In his first year in power, argues Brian Klaas, Donald Trump has deployed the tactics of despots and begun to corrode the institutions of US democracy. What happens next? Democratic Audit editor Ros Taylor spoke to him about his new book, The Despot's Apprentice

Klaas, Brian

Taylor, Ros

LSE Research Online

Brian	Klaas:	‘The	incentives	for	a	Trump	2.0	will	beexactly	the	same	as	the	incentives	for	Trump’In	his	first	year	in	power,	argues	Brian	Klaas,	Donald	Trump	has	deployed	the	tactics	of	despots	and	begun	tocorrode	the	institutions	of	US	democracy.	What	happens	next?	Democratic	Audit	editor	Ros	Taylor	spoke	to	himabout	his	new	book,	The	Despot’s	Apprentice.The	last	time	we	spoke,	your	previous	book,	The	Despot’s	Accomplice	had	just	come	out.That	was	looking	at	US	complicity	in	aiding	and	abetting	undemocratic	regimes	abroad.	Nowyou’ve	written	a	new	book	about	Trump	and	the	threat	he	poses	to	democracy.	What’s	yourbiggest	worry?The	book	looks	at	Trump’s	threat	on	two	fronts.	One	is	the	way	Trump	is	mimicking	the	tactics	of	authoritarianregimes	and	borrowing	their	strategies	to	undermine	democracy	in	the	US.	The	second	is	accelerating	all	the	trendsthat	I	talked	about	in	The	Despot’s	Accomplice	–	that	the	US	is	a	two-faced	actor,	professing	support	for	humanrights	and	democracy	and	simultaneously	cosying	up	to	Saudi	Arabia	and	regimes	like	that.	Trump	is	amazinglyconsistent,	but	he’s	consistent	on	the	wrong	side.	He’s	cheerleading	for	terrible	regimes,	and	he’s	eliminated	a	lot	ofthe	human	rights	and	democracy	language	from	both	US	rhetoric	and	US	policy.	So	there’s	a	much	bigger	focus	inUS	diplomacy	towards	transactional	short-term	deal-making	that	makes	Trump	look	good,	and	much	less	oninvesting	in	long-term	alliances	or	building	a	more	democratic	world	in	the	long	term.Each	of	the	chapters	takes	a	tactic	from	an	authoritarian	regime	that	Trump	uses	–	albeit	to	a	lesser	extent	–	anddraws	a	parallel	between	them.	There’s	the	Orwellian	cult	of	personality,	where	Trump	constantly	lies	to	promote	hisown	ego	and	his	narcissistic	need	for	affirmation.	He’s	called	the	press	an	enemy	of	the	people,	which	is	harsherrhetoric	than	he’s	used	towards	actual	despots.	He’s	been	filling	the	White	House	with	nepotism,	hiring	familymembers,	generals,	cronies:	he’s	even	appointed	his	son’s	family	wedding	planner	to	be	in	charge	of	housing	in	NewYork	and	New	Jersey.	Then	you	have	a	really	worrying	politicisation	of	the	rule	of	law,	which	is	an	essentialcomponent	of	authoritarian	rising.	It	is	basically	saying	that	the	law	is	a	weapon	against	enemies	and	to	save	allies.Trump	has	already	pardoned	one	of	his	political	allies,	Joe	Arpaio,	in	Arizona.	He’s	called	to	lock	up	his	opponentand	now	he’s	going	after	Bob	Mueller	and	trying	to	discredit	him	–	keeping	in	mind	that	this	is	a	Republican-appointed	person	from	Trump’s	own	party.	Those	aspects	are	really	dangerous,	because	they	are	things	that	youcan’t	walk	back	easily.So	what	does	it	look	like	when	a	demagogue	uses	despot-like	tactics	in	ademocratic	system?	And	that’s	exactly	what’s	happening.	On	the	one	hand,	theinstitutions	are	still	intact.	Congress	still	has	power,	the	courts	still	matter,	thechecks	and	balances	are	working.	On	the	other	hand,	he’s	corroding	democracyby	poisoning	the	system	and	by	poisoning	the	minds	of	a	third	of	Americans,	whobelieve	that	authoritarianism	would	be	no	problem	as	long	as	it	was	in	their	favour.Finally,	the	book	looks	at	how	Trump	is	breaking	the	norms	of	democracy	in	waysthat	have	enlarged	what	is	acceptable.	I	think	about	the	first	time	that	he	said	‘fakenews’.	It	was	an	international	story.	And	now	it’s	a	daily	occurrence.	The	first	timehe	called	to	throw	Hillary	Clinton	in	jail,	there	was	a	gasp.	Now	it’s	‘Oh,	just	anothertweet.’	