Efforts to solve conflict and establish peace across the world have evolved into what might be called an ‘international peace architecture’. Oliver P. Richmond tracks the six stages through which this system has emerged and asks whether it is still capable of responding to the demands of modern conflicts

Richmond, Oliver P.

English

LSE Research Online

The	international	peace	architecture:	A	grand	butflawed	design	for	peacemakingEfforts	to	solve	conflict	and	establish	peace	across	the	world	have	evolved	into	what	might	be	called	an‘international	peace	architecture’.	Oliver	P.	Richmond	tracks	the	six	stages	through	which	this	system	hasemerged	and	asks	whether	it	is	still	capable	of	responding	to	the	demands	of	modern	conflicts.During	the	last	century,	the	evolution	of	an	‘international	peace	architecture’,	which	dates	back	at	least	as	far	as	theDuc	de	Sully’s	‘Grand	Design’	in	the	17th	century,	has	encompassed	the	local,	state,	regional,	and	global	scales	ofinternational	relations.	But	what	does	this	peace	architecture	entail	and	how	has	it	been	created?Every	political	system	requires	complex	systems	to	maintain	its	legitimacy,	including	knowledge,	power,	the	abilityto	innovate,	provide	inter-generational	maintenance,	and	reflect	everyday	political	claims	for	order,	progress,	andsustainability.	The	international	peace	architecture	was	formed	through	parallel	processes	to	combat	war	andviolence,	through	global,	regional	and	state	frameworks,	and	in	local	and	transnational	processes	involving	acomplex	development	and	expansion	of	rights.	There	were	six	key	stages	in	its	development.Stages	one	to	fourStage	one	emerged	from	the	balancing	system	of	19th	century	geopolitics,	which	allowed	limited	progress	to	bemade	on	the	basis	of	a	fragile,	imperial	balance	of	power.	This	laid	the	basis	for	stage	two,	after	the	First	WorldWar,	when	the	American	backed	liberal	internationalist	system	was	built.	International	law,	new	forms	of	diplomacy,democracy,	and	growing	multilateralism,	consolidated	the	international	peace	architecture	during	the	20th	century.Stage	three	spanned	the	Marxist	challenge	to	imperialism,	capitalism,	and	liberalism,	drawing	on	the	revolutionaryphilosophies	of	the	French	and	American	revolutions,	the	Soviet	Union’s	vision	of	international	peace,	as	well	asthe	growing	demands	made	by	newly	colonial	states	by	the	1960s	(including	the	Non-Aligned	Movement	thisspurred).	Stage	three	resulted	in	the	Cold	War	balance	of	power	and	ideological,	developmental	stalemate.It	also	provided	a	platform	for	global	networks	focused	on	matters	of	peace	and	justice	to	expand	into	civil	society,science	and	technology,	trade,	law,	conventions,	and	treaties	by	the	1970s.	As	multilateral	and	regional	institutionsdeveloped	over	the	latter	half	of	the	century,	an	important	convergence	arose	with	the	Helsinki	Accords	of	1975.They	connected	foreign	policy,	human	rights,	and	the	constitution	of	a	European	and	potentially	global	order,	whichcapitalised	on	the	international	peace	architecture.These	dynamics	led	to	stage	four	after	the	end	of	the	Cold	War.	This	stabilised	the	existing	layers	of	thearchitecture	while	enormously	expanding	its	overall	scope.	It	required	a	much	higher	set	of	standards.	The	‘Agendafor	Peace’,	published	by	the	UN	Secretary	General	in	1992,	linked	“…social	progress	and	better	standards	of	life	inlarger	freedom”	with	prevention,	peacekeeping,	and	peacebuilding	as	well	as	disarmament,	drawing	stages	one	tofour	together.The	international	peace	architecture	now	included	the	UN,	NATO,	the	EU,	AU,	and	other	regional	organisations,	aswell	as	the	international	financial	institutions,	the	various	international	courts	and	law,	the	donor	systems,	socialmovements,	and	a	multiplying	range	of	NGOs.	