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Power, Techno-economics, and Transatlantic Relations in 1987-1999

Abstract

This essay suggests that in 1987-1999 European elites, in their efforts of asymmetric balancing against the United States hegemony, decided to trade-off military capability for economic competitiveness. Thus, it documents a correlation between a) the reluctance of especially France and Germany during the 1990s to fully embrace and pursue the US-led RMA; and, b) the European Union's efforts since the late 1980s to challenge America's technological and economic supremacy in the aerospace sector. Two projects (Airbus and Galileo) indicate that the quest for strategic independence and the fear of reduced influence in international affairs were the driving forces behind European efforts to challenge the US commercial and technological supremacy in the aerospace sector in 1987-99. Furthermore, the article tries to identify what role the RMA played in this context (focusing in particular on Germany and France). It argues also that since the late 1980s (and especially during the 1990s), the European Commission and countries such as France and Germany perceived US policies in high-technology sectors (accentuated also by vigorous pursuit of the RMA) as limiting Europe’s abilities to advance its own agenda in international economic and security affairs

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