Italy will hold a constitutional referendum on 20-21 September which proposes to reduce the size of both chambers of the Italian parliament. Matthew E. Bergman provides the background to the vote and assesses the potential political consequences

Bergman, Matthew E.

English

LSE Research Online

Italy’s	constitutional	referendum:	Yet	another	reformto	improve	the	country’s	governabilityItaly	will	hold	a	constitutional	referendum	on	20-21	September	which	proposes	to	reduce	the	size	ofboth	chambers	of	the	Italian	parliament.	Matthew	E.	Bergman	provides	the	background	to	the	voteand	assesses	the	potential	political	consequences.On	20-21	September,	Italians	will	go	to	the	polls	for	yet	another	constitutional	referendum	aimed	atreforming	the	political	system	–	the	country’s	fourth	such	referendum	since	2000.	This	referendumspecifically	targets	the	size	of	the	legislative	branch.	The	proposal	would	reduce	the	size	of	the	Chamber	ofDeputies,	the	lower	chamber,	from	630	to	400	and	Senate	membership	from	315	to	200.	Such	a	move	is	rare	indemocratic	nations.	Between	1945	and	2008,	there	have	been	fewer	than	20	instances	of	a	democratic	legislaturedecreasing	in	size	by	greater	than	10%.	The	reform	could	be	seen	as	analogous	to	‘turkeys	voting	for	Christmas’.Nevertheless,	the	views	of	the	Italian	public	on	the	issue	are	worth	exploring.Italy’s	oversized	legislatureThe	size	of	a	legislature	must	strike	a	balance	between	the	representation	of	interests	and	expediency.	Countrieswith	larger	populations	lend	themselves	toward	having	larger	legislatures.	The	so	called	‘cube	root	law’	deduced	byRein	Taagepera	and	Matthew	Shugart	shows	that	the	size	of	a	legislature	can	be	approximated	by	the	cube	root	ofa	country’s	population.	The	table	below	performs	this	calculation	for	several	parliamentary	democracies	using	2019population	estimates.Table:	Cube	root	prediction	of	legislature	size	for	selected	parliamentary	democraciesNote:	Compiled	by	the	author.As	can	be	seen	from	the	table,	the	size	of	the	Italian	Chamber	of	Deputies	is	relatively	large	in	comparison	to	otherdemocracies	and	substantially	larger	than	the	cube	root	of	the	Italian	population.The	political	debateBeyond	the	impact	on	representation,	there	are	two	effects	of	note	arising	from	smaller	legislatures.	From	afinancial	standpoint,	smaller	legislatures	also	have	fewer	politicians	on	the	government	payroll.	Reductions	in	thesize	of	legislative	assemblies	tend	to	occur	during	times	of	economic	crisis.	The	reduction	in	the	Italian	parliamentsize	is	predicted	to	save	the	nation	over	250,000	euros	per	day.The	reform	was	a	long-run	campaign	promise	of	the	Five	Star	Movement	(M5S).	The	M5S	entered	the	nationallegislature	in	2013	as	an	anti-establishment	party.	In	that	election,	the	M5S	received	the	highest	vote	share	of	anyparty,	but	saw	the	largest	share	of	seats	go	to	the	coalition	led	by	the	centre-left	Democratic	Party	(PD).	After	aninternal	party	shake-up,	Matteo	Renzi	of	the	PD	became	the	Prime	Minister	in	2014	on	a	platform	of	party	renewaland	also	championed	a	reform	of	the	electoral	system.In	2019,	these	two	parties	joined	forces	in	a	governing	coalition.	Reducing	the	size	of	the	parliament	was	one	of	thekey	demands	of	the	M5S	for	it	to	join	an	establishment	party	like	the	PD.	The	largest	opposition	party,	the	League,also	supported	the	reform.	In	October	2019,	the	measures	passed	both	houses	of	parliament	with	overwhelmingmajorities,	far	beyond	the	required	2/3	supportive	vote.LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog: Italy’s constitutional referendum: Yet another reform to improve the country’s governability Page 1 of 3		Date originally posted: 2020-09-14Permalink: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2020/09/14/italys-constitutional-referendum-yet-another-reform-to-improve-the-countrys-governability/Blog homepage: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/The	second	effect	of	a	smaller	legislature	was	also	logically	and	quantitatively	deduced	by	Taagepera,	Shugart,	andcolleagues:	smaller	assemblies	tend	to	result	in	fewer	political	parties	receiving	votes	in	elections	and	subsequentlybeing	represented	in	parliament.	Prominent	figures	from	smaller	parties	such	as	pro-European	Human	Rightsactivist	Emma	Bonino,	Italian	Radical	leader	Maurizio	Turco,	and	legislators	representing	Italians	abroad	have	thusclaimed	that	the	reform	could	undermine	democracy,	not	least	because	it	would	be	more	difficult	for	their	parties	togain	representation	in	a	smaller	parliament.	Other	critics	soon	began	noting	that	the	savings	would	be	minimalcompared	to	overall	government	spending,	which	now	totals	close	to	900	billion	euros	per	year.	There	were	alsoconcerns	that	a	reduction	in	parliamentarians	might	increase	the	power	of	lobbyists.Why	previous	referendums	failed	and	why	this	referendum	is	likely	to	succeedItalian	voters	have	often	critiqued	their	government	for	being	bloated	and	overpaid.	While	the	polls	have	slightlynarrowed	from	more	than	80%	support	in	June	to	around	70%	support	in	early	September,	there	remains	a	clearmajority	in	favour	of	the	reform.Although	there	have	only	been	three	prior	constitutional	referendums	in	Italian	history,	there	are	some	clearpatterns.	In	2001,	the	only	successful	constitutional	referendum	thus	far	approved	entailed	transferring	somepowers	from	the	central	government	to	the	regions.	