In	addition,	it	supported	a	constitutional	model,	a	system	ofinternational	law,	and	inter-governmental	institutions	in	a	complex	web	of	interdependence,	norms,	and	standards.The	international	peace	architecture,	by	this	point,	was	becoming	aligned	with	social	claims	for	security,	rights,welfare,	and	justice,	as	well	as	more	complex	identities.	This	process	positioned	a	layer	of	liberal	internationalismupon	the	19th	century	‘balance	of	power’	system,	creating	the	possibility	for	the	mitigation	of	imperial	and	state-centric	war,	as	well	as	civil	war.LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog: The international peace architecture: A grand but flawed design for peacemaking Page 1 of 4		Date originally posted: 2021-07-20Permalink: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2021/07/20/the-international-peace-architecture-a-grand-but-flawed-design-for-peacemaking/Blog homepage: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/Through	this	process,	subaltern	claims	were	represented	in	several	waves	through	stages	two,	three	and	four,	tothe	limited	degree	allowed	by	existing	knowledge-power	structures.	Public	goods	emerged	to	maintain	peace	andorder	through	institutions,	law,	development	and	legitimacy,	their	effects	spilling	across	local	to	global	scales.	Stagefour	enabled	claims	for	rights	and	justice	to	expand	substantially,	also	reducing	more	revolutionary	pressures	on	theinternational	system.Stages	five	and	six:	Growing	instabilitiesBy	stage	four,	the	international	peace	architecture	ran	on	a	very	low	margin	of	reserve	capacity	drained	by	its	scaleand	its	complex	processes.	This	meant	intervention	(broadly	defined	as	military,	peacekeeping,	mediation,peacebuilding,	and	development),	the	reform	of	the	state,	and	civil	peace	formation	processes	came	to	operatewithin	the	framework	of	preserving	states	and	only	the	most	basic	of	rights,	known	as	the	‘stabilisation’	approach(as	in	Syria	since	2011).The	2000s	therefore	saw	the	rise	of	an	authoritarian	and	neoliberal	peace	in	stage	five	of	the	international	peacearchitecture,	focused	on	limited	statebuilding	and	basic	regional	security.	It	was	supported	by	global	capital	in	thehope	that	this	would	buttress	the	development	of	legitimate	authority	in	conflict-affected	environments	likeAfghanistan	and	Iraq.	It	was	supported	by	the	West	for	geopolitical	reasons,	yet	was	undermined	by	its	growing	lackof	political	will.	It	was	also	partially	supported	by	the	emerging	powers	such	as	China	and	India	for	reasons	of	tradeand	regional	influence.Stage	five	was	careless	with	the	legitimacy	of	the	existing	international	peace	architecture,	turning	to	neoliberal,technological,	and	military	hegemony.	This	strategy	undermined	the	entire	architecture	as	well	as	the	micro-processes	within	it	(such	as	peacekeeping,	peacebuilding,	development,	and	mediation).Stabilisation	strategies	risked	abandoning	previous	layers	of	the	international	peace	architecture.	They	offered	littlein	the	way	of	a	response	to	new	modes	of	war,	now	experienced	as	piecemeal,	disaggregated,	multiplephenomena:	from	the	complex,	regional	and	civil	war	in	Syria,	to	guerrilla	warfare	as	recently	ended	in	Colombiaand	urban	violence	of	the	kind	seen	in	Latin	America	in	particular,	or	the	low-level	conflict	across	the	MENA	region,sub-Saharan	Africa	(as	in	the	DRC),	and	South-East	Asia	(as	in	Cambodia)	over	misallocation	under	authoritarianregimes.With	the	arrival	of	the	peacebuilding	doctrine	in	the	1990s,	broader	strategies	that	were	expected	to	deal	withdeeper	instabilities	and	injustices	also	ironically	preserved	the	northern	dominated	hierarchy.	They	increasinglyblocked	structural	reform,	and	the	expansion	of	rights	and	justice,	more	recently	flirting	with	dismantling	much	of	theinternational	peace	architecture.Stage	six	of	the	architecture	would	inevitably	require	intellectual	innovation,	and	material	and	geopoliticalinvestment,	support	for	rights	expansion	and	transversal	dynamics	to	reflect	subaltern	claims	(in	line	with	the	UNSustainable	Development	Goals	(2015)).	