The issue of democratic backsliding in Central and Eastern Europe has received substantial attention in recent years, and many observers are now concerned the coronavirus crisis could exacerbate the problem. Licia Cianetti and Seán Hanley write that while there are genuine threats to democracy in countries like Hungary and Poland, viewing the entire region through the lens of ‘backsliding’ may obscure more than it reveals

Cianetti, Licia

Hanley, Seán

English

LSE Research Online

We	must	go	beyond	the	‘backsliding	paradigm’	tounderstand	what’s	happening	to	democracy	in	Centraland	Eastern	EuropeThe	issue	of	democratic	backsliding	in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	has	receivedsubstantial	attention	in	recent	years,	and	many	observers	are	now	concerned	thecoronavirus	crisis	could	exacerbate	the	problem.	Licia	Cianetti	and	Seán	Hanley	writethat	while	there	are	genuine	threats	to	democracy	in	countries	like	Hungary	and	Poland,viewing	the	entire	region	through	the	lens	of	‘backsliding’	may	obscure	more	than	itreveals.In	recent	years,	Central	and	Eastern	European	(CEE)	democracies	–	once	hailed	as	remarkable	success	stories	ofdemocratic	transformation	–	have	increasingly	attracted	media	and	academic	attention	as	cases	of	democraticreversal.	The	consensus	is	that	democracies	across	the	region	are	in	decline	and	some	might	be	“backsliding”towards	semi-authoritarian	hybrid	regimes	or	even	full	authoritarianism.	Since	the	election	of	illiberal	populistgovernments	with	absolute	parliamentary	majorities	in	Hungary	in	2010	and	Poland	in	2015,	these	two	once	modeldemocratisers	are	now	seen	as	models	of	democratic	backsliding	–	a	trend	that	some	fear	may	be	turbocharged	bythe	ways	in	which	these	government	have	dealt	with	the	coronavirus	emergency.Figure	1:	Mentions	of	‘democratic	backsliding’	in	Google	Scholar	resultsNote:	Compiled	by	the	authors.Scholarly	interest	in	the	phenomenon	of	democratic	backsliding	has	exploded	in	the	last	decade.	Although	therehas	been	much	dispute	both	over	labels	–	some	scholars	prefer	terms	like	‘democratic	erosion’	–	and	the	mix	ofcauses	driving	the	process,	the	basic	contours	of	democratic	backsliding	are	widely	agreed:	it	is	gradual,	led	bydemocratically-elected	governments	(often	right-wing	populist)	and	begins	with	attacks	on	constitutional	checks-and-balances,	the	judiciary	and	media	pluralism.	The	dynamic	is,	as	Nancy	Bermeo	puts	it,	one	of	slow	butrelentless	‘executive	aggrandisement’.LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog: We must go beyond the ‘backsliding paradigm’ to understand what’s happening to democracy in Centraland Eastern EuropePage 1 of 4		Date originally posted: 2020-04-17Permalink: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2020/04/17/we-must-go-beyond-the-backsliding-paradigm-to-understand-whats-happening-to-democracy-in-central-and-eastern-europe/Blog homepage: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/Threats	to	democracy,	especially	in	one-time	democratic	trailblazers,	are	serious,	and	merit	serious	scrutiny	andserious	action.	There	is	a	risk,	however,	that	reading	the	entire	region	through	the	lenses	of	backsliding	mayobscure	as	much	as	it	reveals.	Indeed,	the	growing	pessimistic	consensus	about	democratic	regression	in	Centraland	Eastern	Europe	risks	repeating	–	in	reverse	–	some	of	the	same	mistakes	of	the	previous	optimistic	consensusabout	the	region’s	democratic	progress.A	reverse	transition	paradigm?In	2002,	Thomas	Carothers	published	a	celebrated	critique	of	what	he	termed	the	“transition	paradigm”.	Heidentified	five	flawed	underlying	assumptions	that	policymakers	and	democracy	promoters	held	aboutdemocratisation.	