One of the key stories from Bulgaria’s parliamentary election on 4 April was the rise of a new party led by talk show host and musician Slavi Trifonov, which finished in second place. Nikolay Marinov and Maria Popova write that the election underlined the existence of a new ‘conspiracy cleavage’ in Eastern European politics. Journalists ... Continue

Marinov, Nikolay

Popova, Maria

English

LSE Research Online

The	2021	Bulgarian	election:	A	‘QAnon	turn’	forEastern	European	politics?One	of	the	key	stories	from	Bulgaria’s	parliamentary	election	on	4	April	was	the	rise	of	a	new	party	led	by	talk	showhost	and	musician	Slavi	Trifonov,	which	finished	in	second	place.	Nikolay	Marinov	and	Maria	Popova	write	thatthe	election	underlined	the	existence	of	a	new	‘conspiracy	cleavage’	in	Eastern	European	politics.Journalists	covering	Eastern	European	elections	used	to	have	it	easy.	Throughout	the	1990s	and	2000s,	liberalreformist	pro-European	parties	promised	anti-corruption	and	the	rule	of	law	and	fought	ethnonationalistEurosceptics	and	former-Communists-turned-state-captors.Over	the	last	decade,	this	neat	picture	has	been	complicated	by	the	emergence	of	parties	that	bundle	anti-corruption	with	nationalism	and	illiberalism,	while	state	captors	and	heads	of	clientelist	networks	manage	to	portraythemselves	as	competent	statesmen	and	the	EU’s	true	and	reliable	partners.	A	left-right	cleavage	has	neverstructured	post-Communist	political	competition,	but	now	the	liberal-authoritarian	or	pro-European-nationalistcleavages	may	be	in	decline.In	an	upcoming	working	paper,	we	argue	that	a	new	conspiracy	cleavage	is	rising	where	parties	either	stick	tomainstream	facts	and	politics,	while	sometimes	engaging	in	corruption	and	state	capture	behind	the	scenes,	orchallenge	the	status	quo,	using	a	wide	range	of	conspiracies	–	some	real	(ongoing	state	capture),	many	imagined(Covid-19	and	world	government	plots).Bulgaria’s	2021	electionBulgaria’s	4	April	parliamentary	election	illustrates	this	dynamic.	The	incumbent	centre-right	GERB,	which	has	wonfour	elections	and	formed	three	governments	since	its	founding	in	2009,	went	into	the	campaign	weakened	bysizeable	anti-government	protests	over	endemic	grand	corruption,	a	politicized	judiciary,	and	tightening	control	ofthe	media,	as	well	as	by	testy	cohabitation	with	a	Socialist-backed	President.	After	weathering	the	first	Covid-19wave	well,	Bulgaria	was	hard-hit	in	the	autumn.	The	health	system	was	brought	to	the	brink	of	collapse	by	case	andmortality	rates	among	the	highest	in	Europe.	In	the	final	campaign	stretch,	as	the	third	wave	was	picking	up,	thegovernment	often	switched	policies	–	closing	some	businesses	only	to	reopen	them	the	next	day.	Against	thebackdrop	of	these	setbacks,	punishment	for	GERB	at	the	polls	was	to	be	expected.Bulgarian	Prime	Minister	Boyko	Borisov’s	strategy	was	to	sidestep	the	corruption	and	rule	of	law	issues	altogether,project	statesmanship,	and	emphasise	his	good	relationship	with	Europe.	The	summer	protests	fizzled	out	and	inthe	autumn	he	communicated	directly	with	his	supporters	through	Facebook	live	streams.	He	toured	the	country,driving	his	own	SUV	and	showing	off	his	government’s	major	infrastructure	projects	funded	by	EU	subsidies,boasting	of	his	close	partnership	with	Merkel	and	Macron	and	his	competent	handling	of	the	pandemic.Occasionally,	this	James-Corden-esque	format	included	guests	riding	in	the	back	seat	with	the	PM	discussingpolicy,	as	in	November	when	the	Health	Minister	and	the	director	of	Sofia’s	biggest	hospital	joined	to	see	a	newlybuilt	highway	and	discuss	the	containment	of	the	second	wave.	Borisov’s	campaign	strategy	paid	off	as	his	partyretained	its	plurality	with	26%	of	the	vote.The	new	conspiracy	cleavage	in	Bulgarian	politicsWhy	did	the	opposition	miss	the	opportunity	to	hold	GERB	accountable?	The	answer,	we	argue,	lies	in	theemergence	of	a	conspiracy	cleavage,	which	divided	the	opposition.	The	biggest	story	of	the	elections	was	thesecond	place	showing	of	a	new	political	party,	headed	by	TV	talk	show	host	and	musician,	Slavi	Trifonov.	Withnearly	18%,	Trifonov’s	ITN	displaced	the	Socialists	(former	Communists,	BSP)	from	the	top-two	spot	for	the	firsttime	in	20	years.LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog: The 2021 Bulgarian election: A ‘QAnon turn’ for Eastern European politics? Page 1 of 3		Date originally posted: 2021-04-13Permalink: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2021/04/13/the-2021-bulgarian-election-a-qanon-turn-for-eastern-european-politics/Blog homepage: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/Trifonov	is	more	Trump	than	Zelensky.	This	was	his	first	election,	but	he	is	not	a	political	novice.	He	has	built	acultural	and	political	brand	over	the	last	30	years,	based	on	populism,	soft	nationalism,	and	casual	misogyny	(his1999	hit	song	lyrics	are	a	textbook	example	of	rape	culture:	“There’s	no	‘I	don’t	wanna’,	there’s	no	‘don’t’,	if	I	wannahave	you,	I	turn	into	a	villain,	you’ll	be	with	me,	if	I	say	so”).	