New populist and nativist parties have emerged in many western democracies as a response to large-scale economic transformations, argues Stephane Wolton. The reaction by established parties in trying to imitate their anti-immigrant policies have dangerous consequences for our democratic norms

Wolton, Stephane

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LSE Research Online

The	populists’	trap:	mainstream	responses	to	populistnew	parties	are	a	threat	to	democracyNew	populist	and	nativist	parties	have	emerged	in	many	western	democracies	as	a	response	to	large-scaleeconomic	transformations,	argues	Stephane	Wolton.	The	reaction	by	established	parties	in	trying	to	imitate	theiranti-immigrant	policies	have	dangerous	consequences	for	our	democratic	norms.Gilet	Jaunes	protestors,	Paris,	2018.	Photo	by	 Norbu	Gyachung	on	UnsplashImagine	a	world	with	no	war	between	major	powers	for	decades.	A	world	increasingly	interconnected	via	thecirculation	of	capital,	goods	and	people.	A	world	which	is	approaching	a	‘true	cosmopolitanism’,	where	‘towns	arefull	of	people,	houses	are	full	of	tenants,	hotels	full	of	guests’,	and	‘the	people	are	flooding	the	beaches,	the	citizenscan	no	longer	bathe.’	These	quotes	do	not	apply	to	Barcelona	or	Amsterdam,	and	nor	do	they	describe	our	currentglobalisation.	Rather,	they	depict	the	world	at	the	beginning	of	the	20th	century	in	Jan-Werner	Müller’s	excellentbook	Contesting	Democracy.We	know	how	this	history	goes:	Sarajevo,	World	War	I,	the	Bolshevik	‘Revolution’,	Fascism,	Nazism.	Thebreakdown	of	the	liberal	golden	age	was	brutal,	so	brutal	that	it	pushed	Stefan	Zweig,	the	great	proponent	ofcosmopolitanism,	to	suicide.	How	did	we	go	from	one	extreme	to	the	other?Müller	suggests	an	answer.	The	end	of	the	19th	century	saw	with	the	extension	of	the	franchise	the	irruption	of	themasses	into	politics	–	and	into	life.	The	old	political	system,	built	on	the	idea	of	politics	as	a	gentleman’s	(readelitist)	club,	was	at	odds	with	the	new	world.	This	generated	a	crisis	of	representation	at	two	levels.	One	questionwas	who	is	represented,	or	can	the	old	elites	properly	represent	the	new	members	of	the	polity?	The	second	wasabout	what	type	of	claims	can	be	made	within	the	political	system,	or	how	can	the	interests	of	the	masses	beaccommodated.	Two	competing	(broad)	answers	were	proposed:	the	politics	of	moderation	(or	compromise),	andthe	militarised	politics	of	the	will.	The	latter	was	tried	first,	and	only	its	failure	left	political	space	for	the	former.Democratic Audit: The populists’ trap: mainstream responses to populist new parties are a threat to democracy Page 1 of 3		Date originally posted: 2019-06-25Permalink: https://www.democraticaudit.com/2019/06/25/the-populists-trap-mainstream-responses-to-populist-new-parties-are-a-threat-to-democracy/Blog homepage: https://www.democraticaudit.com/Besides	the	familiar	echoes,	how	is	this	history	informative?	Our	democratic	systems	again	are	experiencing	ashock.	This	is	not	a	political	shock	(all	Western	countries	are	mass	democracies),	but	an	economic	one,	though	ashock	nonetheless.	This	shock	is	the	third	economic	revolution.	The	scale	of	creative	destruction	is	probablyunprecedented,	and	easy	to	notice.	Take	a	stroll	and	count	the	number	of	bank	branches	that	have	closed	in	recentyears.	These	economic	changes	have	also	had	cultural	and	sociological	effects.	It	changes	our	transportationhabits	(congestion	charges,	ultra-low	emission	zones),	modifies	our	leisure	(streaming	rather	than	live	TV)	andaffects	our	consumption	patterns	(ordering	online	rather	than	visiting	shops).	Even	our	money	is	disappearing.	Thethird	economic	revolution	is	a	great	transformation,	which	does	not	occur	without	pushbacks.	In	France,	the	giletsjaunes	originally	protested	against	transportation	costs;	in	the	UK,	book	shops	are	organising	the	resistance	againsttheir	main	rival,	Amazon.	