In	2006	and	2016,	voters	were	asked	for	a	simple	up-or-downvote	on	referendums	that	would	each	change	over	one-third	of	the	articles	of	the	Italian	constitution	and	includedstrengthening	the	power	of	the	Prime	Minister	while	weakening,	in	particular,	the	Senate.Previous	research	I	have	conducted	examined	the	motivations	of	voters	during	the	2016	referendum.	While,	indeed,there	was	overwhelming	support	for	reducing	the	number	of	Senators,	voters	were	less	receptive	towards	othermeasures	that	would	weaken	the	Senate	or	centralise	power	in	the	hands	of	the	executive.Furthermore,	Matteo	Renzi,	the	aforementioned	Prime	Minister	at	the	time	of	the	2016	referendum,	indicated	thathe	would	resign	if	voters	rejected	it.	The	2016	referendum	thus	became	a	referendum	on	the	government.	Votersthat	disagreed	with	the	government’s	performance	were	60%	less	likely	to	support	the	proposal,	including	much	ofthe	supporters	for	the	parties	in	opposition	at	the	time,	including	the	M5S.	The	current	referendum	will	likely	passdue	to	the	simplicity	of	the	reform,	the	historic	popularity	of	the	measures	contained	therein,	general	consensusamong	the	largest	parties,	and	the	lack	of	political	opposition	(except	by	the	smallest	parties).The	effect	on	Italian	politicsReforming	the	electoral	system	is	likely	to	have	both	long-term	and	short-term	effects.	The	last	Italian	parliamentaryelection	occurred	in	March	2018.	Elections	must	occur	within	five-years	of	the	previous	vote,	but	they	have	in	thepast	been	held	more	frequently	than	this.Since	a	large	number	of	lawmakers	will	lose	their	seats	(and	those	in	the	current	legislature	are	not	eligible	forpensions	if	an	election	is	called	before	September	2022)	it	is	not	in	legislators’	financial	interest	to	support	an	earlyelection.	In	the	short-term	then,	this	referendum	could	provide	another	boost	to	the	stability	of	the	new	M5S-PDgoverning	coalition.Since	the	Second	World	War,	Italian	legislators	have	formed	between	8	and	13	parliamentary	groups	–	groups	areeither	single	parties	or	groups	of	parties	that	join	together	for	greater	influence.	In	this	timeframe,	Italy	has	had	66governments.	The	large	number	of	political	groupings	is	one	explanation	for	the	instability	that	characterises	Italianpolitics.	For	example,	not	since	1972	has	a	Prime	Minister	retained	power	following	an	election.As	Italy’s	current	Prime	Minister,	Giuseppe	Conte,	argues,	fewer	parliamentarians	would	lead	to	more	efficientdecision	making.	The	referendum	thus	might	have	a	long-term	effect	in	stabilising	Italian	politics.	With	feweravailable	seats,	voters	for	smaller	parties	might	be	swayed	into	selecting	a	major	party.	Furthermore,	the	reformcould	stem	politicians’	temptations	to	form	new	political	parties.Recent	examples	of	this	phenomenon	include	former	Prime	Minister	Massimo	D’Alema	and	prime	ministerialcandidate	Pier	Luigi	Bersani	leaving	the	Democratic	Party	in	2017	to	form	a	more	left-wing	parliamentary	group(Article	One).	More	recently,	in	September	2019,	former	Prime	Minister	Matteo	Renzi	also	split	from	the	DemocraticParty	to	form	a	more	centrist	group	(Italia	Viva).	In	the	long-run,	such	party	splits	may	prove	to	be	less	likely	as	itwould	be	more	difficult	to	gain	representation	in	a	smaller	legislature.LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog: Italy’s constitutional referendum: Yet another reform to improve the country’s governability Page 2 of 3		Date originally posted: 2020-09-14Permalink: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2020/09/14/italys-constitutional-referendum-yet-another-reform-to-improve-the-countrys-governability/Blog homepage: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/Italy	has	long	exemplified	governmental	instability.	Previous	reforms	to	the	electoral	system	in	the	1990s,	2000s,and	2010s	have	yet	to	alter	this	picture.	The	2020	referendum	serves	as	a	clear	signal	that	the	voting	public	issupportive	of	bringing	stability	to	their	politics.	It	is	not	yet	clear	if	politicians	will	respond	in	kind.Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	theLondon	School	of	Economics.	Featured	image	credit:	Matteo	Piotto	(CC	BY-SA	2.0)_________________________________About	the	authorMatthew	E.	Bergman	–	University	of	ViennaMatthew	E.	Bergman	is	a	Post-doctoral	Researcher	at	the	University	of	Vienna	affiliated	with	thePolitical	Economy	of	Reforms	research	group.	He	has	previously	taught	at	the	University	of	Californiaat	San	Diego	and	served	as	founding	Director	of	the	Krinsk-Houston	Law	&	Politics	Initiative.	Hisresearch	and	teaching	expertise	lies	in	comparative	politics	and	political	economy,	focusing	onEurope.	His	forthcoming	co-authored	book	Party	Personnel	Strategies:	Electoral	Systems	andParliamentary	Committee	Assignments	examines	the	role	that	electoral	rules	have	on	partisan	interests	inlegislative	organisation.	He	is	on	Twitter	@MeBergman2LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog: Italy’s constitutional referendum: Yet another reform to improve the country’s governability Page 3 of 3		Date originally posted: 2020-09-14Permalink: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2020/09/14/italys-constitutional-referendum-yet-another-reform-to-improve-the-countrys-governability/Blog homepage: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/

Italy’s constitutional referendum: yet another reform to improve the country’s governability

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Italy’s constitutional referendum: yet another reform to improve the country’s governability

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