One of the major stories from the 2020 Romanian election was the success of a new nationalist party, the Alliance for the Unity of Romanians, which surprised observers by winning over 9 per cent of the vote. Drawing on new data, Mihnea Stoica, Vladimir Cristea and André Krouwel explain how the party managed to build support so rapidly

Cristea, Vladimir

Krouwel, André

Stoica, Mihnea

English

LSE Research Online

Stealth	populism:	Explaining	the	rise	of	the	Alliancefor	the	Unity	of	RomaniansOne	of	the	major	stories	from	the	2020	Romanian	election	was	the	success	of	a	new	nationalist	party,	the	Alliancefor	the	Unity	of	Romanians,	which	surprised	observers	by	winning	over	9	per	cent	of	the	vote.	Drawing	on	new	data,Mihnea	Stoica,	Vladimir	Cristea	and	André	Krouwel	explain	how	the	party	managed	to	build	support	so	rapidly.The	most	recent	legislative	elections	held	in	Romania	in	December	2020	produced	what	was	regarded	by	mostpolitical	observers	as	a	major	surprise:	a	brand	new,	almost	obscure,	populist	party,	the	Alliance	for	the	Unity	ofRomanians	–	with	an	acronym	that	means	‘gold’	(AUR)	–	managed	to	gain	over	9	per	cent	of	the	vote.	The	successof	this	‘stealth	party’	was	missed	by	most	pollsters	and	analysts.	In	the	local	elections	that	were	held	only	twomonths	before	the	legislative	elections,	the	AUR	only	gained	1	per	cent	of	the	vote.On	top	of	that,	several	smaller	parties	fell	victim	to	the	5%	threshold	for	entering	Parliament.	The	most	remarkablelosers	were	the	Popular	Movement	Party	(PMP)	of	former	President	Traian	Băsescu	and	the	PRO	Romania	Partyof	former	Prime	Minister	Victor	Ponta.	The	outcome	also	indicated	a	fragmented	electorate,	with	no	party	managingto	win	more	than	30	per	cent	of	the	vote.	Finally,	the	incumbent	government	parties	won	enough	seats	to	remain	inoffice,	which	was	also	a	departure	from	the	typical	‘throwing-the-rascals-out’	mentality	of	voters	in	Romania.The	Romanian	political	landscape	in	the	2020	electionsAs	part	of	a	recent	project,	a	team	of	Romanian	academics	from	Babeș-Bolyai	University	developed	a	so-calledVote	Advice	Application	(VAA)	for	the	2020	Romanian	elections.	This	online	application	allowed	users	to	comparetheir	opinions	with	those	of	the	main	parties.	Users	answered	a	set	of	30	questions	on	political	issues.	Based	onthese	answers,	the	VAA	matched	the	user’s	political	preferences	with	party	positions	on	the	same	issues.The	parties	were	coded	on	the	30	topics	according	to	their	official	positions,	campaign	documents	and	speeches	byparty	leaders.	The	tool	framed	the	positions	of	the	parties	on	salient	issues	so	as	to	give	an	ideological	directionand	determine	their	loading	on	one	of	the	deeper	cleavage	dimensions	that	demarcate	the	Romanian	politicallandscape,	producing	a	multidimensional	‘map’	of	party	competition.	Users	could	find	where	they	were	positioned	inthe	political	space,	and	how	close	or	far	they	were	from	the	main	political	parties.	Figure	1	below	shows	this	map	ofthe	Romanian	political	landscape.Figure	1:	Map	of	the	Romanian	political	landscapeLSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog: Stealth populism: Explaining the rise of the Alliance for the Unity of Romanians Page 1 of 5		Date originally posted: 2021-02-26Permalink: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2021/02/26/stealth-populism-explaining-the-rise-of-the-alliance-for-the-unity-of-romanians/Blog homepage: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/Note:	The	figure	shows	parties	on	a	dimension	between	progressive	(liberal)	and	conservative	(conservator)	values,	and	on	a	dimension	between	left	(stânga)	andright	(dreapta)	positions	on	the	economy.	The	parties	shown	in	the	figure	are	the	Social	Democratic	Party	(PSD	–	left	side	of	the	figure),	National	Liberal	Party	(PNL	–arrow	logo,	top	right),	2020	USR-PLUS	Alliance	(blue/red	split	logo,	top	left),	Alliance	for	the	Unity	of	Romanians	(AUR	–	bottom	left),	Democratic	Alliance	ofHungarians	in	Romania	(UDMR	–	red	logo,	top	left),	Popular	Movement	Party	(PMP	–	apple	logo,	right	side),	and	PRO	Romania	(blue/red/yellow	logo,	top	left).For	the	2020	elections,	parties	seemed	to	be	mostly	crowded	on	the	left	side	of	the	political	map.	