The delayed and problematic UK contact-tracing app has become a parable of the government’s failure to deal with the pandemic effectively, says Stephen L Roberts (LSE)

Roberts, Stephen L.

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LSE Research Online

Security, surveillance and shambles: the UK's contact-tracing appLSE Research Online URL for this paper: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/104685/Version: Published VersionOnline resource:Roberts, Stephen L. (2020) Security, surveillance and shambles: the UK's contact-tracing app. LSE COVID-19 Blog (28 May 2020). Blog Entry. lseresearchonline@lse.ac.ukhttps://eprints.lse.ac.uk/ ReuseItems deposited in LSE Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the LSE Research Online record for the item.Security,	surveillance	and	shambles:	the	UK’scontact-tracing	appThe	delayed	and	problematic	UK	contact-tracing	app	has	become	a	parable	of	the	government’s	failure	to	deal	withthe	pandemic	effectively,	says	Stephen	L	Roberts	(LSE).Amid	the	ongoing	COVID-19	pandemic,	the	UK	government’s	long-anticipated	contact-tracing	app	has	received	agreat	deal	of	attention.	Since	the	trialing	of	the	app	started	on	the	Isle	of	Wight,	the	government’s	partnership	withprofit-driven	Big	Tech	corporations	to	accelerate	data	collection	and	analysis	throughout	the	pandemic	has	attractedcriticism.	The	debate	about	whether	data	gathered	by	contact-tracing	apps	should	be	processed	via	centralised	ordecentralised	platforms	has	also	caused	controversy.Christian	Hornick	via	a	CC-BY-SA	2.0	licenceYet	despite	the	government’s	claims	that	the	technology	will	be	‘world-beating‘	and	help	to	exit	the	lockdown	inEngland,	the	launch	of	the	app	has	been	stalled.	While	England’s	track	and	trace	system	will	be	launched	on	28May,	the	government	has	insisted	that	the	app	will	be	fully	effective	and	in	place	by	1	June,	nearly	three	monthsafter	the	WHO	first	designated	COVID-19	a	pandemic	and	after	UK	deaths	from	the	disease	have	exceeded37,000.Delayed,	clouded	in	controversy	and	lagging	behind	in	response:	in	many	ways,	this	‘world-beating’	contact-tracingapp,	whether	yet	in	operation	or	not,	has	become	a	parable	for	the	UK	government’s	failure	to	respond	to	theCOVID-19	pandemic,	and	to	ensure	the	health	and	wellbeing	of	its	citizens.	While	other	countries	with	significantlylower	death	tolls	and	far	more	effective	pandemic	response	capacities	–	including	Germany,	South	Korea	andTaiwan	–	were	operating	transparent	and	effective	contact-tracing	systems	during	peaks	in	the	outbreak,	the	UKgovernment	abandoned	plans	for	a	contact-tracing	system	in	March.	This	was	when	forecasters	estimated	that	theUK	could	face	over	a	million	cases	of	COVID-19	and	the	reproduction	rate	of	the	virus,	R,	was	dangerously	high	inthe	country.In	stark	contrast,	Germany	initiated	testing	and	contact-tracing	of	its	population	in	late	January	when	the	initialcases	of	COVID-19	were	identified.	Similarly,	Taiwan	enacted	transparent	and	continuous	digital	approaches	tocase	identification,	contact-tracing	and	resource	allocation	for	public	health	responses	as	long	ago	as	Chinese	NewYear	2020.Now,	however,	following	the	UK	government’s	dismal	track	record	of	a	lack	of	testing,	shortages	of	PPE	andmedical	equipment,	and	a	demonstrable	failure	to	adhere	to	scientific	and	medical	evidence,	the	delayed	contact-tracing	app	is	being	pitched	as	an	indispensable	asset	in	exiting	lockdown.LSE Covid 19 Blog: Security, surveillance and shambles: the UK’s contact-tracing app Page 1 of 2		Date originally posted: 2020-05-28Permalink: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/covid19/2020/05/28/security-surveillance-and-shambles-the-uks-contact-tracing-app/Blog homepage: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/covid19/Yet	in	the	race	to	bring	the	troubled	app	into	operation,	critical	assessments	of	the	role	and	impacts	of	‘Big	Data-driven’	health	surveillance	have	been	left	behind.	