Iran excels at nurturing paramilitary forces across the Middle East. When it comes to cultivating persuasive ‘soft power’ amongst publics more broadly in the region, however, it has a chequered record. Iran has historically enjoyed a measure of Arab public sympathy for its nuclear programme

Watkins, Jessica

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Iran in Iraq: soft power after SoleimaniLSE Research Online URL for this paper: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/103269/Version: Published VersionOnline resource:Watkins, Jessica (2019) Iran in Iraq: soft power after Soleimani. Conflict Research Programme Blog (30 Jan 2019). Blog Entry. lseresearchonline@lse.ac.ukhttps://eprints.lse.ac.uk/ ReuseItems deposited in LSE Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the LSE Research Online record for the item.03/02/2020 Iran in Iraq: Soft Power after Soleimani | Conflict Research Programme Bloghttps://blogs.lse.ac.uk/crp/2020/01/30/iran-in-iraq-soft-power-after-soleimani/ 1/8Jessica Watkins January 30th, 2020Iran in Iraq: Soft Power after Soleimani0 comments | 1 sharesEstimated reading time: 10 minutesThis blog was originally published on the LSE Middle East Centre blogon 8 January 2020.03/02/2020 Iran in Iraq: Soft Power after Soleimani | Conflict Research Programme Bloghttps://blogs.lse.ac.uk/crp/2020/01/30/iran-in-iraq-soft-power-after-soleimani/ 2/8Qassem Soleimani receiving the Iran’s highest military honour, the Orderof Zolfaghar, from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, March 2019. Source:Prachatai, FlickrIran excels at nurturing paramilitary forces across the Middle East.When it comes to cultivating persuasive ‘soft power’ amongst publicsmore broadly in the region, however, it has a chequered record. Iran hashistorically enjoyed a measure of Arab public sympathy for its nuclearprogramme. Iranian resistance to US and Israeli agendas hasfurthermore earned the regime a degree of popular acclaim: regionalapproval ratings of the leadership rose markedly after Hezbollah tookon Israel in the 2006 Lebanon War. In the predominantly Sunni Arabworld, however, public opinion of the regime has plummeted since then,particularly in light of its activities during the Arab Uprisings. Iran’ssponsorship of mainly Shi’a militant groups stirred broad distrust of itsgeopolitical intentions and lent credibility to the theory that it seeks tocreate a ‘Shi’a crescent’ of in uence across the Middle East. Itsoutreach programmes are often dismissed as bids to convert Iranianclients to the Khomeinist doctrine of ‘wilayat al-faqih’ (Guardianship ofthe Jurisprudent).03/02/2020 Iran in Iraq: Soft Power after Soleimani | Conflict Research Programme Bloghttps://blogs.lse.ac.uk/crp/2020/01/30/iran-in-iraq-soft-power-after-soleimani/ 3/8Even in Iraq, where 65 percent of the population identify as Shi’a, therehad been growing resentment of pervasive Iranian in uence overreligious, political, security and cultural affairs. This in uence has beenextensive since regime change in 2003, but in mid-2014, ISIL’s militarycampaign across Iraq seemingly gave a carte blanche to Iran’s QudsForce to offer weaponry, technical support and advice to the Shi’amilitias which it has backed since the US occupation, and to foster thegrowth of new ones formed to combat ISIL. Qassem Soleimanioperated in Iraq on the invitation of the Iraqi government (or at leastpart of it) and continued to do so in the aftermath of ISIL’s defeat in2017.Iranian in uence in Iraq has deepened since then. The success of Fatah,a political alliance of Iranian-backed militia leaders including those ofthe Badr Organisation, Kata’ib Hezbollah, Asa’aib Ahl Al-Haq and theImam Ali Brigades, in the May 2018 parliamentary elections hasreinforced Iranian leverage over the government. Meanwhile, on theground, those same militias have taken control over large areas ofwestern and northern Iraq, where they have been able to generateincome from the local populace through a combination of deals withlocal businesses, checkpoint tolls, exploitation of natural resources andprotection rackets.To be sure, the Islamic Republic has always been better at ‘smartpower’ (combining coercive and economic power with persuasivecultural in uence) than at either hard or soft power alone. Since