The	SocialDemocratic	Party	(PSD)	was	the	party	positioned	most	to	the	left,	but	it	was	judged	to	be	quite	moderate	on	theprogressive-conservative	dimension.	PRO	Romania,	which	is	a	splinter	party	that	broke	off	from	the	PSD,	was	alsoon	the	left,	but	with	a	slightly	more	progressive	platform.	The	Democratic	Alliance	of	Hungarians	in	Romania(UDMR),	which	mainly	represents	Romanian	citizens	with	a	Hungarian	ethnic	background,	occupied	a	very	similarposition	to	PRO	Romania.The	USR-PLUS	alliance	was	the	most	progressive	left-wing	competitor.	This	alliance	consists	of	the	Save	RomaniaUnion	(USR)	and	the	Freedom,	Unity	and	Solidarity	Party	(PLUS),	two	parties	with	fairly	flexible	ideologicalorientations.	The	Alliance	for	the	Unity	of	Romanians	ended	up	being	the	most	conservative	left-wing	party.	Votersthat	were	located	on	the	right	side	of	the	map	were	likely	to	end	up	closest	to	either	the	National	Liberal	Party	(PNL)–	a	progressive	and	pro-European	party	which	was	in	government	at	the	time	of	the	elections	–	or	the	PMP,	whichis	a	conservative	party	that	shares	some	common	ground	with	the	Republican	Party	in	the	United	States.Stealth	populismBy	far	the	most	unexpected	outcome	of	the	elections	was	the	emergence	of	the	AUR,	which	established	itself	asthe	fourth	largest	political	force	in	the	Romanian	Parliament.	In	recent	years,	Romania	has	been	one	of	the	fewcountries	in	the	European	Union	without	a	major	nationalist-populist	political	force,	following	the	decline	of	theGreater	Romania	Party	(PRM)	at	the	beginning	of	the	2010s.LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog: Stealth populism: Explaining the rise of the Alliance for the Unity of Romanians Page 2 of 5		Date originally posted: 2021-02-26Permalink: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2021/02/26/stealth-populism-explaining-the-rise-of-the-alliance-for-the-unity-of-romanians/Blog homepage: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/What	made	the	electoral	result	of	the	AUR	particularly	surprising	for	political	observers	and	the	general	public	alikeis	that	the	party	did	not	even	appear	in	the	opinion	polls	conducted	before	the	election.	Polls	only	started	to	includeit	in	the	last	days	before	the	election,	and	even	in	these	cases	its	score	was	massively	underestimated.	Yet	whilemany	Romanians	heard	about	the	AUR	for	the	first	time	on	the	night	of	the	elections	as	the	exit-polls	wereannounced,	the	party	had	been	gradually	growing	their	visibility	throughout	2020,	mostly	through	an	efficient	andwell-targeted	campaign	on	social	media.Most	of	the	party’s	main	positions	focus	on	Romanian	nationalism,	conservatism	and	protectionism.	According	tothe	party’s	political	programme,	the	four	main	pillars	of	the	AUR’s	ideology	are	“family,	fatherland,	faith	andfreedom”,	and	their	campaign	efforts	commonly	featured	activism	for	the	unification	between	Romania	andMoldova,	an	opposition	to	progressive	politics,	criticism	of	foreign	investment,	and	scepticism	towards	furtherEuropean	integration.To	sketch	a	profile	of	the	AUR’s	supporters,	we	use	data	collected	during	the	election	campaign	–	through	the	VAAas	well	as	a	post-election	survey	on	a	panel	that	is	weighted	to	be	representative	for	the	total	population.Respondents	were	asked	who	they	voted	for,	but	also	to	estimate	the	likelihood	that	they	would	ever	vote	for	eachof	the	other	main	parties	competing	in	the	election.	This	‘propensity	to	vote’	(PTV)	measure	ranged	from	0	(highlyunlikely)	to	10	(highly	likely).	