I	think	you	can	simultaneously	hold	the	view	that	Trump	is	being	containedmore	than	he	would	be	if	he	was	actually	head	of	an	authoritarian	regime	–	andthat	at	the	same	time	he’s	dragging	the	US	closer	to	that	regime.Why	can’t	we	get	traction	on	Trump?	He	has	done	things	thatwould	have	destroyed	any	other	president.	Is	it	just	theRepublican	party	to	blame,	or	are	other	institutions	not	steppingup?USApp – American Politics and Policy Blog: Brian Klaas: ‘The incentives for a Trump 2.0 will be exactly the same as the incentives for Trump’ Page 1 of 4		Date originally posted: 2018-01-06Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2018/01/06/brian-klaas-the-incentives-for-a-trump-2-0-will-be-exactly-the-same-as-the-incentives-for-trump/Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/The	Republican	party	exists	in	an	environment	where	most	of	the	elections	for	Congress	are	lost	in	the	primary,	asopposed	to	the	general	election.	So	in	2016	the	average	House	member	won	re-election	with	a	margin	of	victory	of37.1%	–	which	is	something	that	you	see	in	authoritarian	regimes.	Some	of	this	is	demographics.	but	some	of	it	isgerrymandering.	The	Republican	base	basically	has	the	power	to	destroy	Republican	incumbents	and	elect	another,more	extreme	Republican,	because	they	know	that	they’re	probably	not	going	to	lose	to	a	Democrat.	That’s	killed	offcompromise,	and	it’s	made	people	who	personally	would	say	that	Trump	is	terrible	back	him	100%.	That’s	a	bigfactor	and	it’s	made	possible	by	the	polarisation	of	American	politics.Then	there’s	the	whataboutism	that’s	become	really	common	in	American	politics.	This	term	–	tellingly	–	came	fromthe	Soviet	Union,	where	they	would	get	criticised	by	the	US	for	human	rights	abuses	and	then	they	would	point	tosome	far	more	minimal	problem	in	the	US	and	say	that	there’s	a	false	equivalence.	Trump	is	a	master	of	this,	and	itis	what	his	spin	team	always	does.	Any	time	that	there’s	an	accusation,	or	obvious	wrongdoing,	they	use	theirfavourite	bogeyman	–	Hillary	Clinton	–	and	say	‘What	about	this?’	For	the	people	who	absolutely	despise	HillaryClinton,	that’s	a	very	effective	tactic.	Sometimes	the	bogeyman	is	the	system.	For	a	large	number	of	people	in	theUS,	Trump	will	never	be	more	guilty	than	the	system	he	attacks.	That’s	why	people	who	normally	would	professbipartisan	principles,	like	a	free	press	and	the	rule	of	law	being	apolitical,	don’t	care	about	them	as	much.	They’dmuch	rather	have	him	attack	that	system.	Whataboutism	as	a	political	norm	is	one	of	the	big	stories	of	2017.Mike	Pence,	Paul	Ryan,	Donald	Trump	and	Mitch	McConnell	celebrate	the	passage	of	the	Tax	Cuts	Act.	December	2017.	Photo:White	House.	Public	domainA	lot	of	people	say	to	me:	‘Trump	is	not	Mussolini	or	Hitler.’	That’s	absolutely	true,	there’s	no	question.	But	if	aMussolini-like	figure	tried	to	come	into	America	and	corrode	the	system	from	within,	that	person	would	be	rebuffedimmediately	because	people	like	Paul	Ryan	and	Mitch	McConnell,	who’ve	been	complicit	with	Trump,	would	see	thethreat.	I	think	because	of	Trump’s	showmanship	and	his	bumbly	nature,	people	falsely	believe	that	he	is	lessinsidious.	They	think,	‘that’s	Trump,	we	can	focus	on	the	tax	plan,’	or	whatever	it	is.	In	a	robust	democracy	likeAmerica,	the	only	type	of	person	who	can	destroy	that	from	within	is	someone	who	is	viewed	as	a	non-threat.	Andthat	is	what	Trump	has	done	masterfully.A	lot	of	people	thought	that	he	was	going	to	be	an	isolationist	because	of	his	plans	on	trade,and	that	he	wouldn’t	get	involved	abroad	because	it	wasn’t	what	his	base	was	interested	in.But	even	leaving	aside	Russia,	he’s	deeply	involved	abroad	–	such	as	in	his	interventionswith	Duterte	and	in	North	Korea.	A	lot	of	the	democracy	promotion	the	US	does	abroad	is	stillgoing	on	because	the	funding	hasn’t	run	out	yet.	