Chief	among	these	were	the	assumption	that	a	country	moving	away	from	authoritarianism	was	intransition	towards	democracy	and	a	tendency	to	think	in	terms	of	a	linear	path	with	“…options	all	cast	in	terms	ofthe	speed	and	direction	with	which	countries	move	on	the	path,	not	in	terms	of	movement	that	does	not	conformwith	the	path	at	all”.He	also	questioned	an	over-focus	on	elections	as	watershed	moments	of	democratic	change	and	theunderestimation	of	the	importance	of	having	a	functioning	state	in	place.	Instead	of	asking	“how	is	the	transitiongoing?”	he	argued	that	analyses	should	ask	“what	is	happening	politically?”	and	sketched	two	common	real-lifescenarios	that	“transitioning”	states	were	more	likely	to	settle	into:	a	corrupt,	“feckless	pluralism”	or	moreauthoritarian	“dominant	power	politics”.Carothers’	famous	–	and	controversial	–	essay	was	in	places	overstated.	In	hindsight,	it	reads	as	a	prescientwarning	not	just	of	the	prevalence	of	‘hybrid	regimes’	manipulating	democratic	institutions	for	authoritarian	ends	inthe	post-Soviet	space	and	Africa,	but	also	of	the	weakness	of	many	supposedly	consolidated	democracies	inCentral	and	Eastern	Europe.	Many	bore	more	than	a	passing	resemblance	to	Carothers’	scenario	of	“fecklesspluralism”.	However,	more	importantly	for	the	current	debate	on	Central	and	Eastern	European	democracies,	itserves	as	a	warning	that	we	should	not	fall	into	a	possible	“backsliding	paradigm”	with	flawed	assumptions	whichare	a	mirror	image	of	the	“transition	paradigm”.Viktor	Orbán,	Hungarian	Prime	Minister,	meeting	with	Charles	Michel,	President	of	the	European	Council,	in	February	2020,	Credit:European	UnionThrough	this	lens,	all	democracies	in	the	region	become	potential	backsliders,	and	their	political	life	is	analysed	onlyin	terms	of	the	extent	(and	forms)	of	their	“backsliding”.	Any	change	or	event	risks	ending	up	being	investigated	onlyas	a	potential	signal	that	a	country	is	backsliding,	about	to	backslide,	prone	to	backsliding,	or	resilient	tobacksliding.	In	other	cases,	forms	of	(un)	democratic	change	that	may	fit	“backsliding”	only	awkwardly	such	as	theCzech	Republic	have	been	crammed	into	a	narrative	defined	by	the	experiences	of	Hungary	and	Poland.LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog: We must go beyond the ‘backsliding paradigm’ to understand what’s happening to democracy in Centraland Eastern EuropePage 2 of 4		Date originally posted: 2020-04-17Permalink: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2020/04/17/we-must-go-beyond-the-backsliding-paradigm-to-understand-whats-happening-to-democracy-in-central-and-eastern-europe/Blog homepage: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/However,	while	many	democracies	in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	are	in	aggregate	deteriorating,	genuinebacksliders	where	democratic	fundamentals	are	in	slow	motion	free	fall	appear	the	exception	not	the	rule.	AnnaLührmann	and	Staffan	I.	Lindberg’s	rigorous	measurement	of	“autocratisation	episodes”	using	the	V-Dem	datasetfinds	that,	of	the	EU’s	10	CEE	member	states,	only	Hungary	and	Poland	have	experienced	democratic	erosion.Two	more	cases	(Serbia	and	North	Macedonia)	appear	if	we	add	in	the	four	CEE	candidate	states.The	risk	of	a	“backsliding	paradigm”,	focusing	on	a	limited	number	of	worst	cases,	is	that	it	limits	our	capacity	tothink	about	the	range	of	(un)	democratic	transformation	taking	place	elsewhere	in	the	region.	