In August 2019, Iraqi Federal Police showed up at the mayor’s office in Fallujah to expel ‘Aissa al-Sayir, the mayor, who had long been a key player in the city’s politics. Citing voting irregularities, the Anbar Governorate deployed the police after Sayir refused to give up his post. The event attracted little notice in the international press, but within Iraq many observers believed that the ultimate mover in this drama was not the local government at all, but Muhammad al-Halbusi, the Speaker of the Iraqi parliament, and one of the wealthiest businessmen in Anbar. The removal of Fallujah’s mayor represented a changing of the guard in Sunni politics, as a new elite seeks to assert itself in the post-ISIS era

Gopal, Anand

Hodge, Jeremy

English

LSE Research Online

12/10/2020 The Rise of the New Sunni Elite in Iraq: The Case of Fallujah | Conflict Research Programme Bloghttps://blogs.lse.ac.uk/crp/2020/11/16/the-rise-of-the-new-sunni-elite-in-iraq-the-case-of-fallujah/ 1/12Jeremy Hodge Anand Gopal November 16th, 2020The Rise of the New Sunni Elite in Iraq: The Case ofFallujah1 comment | 4 sharesEstimated reading time: 10 minutes12/10/2020 The Rise of the New Sunni Elite in Iraq: The Case of Fallujah | Conflict Research Programme Bloghttps://blogs.lse.ac.uk/crp/2020/11/16/the-rise-of-the-new-sunni-elite-in-iraq-the-case-of-fallujah/ 2/12US Secretary Mike Pompeo and Iraqi Speaker Muhammad Halbusi,January 2019. Source: US State Department/Flickr.In August 2019, Iraqi Federal Police showed up at the mayor’s o ce inFallujah to expel ‘Aissa al-Sayir, the mayor, who had long been a key playerin the city’s politics. Citing voting irregularities, the Anbar Governoratedeployed the police after Sayir refused to give up his post. The eventattracted little notice in the international press, but within Iraq manyobservers believed that the ultimate mover in this drama was not the localgovernment at all, but Muhammad al-Halbusi, the Speaker of the Iraqiparliament, and one of the wealthiest businessmen in Anbar. The removalof Fallujah’s mayor represented a changing of the guard in Sunni politics,as a new elite seeks to assert itself in the post-ISIS era.The discussion of ISIS in Iraq often focuses on Sunni-Shia divides, but thistends to ignore the crucial role of intra-Sunni dynamics in preserving thepeace. In post-ISIS Iraq, the Sunni elite have split, with one segment allyingitself to Baghdad and reaping enormous bene ts—for itself and for citieslike Fallujah—while the other segment has found itself excluded frompatronage. Those, like Halbusi, who prove willing to bridge confessionaldivides are the winners in this new Iraq, while the old Sunni elite who cling12/10/2020 The Rise of the New Sunni Elite in Iraq: The Case of Fallujah | Conflict Research Programme Bloghttps://blogs.lse.ac.uk/crp/2020/11/16/the-rise-of-the-new-sunni-elite-in-iraq-the-case-of-fallujah/ 3/12to pre-war alignments are the losers. Understanding this divide is crucialto ensuring a lasting political settlement.The New Elite: The Rise of Muhammad al-HalbusiMuhammad al-Halbusi is one of the most powerful Sunnis in the country,but he derives this status not from a grassroots base but rather by virtueof his alliance with the Fatah parliamentary bloc, which is led by  gureslinked to the powerful Iran-backed Badr Brigade. Hailing from the town ofGarma in Fallujah’s northeastern outskirts, al-Halbusi belongs to theHalbus clan. Pre-2003, the Halbus was far less in uential than Fallujah’sother tribes, and exerted little in uence on the Ba’athist state. The clanalso had few ties to the Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood, which in the lateSaddam years was an important actor in Fallujah. After 2003,marginalised clans like the Halbus did not make up an important part ofthe mainstream anti-U.S. resistance; instead, it was jihadi groups like al-Qa’eda in Iraq that recruited heavily from the ranks of the Halbus andsimilar lower-status clans.In this environment, Muhammad al-Halbusi, who had a degree inengineering, distinguished himself from the majority of his compatriots byworking openly with the Americans as early as 2003 on renovation andreconstruction projects. In June 2004, al-Halbusi’s  rm, Steel CompanyLtd., was one of many Iraqi companies sub-contracted