The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) played a very important role in the process of European integration. Its jurisprudence has again and again strengthened the competencies of the supranational level to the disadvantage of the member states. The CJEU has always been criticized for this pro-integrationist activism but that never had a serious impact on the court’s behavior. In recent years, however, the environment for legal integration has changed: The CJEU is increasingly treading on political sensitive issues; and that in a period when the integration project as such is becoming more and more contested. Scholars of legal integration have expected that this would lead to more criticism of, resistance to or even attacks on the court’s power and thus to a changing or less important role of the CJEU in the integration process. Yet, this expectation has not been fulfilled. Although there have been much controversy on some recent CJEU decisions, this criticism has never exceeded the local stage and led to attempts to recast the Court’s role. The present article approaches this puzzle by investigating the CJEU’s jurisprudence on Golden Shares, one of the most controversial lines of case law in recent years. By doing so, three mechanisms of opposition abatement are identified: Uncertainty about the future development of the case law, case-specific concessions made by the CJEU, and limited damage in the concrete cases at hand