But	presumably	in	the	next	year	or	two	thatwill	start	to	change.USApp – American Politics and Policy Blog: Brian Klaas: ‘The incentives for a Trump 2.0 will be exactly the same as the incentives for Trump’ Page 2 of 4		Date originally posted: 2018-01-06Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2018/01/06/brian-klaas-the-incentives-for-a-trump-2-0-will-be-exactly-the-same-as-the-incentives-for-trump/Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/You’re	right	that	a	lot	of	the	funding	has	been	on	auto-pilot,	but	he’s	destroyed	the	effectiveness	of	the	fundingalready.	Take	the	Philippines	or	Turkey.	The	embassies	are	still	doing	the	right	work	–	the	people	who	are	lifelongdiplomats,	many	of	which	have	left	because	Trump	has	made	them	ineffective	–	they’re	still	fighting	the	good	fight.But	then	Erdogan	rigs	a	referendum	to	consolidate	power	further	in	Turkey.	The	State	Department	says	thereferendum	was	seriously	flawed	and	we	call	for	all	parties	to	show	restraint	and	to	restore	democracy.	Then	Trumpcalls	and	congratulates	Erdogan,	and	nothing	else	matters.	It	undercuts	every	pro-democracy	signal	the	US	has.With	Duterte,	it’s	the	same	thing.	You	get	pressure	from	the	US	embassy	that	supports	human	rights.	But	thenTrump	explicitly	praised	Duterte’s	drug	war	in	a	phone	call	and	then	they	met	together.	One	of	the	most	chillingmoments	was	when	Trump	met	Duterte	at	the	ASEAN	summit	in	Manila.	They	joked	about	journalists	being	spies	inthe	Philippines,	and	then	laughed	about	it.	The	Philippines	is	the	third	most	dangerous	place	for	a	journalist	tooperate.	That	moment	of	laughing	with	a	despot	who	has	overseen	a	system	in	which	doing	investigative	reporting	isbasically	a	death	sentence	–	it’s	an	unthinkable	shift	in	US	foreign	policy,	compared	to	even	the	two-facedness	Italked	about	in	The	Despots’	Apprentice.There’s	also	a	fundamental	shift	in	how	foreign	policy	is	formulated	under	the	Trump	administration.	The	decision	tomove	the	US	embassy	to	Jerusalem	was	not	a	calculated	decision.	There	was	no	consultation	of	allies.	It	wassomething	that	would	fire	up	his	political	base.	The	second	thing	is	that	Trump	Tower	opened	in	Manila	in	2017,	andthere	are	two	Trump	Towers	in	Turkey.	If	he	is	nice	to	despots	Trump	benefits	financially	from	licensing	deals,	orbetter	business.	Or	he	risks	expropriation	of	his	properties.	Which	was	not	true	under	Obama,	or	any	president	inmodern	times.	The	democracy	promotion	agenda	has	effectively	been	undercut	by	one	person,	and	that’s	the	personat	the	top.Is	the	Russian	inquiry	going	to	make	the	difference?I	think	the	Russian	investigation	could	bring	down	Donald	Trump.	It’s	speculation	still.	In	the	Watergate	scandal	–which	is	the	last	time	a	US	president	was	taken	down	by	an	inquiry	–	it	was	four	or	five	days	between	the	release	ofthe	smoking	gun	tape	and	when	Nixon	resigned.	Up	until	that	point,	nobody	knew	it	existed	and	the	inquiry	had	beenopen	for	a	year	and	a	half.	Up	until	that	point,	Nixon	claimed	that	he	was	not	a	subject	of	the	investigation.	There	arevery	many	similarities	here.	You	have	a	president	trying	to	claim	he’s	not	under	investigation,	and	all	signs	pointing	tothe	fact	he	is	–	in	addition	to	collusion,	there’s	obstruction	of	justice	and	a	whole	lot	of	other	potential	criminalliabilities.I	think	it	is	absolutely	obvious	that	there	is	no	innocent	explanation	for	what	happened.	On	the	collusion	aspect,	thesmoking	gun	is	the	Trump	Jr	emails	that	say:	‘We’re	offering	you	high-level	sensitive	dirt	from	the	Russiangovernment	on	Hillary	Clinton.’	And	they	say,	‘We	love	it.	When	can	we	set	up	a	meeting?’	And	then	they	have	themeeting	in	Trump	Tower	with	Trump’s	son,	son-in-law	and	campaign	manager.	At	that	point,	the	rosiest	interpretationis	that	they	tried	and	failed	to	collude.	But	they	still	tried.	So	to	me	that’s	the	end	of	that	story.	