This	shock	is	comparable	with	the	beginning	of	capitalism	analysed	Polanyi’s	seminalbook.	Then,	like	now,	politicians	sought	to	mollify	the	social	consequences	of	the	enormous	changes	experiencedby	the	population.	But	unlike	the	19th	century,	political	decisions	following	the	economic	revolution	are	not	made	bya	monarch	or	a	government	that	is	isolated	from	the	people.	They	are,	at	least	indirectly,	made	by	the	peoplethemselves.And	here	enter	the	populists.	Academic	papers	have	found	that	populist	parties	attract	recent	economic	losers,	whohave	lost	out	from	globalisation,	the	Great	Recession,	automation,	or	greater	economic	insecurity.	As	YotamMargalit	rightly	points	out	in	his	excellent	review	of	the	literature	on	the	causes	of	populism,	each	study	separatelyexplains	only	a	small	fraction	of	the	populist	vote;	all	together,	however,	they	paint	a	consistent	picture	linking	thecurrent	economic	transformation	with	the	rise	of	populism.Pointing	out	that	populists	benefit	most	from	the	economic	revolution	is	one	thing;	explaining	why	them	and	notothers	is	another.	One	possible	factor	is	voters’	distrust	of	more	traditional	parties,	especially	social	democrats.From	the	end	of	World	War	II	to	the	mid-1980s,	Western	democracies	effectively	became	social	democracies.Right-	and	left-wing	parties	practised	the	politics	of	compromise	and	incremental	change,	whereby	trade	unions	andcorporations,	government	and	opposition	negotiated	until	a	solution	acceptable	to	all	parties	could	be	found.	Butcompromise	and	its	constant	tinkering	are	for	small	changes,	not	revolutionary	transformations.	However,	instead	ofconstant	discussion	and	adaption,	economic	losers	demand	actions	–	a	counter-revolution	no	less.	What	they	seekis	the	political	will	to	reverse	the	course	of	history	and	this	is	exactly	what	populists	offer.	In	Italy,	Lega	and	theirleader	Salvini	do	not	celebrate	the	1950s	as	the	golden	age	of	the	country	(though	it	was,	but	thanks	to	socialdemocracy	and	compromise),	but	instead	they	see	the	Fascist	era	as	the	pinnacle	of	Italian	glory.A	second	factor	facilitating	populist	success	is	‘descriptive	representation’,	to	borrow	from	Hannah	Pitkins.Descriptive	representation	has	long	been	seen	as	essential	for	women	(female	legislators	best	represent	theirinterest)	and	minorities	(BAME	politicians	best	defend	the	rights	of	ethnic	minorities)	because	of	shared	experience.Populists	play	the	same	tune.	They	signal	that	economic	losers	can	trust	their	party	because	they	field	candidateswho	are	like	them.	For	example,	those	who	have	lost	out	from	economic	changes	are	over-represented	in	thecandidates	put	forward	by	the	Sweden	Democrats,	whereas	they	are	under-represented	in	all	other	parties.Populists	do	more	than	represent	(at	least	descriptively)	economic	losers.	They	also	advance	a	particular	vision	ofpolitics.	They	adhere	to	Carl	Schmidt’s	vision	that	politics	is	determined	by	the	distinction	between	friends	andenemies.	Populists	systematically	promote	an	agenda	of	hatred	and	of	division.	Nigel	Farage	campaigns	on	thetheme	of	the	great	betrayal,	just	like	the	German	far-right	after	World	War	I.	Donald	Trump	talks	about	‘MakingAmerica	Great	Again’	just	like	the	National	Front	wanted	to	‘Make	Britain	Great	Again’	during	the	1975	EUreferendum	campaign.	The	populist	rhetoric	is	a	rhetoric	of	us	versus	them,	with	Muslims	(in	Europe)	or	Hispanics(in	the	US)	as	the	main	targets.	The	populist	agenda	consists	of	separating	the	native	majority	from	an	imaginaryenemy	within.Democratic Audit: The populists’ trap: mainstream responses to populist new parties are a threat to democracy Page 2 of 3		Date originally posted: 2019-06-25Permalink: https://www.democraticaudit.com/2019/06/25/the-populists-trap-mainstream-responses-to-populist-new-parties-are-a-threat-to-democracy/Blog homepage: https://www.democraticaudit.com/Populists’	talk	or	populist-promoted	policies	targeting	the	minority	(such	as	burqa	ban,	and	anti-veil	laws)	are	notjust	symbolic	words	or	actions.	