to work on a $28.6million water treatment facility in Fallujah. The project soon stalled due tothe deteriorating security situation and contractor negligence; by 2005,FluorAMEC, the American  rm leading the project, estimated that it wouldcost $51.3 million to complete the project. By 2011, this had risen to$107.8 million. By this point, Muhammad al-Halbusi had become a major12/10/2020 The Rise of the New Sunni Elite in Iraq: The Case of Fallujah | Conflict Research Programme Bloghttps://blogs.lse.ac.uk/crp/2020/11/16/the-rise-of-the-new-sunni-elite-in-iraq-the-case-of-fallujah/ 4/12player in Fallujah. Three years later, he was elected to represent the city inparliament.The Old Elite: The Decline of ‘Aissa al-SayirThe political trajectory of Aissa al-Sayir, the ousted Fallujah mayor, wasthe mirror opposite of Halbusi’s. Understanding his rise and fall requiresexploring the complex relationship between the Baʿth regime and Islamistmovements before 2003. During the 1970s and 1980s, Saddam Hussein’sgovernment carried out extensive repression of the Iraqi MuslimBrotherhood, sentencing many to death. However, by the 1990s the Iraqipresident’s stance towards the group began to shift, especially as theregime looked to promote an alternative Islamist vision that couldcompete with, and be more easily managed than, Saudi-linked Sala sm. In1991, dozens of Brotherhood leaders saw their sentences commuted, andwere eventually released. In Fallujah and elsewhere in Anbar, Brotherhood gures such as Abd al-Razaq al-Sa’adi and Makki Hussein al-Kubaysi, whohad been operating covertly, began to proselytise in the open, often inconjunction with the Baʿth party’s Faith Campaign. (Al-Kubaysi was anassociate of Baʿthist Faith Campaigner Subhei Samara’i, promoting pro-Ba’athist variant of Brotherhood thinking; ‘Abd al-Razaq al-Sa’adimeanwhile, brother of Brotherhood leader ‘Abd al-Malik al-Sa’adi, wasclose with ‘Abd al-Latif al-Humaym, another pro-Ba’athist cleric who wasamong the richest families in Anbar.) Many of these  gures became keyleaders in the post-2003 insurgency; Makki al-Kubaysi, for example,became one of the founders of the Association of Muslim Scholars, abody that funneled funds to Brotherhood-linked insurgent groups such asthe 1920 Revolutionaries Brigades and the Islamic Army of Iraq.One of the leaders who emerged from this milieu was ‘Aissa al-Sayir.Having graduated with the rank of Lieutenant from Iraq’s Police Academy12/10/2020 The Rise of the New Sunni Elite in Iraq: The Case of Fallujah | Conflict Research Programme Bloghttps://blogs.lse.ac.uk/crp/2020/11/16/the-rise-of-the-new-sunni-elite-in-iraq-the-case-of-fallujah/ 5/12in 1993, al-Sayir had solid Baʿthist credentials. At the same time, his tribe,the Albu ‘Aissa, had contributed more members to the ranks of Fallujah’sMuslim Brotherhood than any other tribe. After 2003, ‘Aissa himselfbecame a high-ranking member of the Brotherhood’s political front, theIraqi Islamic Party (IIP). Many prominent IIP-a liated  gures whodominated Sunni politics after 2003, such as Rafa al-‘Aissawi and KhamisKhanjar, were similarly Albu ‘Aissa tribesmen from Fallujah. Following theUS invasion, IIP chapters throughout Anbar seized control of city councils,police departments, and the Anbar provincial council, liaising with theAmericans while simultaneously funding the 1920’s RevolutionaryBrigades, the Islamic Army of Iraq, and other insurgent groups.In 2007, the IIP in Fallujah formed a new armed faction, Hamas Iraq, whichjoined the US-backed Sahwa—“Awakening”—movement against al-Qa’eda.Al-Sayir, who was o cially serving as an “aide” to the police chief,moonlighted as the commander of Hamas Iraq. Hamas Iraq is widelybelieved to have exploited the cover provided by the Sahwa to lead acampaign of arrests and executions against the IIP’s political enemies.For a brief period in 2011 and 2012, al-Sayir spent time in jail following agovernment crackdown on the IIP and other Sunni politicians such as Ra al-‘Aissawi and former Iraqi Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi.However, following the re-emergence of al-Qa’eda in Iraq as ISIS in 2013, arapprochement occurred between the IIP and the Iraqi government, whichsought an Islamist ally to thwart the appeal of ISIS among Sunnis. Inprovincial