itsformation, the regime has faced almost constant internationalsanctions, limiting its conventional military capabilities and encouragingreliance on more economical forms of guerrilla warfare. Ideologically,while the regime sought from the outset to appeal to theMuslim umma in the region overall, uptake of its initiatives has beenincreasingly con ned to Shi’a communities. But Iran has made the mostof its limitations in Iraq, deriving smart power by manipulating the03/02/2020 Iran in Iraq: Soft Power after Soleimani | Conflict Research Programme Bloghttps://blogs.lse.ac.uk/crp/2020/01/30/iran-in-iraq-soft-power-after-soleimani/ 4/8combination of identity politics, patronage networks, and coercionwhich have become prevalent in Iraqi politics and society, andpermeating grassroots religious and charitable institutions and theinformal economy in ways that Western allies have neither the abilitynor the inclination to do.Periodic polling by Al-Mustakella for Research between 2005 and2019 suggests that amongst Iraq’s Shi’a, shifting views on whether Iranis a reliable partner have roughly corresponded to the threat level posedby Sunni militant jihadists at any given time (and potentially also thepresence or absence of US and allied forces). The 61% Shi’a approvalrating for Iran in 2005–6 during the  rst phase of sectarian con ict fellto 26% after the US-led surge and military drawdown in 2009–10. Duringthe war against ISIL in 2014–15, approval for Iran hit 86%, but fell afterISIL’s defeat to 49% in 2018–early 2019 (and just 36% when Sunnis wereincluded). Iran is clearly aware of this dynamic: its media outlets havecontinually justi ed the country’s paramilitary role in Iraq byemphasising the ongoing threat of Sunni militant extremists and of‘Zionist-Crusader’ (principally American) forces in the country, long aftervictory over ISIL was declared.Amongst the generation of Iraqi Shi’a who grew up after the fall ofSaddam, however, there are many who reject this level of interference.Polling in late 2019 amongst the predominantly young and Shi’a pro-reform protesters in Baghdad and the southern provinces indicated thatonly 1 percent trusted Iran (compared with 7 percent who trusted theUS, and 30 percent who trusted the UN). Over the past few months,criticism of Iran’s role in promulgating entrenched corruption in Iraq hasbecome increasingly outspoken, and while Iranian-backed elements ofthe security forces were reportedly responsible for repressivecrackdowns on protestors, in terms of public relations, Iran was on theback foot. Iranian-sponsored Arab media were careful not to speak outagainst Iraq’s senior religious authority, Sayyid al-Sistani, who defended03/02/2020 Iran in Iraq: Soft Power after Soleimani | Conflict Research Programme Bloghttps://blogs.lse.ac.uk/crp/2020/01/30/iran-in-iraq-soft-power-after-soleimani/ 5/8the ‘legitimate demands’ of peaceful protestors. Rather, a commonreading of the protests by those outlets was to stress that agentsprovocateurs had sabotaged the legitimate protests, leading to bloodyoutcomes.The assassination of Qassem Soleimani (along with Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the de facto head of Iraq’s Popular Mobilisation Forces in theIraqi government) in a US drone strike on Baghdad airport last Fridaycould well signal a death knell for the protest movement. In TahrirSquare, protestors reportedly staged some small-scalecelebrations after news of Soleimani’s death on Friday, but eyewitnessaccounts have subsequently suggested that overall, the news had asobering effect on the protest atmosphere, as anticipation of acrackdown swells. Expressing anti-Iranian sentiment threatens to bequickly transformed from a legitimate right to an act of nationaltreachery.Note: The CRP blogs gives the views of the author, not the position ofthe Con ict Research Programme, the London School of Economicsand Political Science, or the UK Government.About the authorPosted In: Governance | Identity Politics | Peace and SecurityJessica is Research O cer at the LSE Middle East Centre workingon the Con ict Research Programme.Jessica Watkins

Iran in Iraq: soft power after Soleimani

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Iran in Iraq: soft power after Soleimani

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