Democratising	the	international	adds	a	concern	with	global	inequalitiesand	long-term	sustainability,	as	raised	by	global	civil	society	networks,	as	well	as	emancipatory	global	governancelinked	to	global	cooperation	and	justice.	Such	a	trajectory	points	to	deep	relationality	across	societies	and	the	deepstructures	of	the	environment	or	commons.Stage	six	might	reflect	the	long	process	of	‘rights-seeking’	across	cultural,	political,	social,	and	economic	terrains,pushing	beyond	a	core-periphery,	neo-colonial	or	neoliberal	political	economy.	It	highlights	two	processes,	one	alinear	process	of	liberal	institution	and	constitution	building,	perhaps	leading	to	some	sort	of	global	federation,	andsecondly	the	micro-powers	that	actualise	subaltern	political	claims,	via	a	networked,	transversal	process,	leading	tomore	decentralised	systems	of	governance.	This	points	to	complex	forms	of	peace	that	support	reconciliation,equality,	justice	and	sustainability	across	issue	areas,	networks,	and	scales.However,	more	negative	alternatives	are	also	on	the	horizon.	The	mounting	contradictions	and	failures	of	theprevious	layers	have	meant	that	stage	six	is	clearly	bifurcated,	limiting	its	capacity	to	stabilise	the	existing	layers	ofthe	international	peace	architecture	or	deal	with	the	newer	dynamics	driving	war	and	conflict.	Its	alternative	pathpoints	to	a	‘pax	technica’:	a	hybrid	of	neoliberalism	and	new	technologies	of	power,	extending	many	of	the	older,predatory	patterns	of	elite	political	power,	which	might	be	termed	‘digital	governmentality’.	It	may	refresh	variants	ofstages	one	and	five	(geopolitics	and	statebuilding	/	stabilisation),	and	reject	or	dilute	expanded	rights	and	scientificclaims	about	sustainability	and	global	justice.LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog: The international peace architecture: A grand but flawed design for peacemaking Page 2 of 4		Date originally posted: 2021-07-20Permalink: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2021/07/20/the-international-peace-architecture-a-grand-but-flawed-design-for-peacemaking/Blog homepage: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/Blockages	and	counter-peaceInternal	tensions	in	the	different	elements	of	the	international	peace	architecture	ensured	that	it	became	moreentrenched	and	difficult	to	reform	as	it	expanded.	It	simultaneously	addressed	and	provoked	revanchist	andcounter-revolutionary	forces	associated	with	systems	of	geopolitics,	nationalism,	race,	class,	gender,	and	capital,	aswell	as	challenges	to	them.	It	involved	confronting	and	challenging	existing	vested	power	structures,	and	itscapacity	is	very	much	reactive.Peace	is	formed	after	war	and	conflict	due	to	a	mix	of	social	and	elite	forces,	and	it	is	not	able	to	anticipate	thenature	of	future	wars	because	of	its	limited	capacities.	Stage	four’s	global	scale	also	meant	it	faced	the	charge	ofinconsistency	in	maintaining	a	common,	normative	order	(see	the	cases	of	Syria	since	2011	and	Rwanda	in	1994versus	say	Kosovo	and	Bosnia	in	the	late	1990s).	It	was	soon	opposed	by	traditional	power	alignments	(class,capital,	state,	and	geopolitics)	as	well	as	by	the	emerging	‘great	powers’	and	decolonial	justice-oriented	challengesfrom	the	Global	South.	This	array	of	blockages	hindered	peacebuilding	processes	and	constituted	a	substantialcounter-peace	framework.The	example	of	peacebuilding	in	Bosnia	and	Herzegovina	is	illustrative.	Since	the	1995	Dayton	Peace	Accords,dominant	power	structures	have	been	revived.	These	seemingly	ad	hoc	dynamics	have	blocked	reforms,	stoppedthe	expansion	of	civil	society,	and	pushed	back	the	rule	of	law.	They	have	also	limited	the	scope	for	action	of	theOffice	of	the	High	Representative,	making	it	very	difficult	to	move	beyond	the	limited	Dayton	Agreement.Bosnia’s	progress	towards	EU	accession	has	stalled	because	offending	power-structures	were	supported	by	rentsreceived	from	ethno-nationalism,	territorialism,	secessionism,	militarism,	as	well	as	the	gains	made	fromunregulated	capital.	