the euro rescue policy of the Federal gov-
ernment. It emphasizes that the ECB is inde-
pendent, and refuses point blank to comment 
on its policies. Can the Federal Constitutional 
Court force it to change tack? And what 
would be the consequences if that happened? 
Of course one of the criticisms of the two judges 
who wrote dissenting opinions to the FCC’s ref-
erence to the ECJ was that it is not quite clear 
what the FCC should actually do if it comes to the 
conclusion that OMT has violated the constitu-
tion. Forcing the Federal Government by means 
of an FCC ruling to file a suit contesting the legal-
ity of the OMT programme with the ECJ would not 
be very meaningful, since the ECJ has just issued 
a ruling on the legality of the OMT programme. 
The FCC could certainly stop the Bundesbank 
from participating in such programmes. But in or-
der for this to happen someone would have to 
demonstrate that the OMT programme violates 
the constitution, and that is something I cannot 
imagine. 
What does the ruling and its impact on Ger-
man law signify for future crisis policy as a 
whole?  
It means on the one hand that when they choose 
instruments in the context of crisis policy the po-
litical actors and the ECB will have the same flex-
ibility as they have had in the past. This ruling 
does not deprive them of anything. In particular 
the ruling does not suggest that the ECJ is critical 
of the ECB’s “quantitative easing.” But at the 
same time it is made clear that there are certain 
legal constraints which must be complied with. 
Thus the ruling is neither a carte blanche nor a 
blank cheque, but a reminder of the fact that cer-
tain rules in general and procedural and justifica-
tion rules in particular have to be obeyed. It em-
phasizes that the ECB is not above the law. But 
most importantly the ECJ ruling with its level-
headed tone and its sober statements has not ex-
acerbated the risk of a judicial conflict, or a war of 
judges between the ECJ and the FCC. When one 
thinks of the Greek crisis and its economic prob-
lems, the last thing the EU needs is a legal crisis. 
The ECJ has proffered its hand to the FCC. The 
German Constitutional Court should not refuse to 
shake it. 
 
flashlight europe 
 
V.i.S.d.P. 
Bertelsmann Stiftung 
Carl Bertelsmann Straße 256 
D-33311 Gütersloh 
www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de 
Isabell Hoffmann 
isabell.hoffmann@bertelsmann-stiftung.de 
Telefon +49 5241 81 81602 
Personal details: 
Franz C. Mayer, Chair of Public Law, European Law and Public International Law, Comparative Law, 
Law & Politics, University of Bielefeld. He was Counsel to the German Parliament in the German Con-
stitutional Court’s Treaty of Lisbon case and in the Euro case (EFSF/Greek aid measures). 
 
The interview was conducted by: 
Isabell Hoffmann, Bertelsmann Stiftung, Europe's Future Program 
 


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Flashlight Europe N°5–June 2015. OMT is Monetary Policy and Not Economic Policy

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