We	also	asked	voters	to	place	themselves	on	a	standard	left-right	scale,	from	0	to	10.If	we	regress	vote	propensities	of	the	AUR	against	the	self-declared	left-right	dimension	we	get	no	significant	result.A	regression	of	vote	propensities	for	the	party	against	the	calculated	left-right	dimension	based	on	all	substantivestatements	on	the	economic	dimension	indicates	that	AUR	voters	tend	to	lean	to	the	right	in	policy	preferences.However,	when	we	only	take	voters	with	a	high	propensity	to	vote	for	the	party	(greater	than	or	equal	to	6	on	thescale),	this	effect	is	no	longer	significant.Voters	for	the	AUR	are	not	very	pronounced	on	the	left-right	dimension,	but	are	very	mixed	both	in	self-declaredideological	orientation	as	well	as	actual	policy	preferences.	The	appeal	of	the	AUR	is	on	the	cultural	dimension,where	AUR	voters	are	much	more	pronounced.	In	their	conservative-progressive	orientation,	AUR	voters	areclearly	conservative,	for	example	opposing	abortion	rights,	same-sex	marriage	and	immigration.	This	findingmatches	with	the	position	of	the	AUR	in	the	Romanian	political	landscape,	based	on	its	political	programme,	wherethe	party	displays	a	mix	of	deeply	conservative	stances	on	the	cultural	dimension,	but	is	moderately	left-wing	on	theeconomic	dimension	(see	Figure	1).On	economic	issues,	AUR	voters	seem	to	be	highly	diverse	in	terms	of	the	left-right	spectrum,	and	voter	opinionson	substantive	issues	show	conflicting	responses.	For	example,	vote	propensities	for	the	AUR	are	essentiallyunrelated	to	responses	to	the	statement	that	“the	government	should	offer	unemployed	people	more	financialsupport”,	yet	they	favour	wealth	redistribution	from	the	rich	to	the	poor.	However,	AUR	supporters	are	also	morelikely	to	be	opposed	to	government	intervention	in	the	economy	and	agree	with	decreases	in	government	spending.When	we	plot	such	contradictory	economic	mindsets,	we	get	the	results	shown	in	Figure	2	below.Figure	2:	Political	positions	of	Romanian	voters	(AUR	voters	highlighted)LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog: Stealth populism: Explaining the rise of the Alliance for the Unity of Romanians Page 3 of 5		Date originally posted: 2021-02-26Permalink: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2021/02/26/stealth-populism-explaining-the-rise-of-the-alliance-for-the-unity-of-romanians/Blog homepage: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/Note:	The	figure	shows	an	estimate	of	the	political	positions	of	all	voters	contained	in	the	sample,	based	on	their	responses	to	questions	asked	via	the	Vote	AdviceApplication	and	a	separate	survey.On	European	integration,	AUR	voters	appear	to	be	much	more	critical	of	the	European	Union	than	the	generalelectorate.	They	are	more	likely	to	agree	with	the	statement	that	“overall,	EU	member	status	is	a	bad	thing	forRomania”	and	that	“European	decision-makers	are	treating	Romania	like	a	colony”.	They	also	tend	to	agree	withthe	prioritisation	of	Romanian	investors	over	foreign	ones	when	awarding	governmental	aid	and	oppose	the	right	ofHungarian-Romanians	to	education	in	their	native	language.Covid-19,	climate	change,	and	corruptionBesides	these	conventional	topics,	a	major	reason	for	the	success	of	the	AUR’s	campaign	was	the	position	many	ofthe	party’s	prominent	figures	took	on	the	Covid-19	pandemic.	Throughout	the	outbreak,	they	criticised	thegovernment’s	response,	called	for	a	loosening	of	lockdown	measures,	campaigned	against	face	mask	rules,	playeddown	the	severity	of	the	virus,	organised	gatherings	and	rallies	without	observing	social	distancing	rules,	and	insome	cases	even	promoted	conspiracy	theories	about	the	virus	or	vaccines.	In	a	country	where	22%	of	thepopulation	does	not	want	to	take	a	Covid-19	vaccine	and	another	9%	claims	to	be	unlikely	to	take	it,	these	actionsgave	the	party	widespread	visibility	and	attracted	sympathy	from	some	parts	of	society.These	attitudes	can	also	be	seen	in	the	data,	as	a	preference	for	the	AUR	is	positively	associated	with	a	belief	that“the	government	should	allow	people	to	make	their	own	decisions	on	how	they	want	to	protect	themselves	from	thecoronavirus	during	this	pandemic”,	and	that	“churches	should	remain	open	during	the	pandemic”.	