The	UN,	EU,	and	other	organisations	supported	stabilisation	policies	as	a	result,	enablingcontinuity	in	public	office,	and	institutions,	reflecting	elite	power.	These	counter-peace	dynamics	neutralised	thealready	weak	liberal	peacebuilding	framework.	Reconciliation	has	been	replaced	by	entrenchment,	which	may	slideback	towards	conflict	without	decisive	regional	and	international	engagement.This	reiterates	a	familiar,	contemporary	story:	that	conflict	requires	peacemaking	systems	to	be	embedded	in	social,state,	regional	and	international	frameworks.	If	they	become	derailed	or	collapse	because	of	ad	hoc	blockages	ormore	purposive	counter-peace	challenges,	the	international	peace	architecture	systems	will	need	to	be	reinventedor	reinvigorated,	starting	the	cycle	once	more.The	future	of	the	international	peace	architectureOverall,	the	international	peace	architecture	represents	an	attempt	to	respond	to	the	aftermath	of	different	types	ofwar	while	maintaining	western	and	northern	hegemony,	yet	also	to	support	the	construction	of	a	social	state.	Thesegoals	are	contradictory:	the	international	peace	architecture	combines	both	emancipatory	and	hegemonicframeworks,	in	which	ideological	contestation	has	not	been	resolved.	It	represents	a	reactive	architecture	thatmainly	evolves	after	new	dynamics	of	war	and	violence	threaten	the	international	system.Yet,	each	stage	is	also	a	vehicle	for	the	expansion	of	subaltern	and	human	rights	claims	across	the	internationalsystem,	which	has	influenced	the	development	of	the	social	contract,	the	nature	of	the	state,	and	international	orderitself.	This	is	reflected	in	the	UN’s	recent	Sustaining	Peace	agenda.	The	international	peace	architecture	nowconnects	peace	with	scientific	positions	far	beyond	those	suggested	by	geopolitics,	the	nation	state,	or	western-dominated	elite	multilateralism.It	is	perhaps	for	these	reasons	that	counter-peace	retrenchments,	combined	with	new	forms	of	conflict,	haveappeared	to	overwhelm	the	capacity	of	the	international	peace	architecture	as	it	is	currently	constituted.	This	raisesa	contemporary	policy	and	intellectual	question	for	those	working	in	and	on	international	relations:	how	mightreactionary	forces	connected	to	the	newer	dynamics	of	war	be	tamed	by	another	layer	of	the	international	peacearchitecture,	while	at	the	same	time	stabilising	the	entire,	complex,	and	fragile	edifice?For	more	information,	see	the	author’s	accompanying	paper	in	the	European	Journal	of	InternationalSecurity	and	forthcoming	book,	The	Grand	Design	(Oxford	University	Press)LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog: The international peace architecture: A grand but flawed design for peacemaking Page 3 of 4		Date originally posted: 2021-07-20Permalink: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2021/07/20/the-international-peace-architecture-a-grand-but-flawed-design-for-peacemaking/Blog homepage: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	theLondon	School	of	Economics.	Featured	image	credit:	UN	Photo/Violaine	Martin	(CC	BY-NC-ND	2.0)LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog: The international peace architecture: A grand but flawed design for peacemaking Page 4 of 4		Date originally posted: 2021-07-20Permalink: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2021/07/20/the-international-peace-architecture-a-grand-but-flawed-design-for-peacemaking/Blog homepage: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/

The international peace architecture: a grand but flawed design for peacemaking

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The international peace architecture: a grand but flawed design for peacemaking

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