To	understand	thebulk	of	CEE	cases,	where	there	is	neither	clear	democratic	progress	nor	sharp	regress,	we	are	left	either	with	theshaky-looking	notion	of	non-backsliding	states	being	consolidated	democracies,	or	loose	and	as	yet	under-theorised,	residual	categories	centring	on	qualified	or	low-quality	stability,	“arrested	development”	or	stagnation.A	paradigm	that	allows	for	only	three	possible	directions	of	travel	may	blind	us	to	trajectories	that	don’t	follow	alinear	pattern	of	advance,	stasis	or	retreat.	Even	stagnant	does	not	mean	immobile	with	the	possibility,	for	example,of	“near	misses”	or	“swerves”	into	and	out	of	authoritarianism;	some	archetypically	“backsliding”	phenomena	suchas	political	populism	may	be	deeply	ambiguous	in	their	effects,	particularly	those	with	a	“centrist”	anti-corruptionorientation	such	as	Slovakia’s	new	main	governing	party	OL’aNO,	while	classic	bulwarks	of	democracy	such	aslocal	civil	society	can	be	harnessed	to	bolster	backsliding	and	illiberalism.Backsliding	through	elections	only?The	backsliding	paradigm	is	in	less	danger	of	reproducing	some	of	the	other	flaws	of	its	predecessor.	Nevertheless,rereading	Carothers’	classic	essay	suggests	some	additional	pitfalls	to	be	avoided.Elections	were	seen	in	the	transition	paradigm	as	being	central	–	too	central	according	to	Carothers	–	in	cementingdemocratic	breakthroughs.	They	seem,	implicitly,	to	play	a	similar	watershed	role	now	in	the	emerging	backslidingparadigm,	kickstarting	the	process	by	putting	illiberal	or	democratic	disloyal	politicians	into	power.	However,	turningCarothers’	thinking	around,	the	election	of	such	politicians	does	not	necessarily	lead	to	backsliding	(for	example,	ifinstitutions	are	robust	and	checks	and	balances	too	entrenched).	At	the	same	time,	not	all	agents	of	backslidingneed	be	elected	politicians	–	corrupt	private	interests	can	capture	parties	and	institutions	warping	democracy	somuch	that	it	tips	into	a	special	kind	of	authoritarian	hybrid	regime	–	the	interpretation	Michal	Klíma	gives	of	thedecline	of	“standard”	West	European	style	party	politics	in	the	Czech	Republic.Echoes	of	the	transition	paradigm’s	over-optimistic	underplaying	of	social-structural	determinants	can	also	be	foundin	the	emerging	reverse	transition	paradigm.	Many	accounts	of	backsliding	in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	havetended	to	dwell	on	the	immediate	political	context	such	as	electoral	volatility,	polarisation	or	the	rise	of	populistactors	and	ideologies;	external	shocks	such	as	the	Great	Recession,	the	refugee	crisis	or	the	woes	of	theEurozone;	or	changes	in	external	actors’	policies	such	as	the	fading	out	of	the	EU’s	accession	conditionalities.	Thefact	that	one-time	democratic	front-runners	such	as	Hungary	and	Poland	succumbed	to	backsliding	has	tended	toreinforce	the	view	of	backsliding	as	contagion	–	driven	by	the	rise	of	illiberal	ideas	and	unscrupulous	elites	–	thatcan	spread	regardless	of	structural	conditions.This	is	in	some	ways	unsurprising.	The	ongoing	nature	of	the	process	makes	the	backsliding	paradigm	prone	to“presentism”,	over-focusing	on	a	limited	selection	of	current	events	at	the	expense	of	wider	historical	and	socialcontext.	When	it	comes	to	explanatory	factors,	many	of	the	usual	suspects	such	as	human	development,	inequality,or	ethno-linguistic	divisions	do,	at	best,	a	patchy	job	in	distinguishing	CEE	backsliders	from	countries	with	morevariegated	patterns	of	(un)democratic	development.	The	coronavirus	crisis	stands	as	a	sobering	reminder	of	thereality	and	power	of	exogenous	shocks.	Moreover,	as	Albert	O.	