The	obstruction	ofjustice	question	I	think	was	over	when	Trump	admitted	that	he	fired	James	Comey	because	of	the	Russianinvestigation.Ultimately	what	I	fear	may	happen	is	Mueller	has	a	report	that	says	there’s	a	high	degree	of	probability	that	Trumpcommitted	crimes,	he	gives	it	to	Congress	and	Congress	effectively	shrugs,	engages	in	whataboutism	and	then	triesto	discredit	Mueller.	That	is	a	really	dangerous	scenario	because	you’ll	have	two-thirds	of	the	country	believing	–correctly	–	that	Mueller’s	investigation	was	fair	and	thorough,	and	a	third	viewing	this	as	an	assault	on	their	guy.	Oneof	my	next	research	projects	is	about	these	voters-	in	some	literature	they’re	referred	to	as	latent	authoritarians	–who	would	accept	authoritarian	rule	as	long	as	it’s	done	to	their	initial	benefit.	They	don’t	care	about	procedure.That’s	what’s	different	about	Trump.	Those	people	always	existed	in	western	democracies	–	they	exist	in	Europe,they	exist	in	the	US	–	but	there’s	been	a	sort	of	pact	among	elites	that	they	don’t	engage	with	this	behaviour,because	it’s	so	out	of	balance.	Trump	has	broken	that	down,	so	that	these	people	cheer	that	type	of	behaviour,	andthey	also	expect	it.USApp – American Politics and Policy Blog: Brian Klaas: ‘The incentives for a Trump 2.0 will be exactly the same as the incentives for Trump’ Page 3 of 4		Date originally posted: 2018-01-06Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2018/01/06/brian-klaas-the-incentives-for-a-trump-2-0-will-be-exactly-the-same-as-the-incentives-for-trump/Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/That’s	why	I’m	worried	about	the	post-Trump	era.	Even	if	he	gets	impeached,	even	if	he	gets	removed	from	office,that	third	of	America	that	is	totally	OK	and	excited	about	everything	he’s	been	doing	are	still	part	of	the	system.They’re	still	a	huge	electoral	force,	and	the	incentives	for	a	Trump	2.0	will	be	exactly	the	same	as	the	incentives	forTrump.	In	the	book,	I	have	a	chapter	called	The	Forerunner	which	imagines	a	scenario	in	2020.	It	looks	at	howTrump	has	paved	the	way	for	a	much	more	polished	version	of	himself:	a	Reagan-esque	or	Obama-esque	figure	withthe	political	discipline	of	a	normal	politician,	but	the	same	ideology	and	tactics	as	Trump	.	That	is	an	effective	andprobably	winning	strategy,	and	one	that	would	be	much	more	dangerous.The	Despot’s	Apprentice:	Donald	Trump’s	Attack	on	Democracy	is	published	by	Hurst.This	article	first	appeared	at	the	Democratic	Audit	of	the	UK	blog.Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.										Note:		This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	and	not	the	position	of	USAPP	–	American	Politics	and	Policy,	nor	ofthe	London	School	of	Economics.Shortened	URL	for	this	post:	http://bit.ly/2CMM8Fq	________________________________About	the	intervieweeBrian	Klaas	–	LSE	GovernmentDr	Brian	Klaas	is	a	Fellow	in	Comparative	Politics	at	the	London	School	of	Economics.	He	focuseson	global	democracy,	democratic	transitions,	political	violence	and	volatility	(particularly	coups	andcivil	wars),	and	rigged	elections	–	and	the	economic	risks	of	all	these	challenges.	He	is	also	aformer	US	campaign	adviser.	Twitter	@brianklaasUSApp – American Politics and Policy Blog: Brian Klaas: ‘The incentives for a Trump 2.0 will be exactly the same as the incentives for Trump’ Page 4 of 4		Date originally posted: 2018-01-06Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2018/01/06/brian-klaas-the-incentives-for-a-trump-2-0-will-be-exactly-the-same-as-the-incentives-for-trump/Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/

Brian Klaas: 'the incentives for a Trump 2.0 will be exactly the same as the incentives for Trump'

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Brian Klaas: 'The incentives for a Trump 2.0 will be exactly the same as the incentives for Trump'

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