Memories	of	the	Royal	Free	hospital	Google	DeepMind	scandalare	still	fresh	in	the	minds	of	many,	and	people	are	acutely	and	rightly	concerned	over	how	data	from	theirsmartphones,	Bluetooth	sentinels	and	call	records	might	be	accessed,	processed	and	stored.Far	from	working	to	engender	trust,	transparency,	and	engagement	with	the	public,	the	UK	government’s	approachhas	failed	to	learn	from	similar	tracing	technologies	elsewhere.	It	is	still	advocating	for	a	centralised	data	design,whereby	contact-matching	of	potential	infected	individuals	happens	on	a	remote	computer	server,	rather	than	adecentralised	platform,	where	this	process	occurs	on	users’	smartphones	and	a	higher	degree	of	anonymity	isensured.A	recent	security	analysis	has	highlighted	technical	and	security	issues	with	the	design	of	the	contact-tracing	app,recommending	it	be	shifted	to	the	widely-adopted	decentralised	approach,	and	how	such	data	could	be	repurposedor	stored	after	the	pandemic	subsides.Nonetheless,	the	Health	Secretary	has	reiterated	that	new	laws	to	regulate	how	data	for	the	UK’s	contact	tracing-app	is	used	and	stored	are	not	needed	because	the	existing	Data	Protection	Act	will	do	the	job.	Yet	again,	thegovernment	has	missed	the	larger	picture.	Merely	saying	that	existent	data	laws	are	sufficient	during	a	period	ofnational	emergency,	and	failing	to	account	for	established	public	anxieties	about	surveillance	creep	does	little	toengender	faith	in	governance	structures	or	leadership.As	evidence	from	past	epidemics	shows,	it	is	not	only	technology	and	infrastructure	which	are	critical	to	controllingoutbreaks,	but	also	the	willingness	of	communities	and	individuals	to	take	up	such	technologies	and	to	participate	incontact-tracing	operations	to	lower	infections,	especially	in	scenarios	like	the	UK’s	where	participation	in	digitalcontact-tracing	remains	voluntary.	This	government	has	much	to	learn	about	transparent	engagement	and	opencommunication	from	other	states	with	far	more	successful	pandemic	responses,	including	Germany	and	Taiwan.Because	of	public	concerns	about	data	security	and	the	centralised	design	of	the	tracing	technology,	NorthernIreland	has	rejected	the	app	in	favour	of	participating	in	an	All-Ireland	contact-tracing	programme	with	the	Republicof	Ireland	based	on	a	decentralised	system	design.	Similarly,	Scotland	has	urged	caution	and	has	not	yet	endorsedthe	app,	while	it	uses	established	practices	of	manual	contract-tracing.	This	divergence	is	part	of	an	increasinglyacrimonious	dynamic	between	the	UK	government	and	those	of	Wales,	Scotland	and	Northern	Ireland.You	cannot	‘Big	Data’	your	way	out	of	a	pandemic.	So	much	of	what	has	been	lost	in	the		pandemic	–	lost	time,	lostlives,	and	financial	losses	–	is	due	to	this	and	previous	government	failures	to	take	the	pathogenic	risks	of	aglobalised	world	seriously,	and	to	invest,	educate,	and	prepare	both	health	systems	and	populations	for	theiroccurrences.Clouded	in	controversy,	confusion,	division	and	delay,	the	contact-tracing	app	has	become	deeply	symbolic	of	thisgovernment’s	mounting	failure	to	respond	to	the	pandemic.	The	app	will	be	watched	closely	when	it	launches.	Itcannot,	however,	distract	from	the	wider	mishandling	and	failure	of	this	government	to	effectively	contain	thepandemic.This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	COVID-19	blog,	nor	LSE.LSE Covid 19 Blog: Security, surveillance and shambles: the UK’s contact-tracing app Page 2 of 2		Date originally posted: 2020-05-28Permalink: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/covid19/2020/05/28/security-surveillance-and-shambles-the-uks-contact-tracing-app/Blog homepage: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/covid19/

Security, surveillance and shambles: the UK's contact-tracing app

http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/104685/3/Roberts_security_surveillance_and_shambles_the_uks_contact.pdf

Security, surveillance and shambles: the UK's contact-tracing app

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