Hirschman	famously	pointed	out,	some	of	the	mostunhelpful	paradigms	are	precisely	those	which	pessimistically	see	change	as	blocked	off	by	structural	factors.But	any	sense	that	backsliding	can	happen	anywhere	and	everywhere	–	and	perhaps	already	is	happening	–	willneed	to	be	qualified	by	a	reappraisal	of	constraining	cultural,	social	and	economic	limits	–	a	process	alreadyunderway	in	scholarly	reassessment	of	the	rash	of	panicky	“it	could	happen	here”	reactions	to	the	election	ofDonald	Trump,	whose	authoritarian	instincts	have	damaged	but	not	derailed	American	democracy,	despite	the	factthat	systematic	gerrymandering	of	congressional	boundaries	and	efforts	at	“voter	suppression”	make	some	keyelements	of	US	democracy	deeply	flawed.The	limits	of	paradigmsLSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog: We must go beyond the ‘backsliding paradigm’ to understand what’s happening to democracy in Centraland Eastern EuropePage 3 of 4		Date originally posted: 2020-04-17Permalink: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2020/04/17/we-must-go-beyond-the-backsliding-paradigm-to-understand-whats-happening-to-democracy-in-central-and-eastern-europe/Blog homepage: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/No	one	would	deny	that	processes	of	democratic	backsliding	have	taken	hold	in	countries	such	as	Hungary	andPoland	and	some	other	Third	Wave	democracies	beyond	Europe.	But	it	is	important	not	to	look	at	the	whole	of	theCEE	region	as	“potential	Hungaries”.	Seeing	the	entire	region	through	a	very	narrow	lens	limits	our	ability	to	makesense	of	much	of	it.Not	all	that	is	bad	about	democracy	in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	is	an	effect	of	backsliding	or	a	sign	of	incipientbacksliding.	As	Hirschman	reminds	us,	“large-scale	social	change	typically	occurs	as	a	result	of	a	uniqueconstellation	of	highly	disparate	events	and	is	therefore	amenable	to	paradigmatic	thinking	only	in	a	very	specialsense.”	This	applies	both	to	CEE	states	unfortunate	enough	to	exemplify	the	backsliding	paradigm	and	to	the	lesswell	reflected	upon	journeys	of	those	that	do	not.A	longer,	fully	referenced	version	of	this	piece	has	been	uploaded	as	a	working	paper	in	the	APSA	pre-print	servicehere.	The	authors	welcome	comments	and	feedback.Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	authors,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	theLondon	School	of	Economics._________________________________About	the	authorsLicia	Cianetti	–	Royal	Holloway,	University	of	LondonLicia	Cianetti	is	a	Leverhulme	Early	Career	Fellow	at	Royal	Holloway,	University	of	London.	She	is	theauthor	of	The	Quality	of	Divided	Democracies:	Minority	Inclusion,	Exclusion,	and	Representation	in	theNew	Europe	(University	of	Michigan	Press,	2019).Seán	Hanley	–	UCL	–	School	of	Slavonic	and	East	European	StudiesSeán	Hanley	is	an	Associate	Professor	in	Comparative	Central	and	East	EuropeanPolitics	at	the	UCL	School	of	Slavonic	and	East	European	Studies.	His	recent	researchdeals	with	democratic	decline	and	technocratic	government	in	Central	Europe.LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog: We must go beyond the ‘backsliding paradigm’ to understand what’s happening to democracy in Centraland Eastern EuropePage 4 of 4		Date originally posted: 2020-04-17Permalink: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2020/04/17/we-must-go-beyond-the-backsliding-paradigm-to-understand-whats-happening-to-democracy-in-central-and-eastern-europe/Blog homepage: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/

We must go beyond the backsliding paradigm to understand what’s happening to democracy in Central and Eastern Europe

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We must go beyond the backsliding paradigm to understand what’s happening to democracy in Central and Eastern Europe

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