With	respect	toanother	topic	where	populist	parties	have	a	tendency	to	disagree	with	the	expert	consensus,	climate	change,	theAUR	fits	the	prevailing	trend	as	their	voters	are	more	prone	to	believe	that	“the	so-called	climate	crisis	is	anexaggeration”	than	the	voters	of	other	parties.LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog: Stealth populism: Explaining the rise of the Alliance for the Unity of Romanians Page 4 of 5		Date originally posted: 2021-02-26Permalink: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2021/02/26/stealth-populism-explaining-the-rise-of-the-alliance-for-the-unity-of-romanians/Blog homepage: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/Another	core	message	of	the	AUR	campaign	was	its	fight	against	government	corruption	and	the	politicalestablishment.	Analysing	the	data,	it	becomes	clear	how	these	messages	have	resonated	so	strongly,	as	AURsympathisers	appear	to	be	less	trusting	of	Romanian	institutions	than	the	voters	of	any	other	party.	“Thegovernment	is	led	by	interest	groups	that	aim	to	protect	themselves”	and	“quite	a	lot	of	the	people	leading	thegovernment	are	corrupt”	are	two	statements	that	they	strongly	resonated	with,	and	AUR	voters	also	seem	to	be	themost	pessimistic	about	the	direction	in	which	Romania	is	currently	heading.Sources	of	supportAfter	the	unexpected	result	in	December,	political	analysts	began	to	assess	where	AUR	voters	had	switched	theirallegiances	from.	Our	data	reveals	that	there	is	no	one	party	from	which	AUR	has	won	its	voters.	Instead,	theirvoters	include	people	who	voted	for	all	of	the	other	parties	in	2016,	as	well	as	a	very	substantive	proportion	ofpeople	(as	high	as	50%	of	their	electorate)	who	did	not	vote	in	2016,	were	not	allowed	to	vote	because	they	wereunder	the	legal	voting	age,	or	voted	for	smaller	fringe	parties	that	did	not	enter	the	Parliament.Demographically,	our	data	shows	that	AUR	voters	are	more	likely	to	be	male	and	have	a	lower	level	of	education.Interestingly,	compared	to	parties	such	as	USR-PLUS	or	the	PSD,	whose	electorates	are	very	age-specific	(youth	inthe	case	of	the	former,	the	elderly	in	the	case	of	the	latter),	the	AUR	seems	to	attract	voters	of	all	ages.Nevertheless,	the	party	is	marginally	more	popular	among	younger	people.	These	findings	are	consistent	withprevious	results	presented	by	CURS-Avangarde’s	exit-poll.While	nationalist	political	mobilisation	is	no	stranger	to	Romanian	politics,	as	illustrated	by	the	previous	success	ofthe	Greater	Romania	Party,	the	rise	of	the	AUR	from	an	almost	insignificant	force	to	the	fourth	largest	party	inParliament	was	undoubtedly	surprising.	Many	Central	and	Eastern	European	countries	have	experienced	anilliberal,	populist	and	ultraconservative	wave	over	recent	years,	so	there	are	reasons	to	believe	the	AUR	may	behere	to	stay.	However,	whether	the	party	will	be	able	to	consolidate	their	rather	erratic	and	inconsistent	voter	baseremains	to	be	seen.Note:	This	article	is	based	on	work	conducted	as	part	of	the	‘Populism’s	Roots:	Economic	and	Cultural	Explanationsin	Democracies	of	Europe’	(PRECEDE)	project,	financed	by	the	Volkswagen	Foundation.	The	article	gives	theviews	of	the	authors,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the	London	School	ofEconomics.	Featured	image	credit:	Dennis	Jarvis	(CC	BY-SA	2.0)LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog: Stealth populism: Explaining the rise of the Alliance for the Unity of Romanians Page 5 of 5		Date originally posted: 2021-02-26Permalink: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2021/02/26/stealth-populism-explaining-the-rise-of-the-alliance-for-the-unity-of-romanians/Blog homepage: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/

Stealth populism: explaining the rise of the Alliance for the Unity of Romanians

Stoica, Mihnea S.

VU Research Portal

Stealth populism: Explaining the rise of the Alliance for the Unity of Romanians

https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2021/02/26/stealth-populism-explaining-the-rise-of-the-alliance-for-the-unity-of-romanians/

Stealth populism: explaining the rise of the Alliance for the Unity of Romanians

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