He	talks	the	anti-corruption	talk,	but	has	not	walked	thewalk	–	in	2017,	he	was	the	driving	force	behind	a	populist	and	accountability-reducing	referendum	proposal	todramatically	decrease	state	financing	of	political	parties.	His	party’s	name	–	There	is	Such	a	People!	(ITN)	–	is	aplay	on	a	popular	phrase	expressing	exasperation	at	the	failure	of	the	Bulgarian	state	to	produce	competent	andjust	government:	“There	is	no	such	state	(anywhere)!”	The	implication	is	that	the	Bulgarian	people	can	change	theBulgarian	state,	if	only	they	elect	the	right	politicians.On	the	left-right/authoritarian-liberal	dimension,	ITN	is	indistinguishable	from	GERB,	as	this	recent	electioncompass	study	shows.	But	on	the	conspiracy	cleavage,	ITN	is	diametrically	opposed.	Where	GERB	claims	chargesof	shadowy	oligarchs	pulling	the	strings	of	Bulgarian	politics	are	just	conspiracy	theories,	ITN	amplifies	them.Rhetorically	at	least,	GERB	has	repeatedly	aligned	with	the	EU:	on	the	Covid-19	scientific	consensus	now;previously,	on	how	to	handle	the	migration	crisis;	and	on	fostering	political	stability	through	European	solidarity.Trifonov	through	ITN,	by	contrast,	has	dabbled	in	the	related	conspiracies	–	Covid-19-denialism,	anti-vaxxerism	–and	has	flirted	with	Euroscepticism	and	anti-immigration	positions,	again	from	the	conspiratorial	viewpoint	that	themigration	crisis	was	a	tool	for	the	Great	Powers	to	weaken	Bulgarian	sovereignty.Two	other	opposition	parties	who	have	criticised	GERB’s	corruption	and	collusion	with	organised	crime	made	gains,coming	on	the	heels	of	successful	social	mobilisation	during	the	summer	protests.	Democratic	Bulgaria	(DemBG),which	missed	the	4%	threshold	in	the	2017	election,	got	nearly	10%	and	a	newcomer,	named	Rise	Up,Bulgaria/Mafia	Out	(RiseBG),	passed	the	4%	barrier.While	both	parties	have	largely	liberal	reformist	platforms,	they	have	also	flirted	with	nationalism	and	conspiracies.Our	analysis	of	parties’	Facebook	communications	over	the	last	two	months	(all	the	major	parties,	except	ITN,	whoposted	only	clips	of	the	show,	rather	than	statements),	reveals	that	among	all	parties,	DemBG	were	the	most	likelyto	use	conspiratorial	language	(Figure	1	below).	One	of	RiseBG’s	four	co-leaders,	downplayed	the	seriousness	ofthe	pandemic	by	borrowing	Bolsonaro’s	“little	flu”	diminutive	and	boasting	that	despite	the	government’sfearmongering,	people	are	not	afraid.Figure	1:	Cumulative	mentions	of	conspiracies	in	the	Facebook	communications	of	Bulgarian	politicalparties	(Feb-April	2021)LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog: The 2021 Bulgarian election: A ‘QAnon turn’ for Eastern European politics? Page 2 of 3		Date originally posted: 2021-04-13Permalink: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2021/04/13/the-2021-bulgarian-election-a-qanon-turn-for-eastern-european-politics/Blog homepage: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/Note:	Figure	compiled	by	the	authors.On	the	nationalism	issue,	we	find	that	DemBG,	the	far	right,	ethnonationalist	VMRO,	and	the	mainstream,	state-capture-tainted	Socialists	(BSP)	register	the	highest	frequency	of	mentions	of	country	and	nation	(Figure	2).	Itappears	that	DemBG	was	pushed	to	compete	with	the	nationalists	by	packaging	anti-corruption	and	pro-Europeanreforms	with	patriotic	appeals	–	a	rather	unnatural	combination	–	instead	of	turning	to	civil	and	political	rightsexpansion.	For	example,	DemBG	could	have	reopened	the	debate	into	Bulgaria’s	refusal	to	sign	the	IstanbulConvention	on	women’s	rights	and	domestic	violence.Figure	2:	Percentage	of	Facebook	communications	by	Bulgarian	parties	that	mention	‘Bulgaria’	or‘Bulgarian’	(Feb-April	2021)Note:	Figure	compiled	by	the	authors.The	Bulgarian	election	results	were	consistent	with	other	recent	elections	in	the	region.	Romania’s	autumn	electionsaw	the	emergence	of	a	conspiracy-peddling	populist	ethnonationalist	party,	AUR.	In	Serbia,	President	AleksandarVučić’s	party	won	a	landslide	victory	over	the	summer	by	emphasising	its	pro-European	stance	and	paintingopposition	protesters	as	conspiracy-minded	anti-maskers.	The	pandemic	has	increased	conspiratorial	stockeverywhere,	and	these	examples	demonstrate	that	we	now	need	more	research	on	the	influence	of	conspiracybeliefs	on	political	competition	in	democracies.Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	authors,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	theLondon	School	of	Economics.	Featured	image	credit:	European	CouncilLSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog: The 2021 Bulgarian election: A ‘QAnon turn’ for Eastern European politics? Page 3 of 3		Date originally posted: 2021-04-13Permalink: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2021/04/13/the-2021-bulgarian-election-a-qanon-turn-for-eastern-european-politics/Blog homepage: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/

The 2021 Bulgarian election: a ‘QAnon turn’ for Eastern European politics?

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The 2021 Bulgarian election: a ‘QAnon turn’ for Eastern European politics?

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