They	can	have	severe	consequences.	The	election	of	Donald	Trump	caused	asignificant	increase	in	citizens’	willingness	to	express	their	racial	bias.	Abdelgadir	and	Fouka	show	that	all	Muslimfemale	pupils	suffered	academically	from	the	introduction	of	the	2004	headscarf	ban	in	French	schools,	whetherthey	wore	the	niqab	(a	tiny	minority)	or	they	did	not	(the	vast	majority).	In	a	recent	working	paper,	Torun	Dewan	andI	argue	that	symbolic	policies	are	meant	to	make	salient	identity	traits	commonly	associated	with	the	non-nativepopulation	(for	example,	the	burqa	ban	makes	salient	that	some	individuals	are	Muslims	and	not	Christian,	whetheror	not	these	individuals	wore	the	burqa	in	the	first	place).	Once	salient,	identity	can	serve	as	a	focal	point	in	hiringdecisions,	yielding	a	labour	market	loaded	in	favour	of	native	workers.	As	a	result,	the	minority	sees	theiremployment	prospects	diminished.	As	the	labour	market	becomes	segregated,	the	economy	shrinks,	andredistributive	transfers	are	reduced,	imposing	another	cost	on	the	minority.And	it	is	here	that	the	populists’	trap	lies.	Populists	entangle	legitimate	concerns	with	their	agenda	of	hatred.	Tocounter	populists’	success,	democratic	parties	have	responded	by	importing	(in	only	a	slightly	toned-down	version)the	whole	populist	agenda,	without	distinction.	In	the	UK,	most	Tory	leadership	contenders	want	to	appear	purerthan	the	hardest	Brexiters.	As	a	pure	incarnation	of	the	politics	of	the	will,	Boris	Johnson	asserts	that	‘we	can	do	it	ifwe	really	want	it’.	Labour,	in	turn,	embodies	the	us-versus-them	approach:	‘for	the	many,	not	the	few’.	In	France,the	former	leader	of	the	traditional	right-wing	party	Les	Republicains,	Laurent	Wauquiez,	tried	to	imitate	Marine	LePen’s	far-right	Rassemblement	National.	In	Denmark,	the	centre-left	Social	Democrats	now	stand	against	non-European	immigration.	This	strategy	can	only	benefit	populists.	Their	agenda	becomes	mainstream,	if	not	theirparty	per	se	(see,	for	example,	the	poor	result	of	Les	Republicains	in	the	recent	European	Election).	Thisnormalisation	also	encourages	even	greater	extremism	at	the	fringe	such	as	Stram	Kurs,	a	Danish	party	thatpublicly	campaigns	for	the	deportation	of	all	Muslims	from	Denmark.	The	current	response	to	populism	is,	thus,politically	dangerous,	and	it	is	also	morally	wrong.	The	populists’	claim	to	respond	to	legitimate	concerns	does	notmake	their	policies	less	objectionable.	It	is	a	trap	we	cannot	afford	to	fall	into.This	article	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	Democratic	Audit.About	the	authorStephane	Wolton is	assistant	professor	in	political	science	at	the	London	School	of	Economics.Similar	PostsBook	Review	|	The	New	Populism:	Democracy	Stares	into	the	Abyss	by	Marco	RevelliBook	Review	|	The	Far	Right	Today	by	Cas	MuddeBook	Review	|	Absorbing	the	Blow:	Populist	Parties	and	their	Impact	on	Parties	and	PartySystems	edited	by	Steven	Wolinetz	and	Andrej	ZasloveUnderstanding	populism:	what	role	do	crises	play	in	the	growth	of	Euroscepticism?Populism	may	well	be	inevitable	in	democracies,	but	it	is	also	the	cause	of	democratic	disenchantmentDemocratic Audit: The populists’ trap: mainstream responses to populist new parties are a threat to democracy Page 3 of 3		Date originally posted: 2019-06-25Permalink: https://www.democraticaudit.com/2019/06/25/the-populists-trap-mainstream-responses-to-populist-new-parties-are-a-threat-to-democracy/Blog homepage: https://www.democraticaudit.com/

The populists’ trap: mainstream responses to populist new parties are a threat to democracy

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The populists’ trap: mainstream responses to populist new parties are a threat to democracy

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