elections that April, the IIP catapulted back to power throughoutAnbar, regaining in uence over the governorship, provincial council, andnumerous other bodies. In 2015, al-Sayir was appointed mayor of Fallujah.The Birth of a New Era12/10/2020 The Rise of the New Sunni Elite in Iraq: The Case of Fallujah | Conflict Research Programme Bloghttps://blogs.lse.ac.uk/crp/2020/11/16/the-rise-of-the-new-sunni-elite-in-iraq-the-case-of-fallujah/ 6/12Though the rise of ISIS proved useful for the IIP, it paid far greaterdividends for the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), a massive umbrellabody comprised of mostly Shi’a militias that operated in partnership with—but not under the purview of—regular Iraqi army forces. Even the PMF’scritics acknowledged its indispensable role in defeating ISIS, a legacy thatgranted the group political capital during the May 2018 parliamentaryelections. The factions closest to Iran united as the Fatah Alliance.Muhammad al-Halbusi was by now a rival of the IIP, who sought tomonopolise resource distribution and exclude those outside theirpatronage network, especially with an independent power base like al-Halbusi. So he took the unusual step of throwing his lot in with Fatah, apro-Iran party. The gamble paid off, as Halbusi was elected Iraq’s Speakerof Parliament, despite the fact that his party, Al-Hal Alliance, had won fewvotes.“We supported Muhammad al-Halbusi to become speaker of Iraq’sparliament,” said Hadi al-Ameri, Chairman of the Fatah Alliance and theBadr Brigades. “He’s a man of his word.” Throughout 2020, Fatah MPshave publicly defended al-Halbusi from attempts by IIP-a liated o cialsto submit a vote of no-con dence and have him impeached. Al-Halbusi’sAl-Hal Alliance used such support to supplant the IIP as the new powerbroker in Anbar province. It has also bene ted from independent revenuestreams, such as that of Jamal al-Karbuli, a wealthy Sunni businessmanfrom Masyab, a mixed-sect city in southern Iraq where the Badr Brigadesmaintain a strong presence. Both the Governor of Anbar that orderedAissa al-Sayir’s removal, Ali Farhan al-Dulayimi, and al-Sayir’s replacement,Muwayyed Farhan al-Dulaymi, are members of the Al-Hal Alliance and owetheir status to deals made by al-Halbusi in parliament.Since al-Halbusi’s appointment, Fallujah has witnessed a massivereconstruction boom. Hundreds of new residential units have popped up.12/10/2020 The Rise of the New Sunni Elite in Iraq: The Case of Fallujah | Conflict Research Programme Bloghttps://blogs.lse.ac.uk/crp/2020/11/16/the-rise-of-the-new-sunni-elite-in-iraq-the-case-of-fallujah/ 7/12O cials are paving the city’s main thoroughfares, rebuilding the importantal-Muwaza n bridge, and are working on the city’s water treatment facility.(This latter project is being paid for with a $285 million loan from theJapanese International Cooperation Agency in 2015.)The rivalry between al-Halbusi and the IIP in Fallujah, rooted in old socio-economic cleavages, is now oriented around seeking to bene t from suchlucrative contracts. Shortly before his dismissal, Aissa al-Sayir wasrumored to have met with Khamis Khanjar, a fellow Albu ‘Aissa tribesmanwith historical links to the IIP and who, like al-Halbusi, has used his richesto in uence national politics, making the two bitter enemies. Khanjar’sown party, “the Arab Project,” includes in its ranks IIP  gures such as Rafaal-Aissawi and Tariq al-Hashimi, targets of the government’s crackdownon Sunni politicians in 2011-2012. Prior to his removal, opponentsaccused al-Sayir of stalling reconstruction projects in Fallujah in order toensure that the city’s IIP elite won the contracts. However, since al-Sayir’sdeparture, al-Halbusi has become something of a “city boss” in Fallujah,with companies linked to him and his Al-Hal Alliance monopolising fundspouring into the city.Social media gives a sense of the reach of al-Halbusi’s patronage network.Fallujah’s mayor, for example, recently tweeted using the hashtag#Fallujah_in_the_eyes_of_Halbusi’s_men a video of two supportersstanding on the city’s renovated main thoroughfare, praising theirbenefactor:“We want to say thank you, Anbar’s number one hero of reconstruction, thearchitectural engineer, Muhammad al-Halbusi! And who else? Fallujah’s12/10/2020 The Rise of the New Sunni Elite in Iraq: The Case of Fallujah | Conflict Research Programme Bloghttps://blogs.lse.ac.uk/crp/2020/11/16/the-rise-of-the-new-sunni-elite-in-iraq-the-case-of-fallujah/ 8/12mayor, Sir Muwayyed Farhan al-Dualimi. Your positive touch [on the city] isclear!”.@moaedfarhan77Rebuilding Fallujah has brought tremendous bene ts for the city. Thatsuch efforts are linked to a political force rooted in a cross-sect alliance isa cause for optimism. Al-Halbusi himself has promoted his alliance withFatah using just such a narrative, declaring that following after the horrorsof ISIS, Iraqis are ready to move past confessional divides.Yet in allying with the Badr Brigades and in marginalising the old Sunnielite, Halbusi and the new elite risk stoking resentment in Anbar—potentially creating fault lines that ISIS-like groups can exploit in thefuture. The mass graves dotting the surroundings of Fallujah, left behindby Iran-backed militias, remain unaccounted for. (Recently, for example, al-Halbusi refused to point  ngers at the militias when a few dozen bodiesturned up in al-Babil governorate, where many Sunnis had been abductedand killed). Tens of thousands who have lost their family members due tothese militias remain without justice, or a truth and reconciliation process.Through such partnerships, Halbusi has added to the sense in Fallujahthat these militias are able to operate with impunity. Meanwhile, the IIPcontinues to exert an in uence. Its members proliferate the ranks ofAnbar’s Sunni middle class, and occupy many bureaucratic posts in localgovernment and in key industries. The best hope for a stable Iraq is alasting political settlement, which will depend on the country’s resources—in terms of reconstruction funds and access to justice—being sharedequitably across its society.Note: The CRP blogs gives the views of the author, not the position of theCon ict Research Programme, the London School of Economics andPolitical Science, nor the UK Government.12/10/2020 The Rise of the New Sunni Elite in Iraq: The Case of Fallujah | Conflict Research Programme Bloghttps://blogs.lse.ac.uk/crp/2020/11/16/the-rise-of-the-new-sunni-elite-in-iraq-the-case-of-fallujah/ 9/12About the authorPosted In: Governance | Iraq | Public Authority1 CommentsJeremy Hodge is a Lead Research Coordinator for the Zomia Centerfor the Study of Non-State Spaces. He is also an investigativereporter covering the con icts in Syria and Iraq, as well as collusivestate-business relations and the petroleum/defense sectors in thebroader Middle East. Jeremy’s articles have appeared in ForeignAffairs, The Nation, The Daily Beast, Le Monde Diplomatique, Al-Jazeera and other outlets and have been nominated for awards bythe Overseas Press Club.Jeremy HodgeAnand Gopal is a 2019/2020 Fellow on the Con ict ResearchProgramme. His research project is titled: Iraq after ISIS: PoliticalSettlement, Reconciliation and Countering Drivers of Con ict. He isan Assistant Research Professor at the Center for the Study ofReligion and Con ict and the Center on the Future of War at ArizonaState University, and a Fellow at Type Media.Anand Gopal12/10/2020 The Rise of the New Sunni Elite in Iraq: The Case of Fallujah | Conflict Research Programme Bloghttps://blogs.lse.ac.uk/crp/2020/11/16/the-rise-of-the-new-sunni-elite-in-iraq-the-case-of-fallujah/ 10/12Read NextThe Popular Mobilisation and COVID-19 Pandemic in Iraq: a newraison d’être?April 28th, 2020Related PostsCivicnessProtest movements in Iraq in the age of a ‘new civil society’ OCTOBER 3RD, 2019 7IraqSecurity and Governance in the Disputed Territories Under aFractured GOI: The Case of Northern Diyala12/10/2020 The Rise of the New Sunni Elite in Iraq: The Case of Fallujah | Conflict Research Programme Bloghttps://blogs.lse.ac.uk/crp/2020/11/16/the-rise-of-the-new-sunni-elite-in-iraq-the-case-of-fallujah/ 11/12DECEMBER 6TH, 2018FeaturedIraq’s State-Owned Enterprises: A Case Study for PublicSpending ReformOCTOBER 18TH, 2018IraqFrom Green to Blue? 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The rise of the new Sunni elite in Iraq: the case of Fallujah

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The rise of the new Sunni elite in Iraq: the case of Fallujah

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