The European Arrest Warrant is important to Theresa May. But, as Auke Willems (LSE) explains, it will be difficult to negotiate the pan-European security co-operation she wants unless Britain is prepared to cross the 'red line' of recognising the European Court of Justice, as well as the Charter of Fundamental Rights

Willems, Auke

The European Arrest Warrant is important to Theresa May. But, as Auke Willems (LSE) explains, it will be difficult to negotiate the pan-European security co-operation she wants unless Britain is prepared to cross the ‘red line’ of recognising the European Court of Justice, as well as the Charter of Fundamental Rights

LSE Research Online

Why	Britain’s	habit	of	cherry-picking	criminal	justicepolicy	cannot	survive	BrexitThe	European	Arrest	Warrant	is	important	to	Theresa	May.	But,	as	Auke	Willems	(LSE)	explains,	it	will	be	difficultto	negotiate	the	pan-European	security	co-operation	she	wants	unless	Britain	is	prepared	to	cross	the	‘red	line’	ofrecognising	the	European	Court	of	Justice,	as	well	as	the	Charter	of	Fundamental	Rights.Belgian	police	in	Brussels,	2013.	Picture:	Antonio	Ponte	via		CC-BY-SA	2.9Cooperation	on	matters	of	police	and	criminal	law	–	or	security	cooperation,	as	the	UK	government	prefers	to	call	it–	is	high	on	the	list	of	Brexit	priorities.	In	particular,	the	European	Arrest	Warrant	(EAW),	the	EU’s	flagshipinstrument	for	fast-track	extradition,	is	highly	valued	by	Theresa	May.	The	government	has	given	some	insight	intohow	it	wants	this	relationship	to	take	shape	in	a	Future	Partnership	Paper	on	Security,	law	enforcement	andcriminal	justice,	as	well	as	in	May’s	speech	at	the	Munich	Security	Conference	where	she	underlined	theimportance	of	cooperation	in	this	area:	“Extradition	outside	the	European	Arrest	Warrant	can	cost	four	times	asmuch	and	take	three	times	as	long.”	While	these	put	forward	a	strong	case	for	why	cooperation	should	continue,they	leave	much	to	be	desired	in	terms	of	how	this	should	be	achieved.Absent	from	public	debate,	but	not	from	the	negotiating	tableSurprisingly,	criminal	justice	cooperation	has	received	relatively	little	attention	in	public	debate	when	compared	tothe	blockbuster	files	of	the	divorce	bill,	the	Irish	border,	citizens’	rights,	and	future	trade	relations.	Surprising,because	the	interests	at	stake	concern	such	fundamental	values	as	security,	freedom	and	rights.	But	despite	thelack	of		public	attention,	it	is	no	surprise	that	criminal	justice	is	one	of	the	government’s	priority	areas.	It	is,	after	all,a	core	task	of	a	state	to	provide	security	for	its	citizens,	and	in	a	rapidly	globalising	world	it	is	impossible	to	do	thisalone.	Certain	forms	of	serious	crime	are	cross-border	by	nature	–	drug-trafficking,	human	trafficking,	and	terrorism–	but	also	‘new’	forms	of	crime	such	as	cybercrime	necessitate	a	joint	and	coordinated	response.	The	prospect	thatthe	UK	would	fall	outside	the	EU’s	criminal	justice	framework	and	become	a	safe	haven	for	criminals	and	terroristsis	not	an	appealing	thought.The	UK’s	central,	and	privileged,	position	in	EU	criminal	lawDemocratic Audit: Why Britain’s habit of cherry-picking criminal justice policy cannot survive Brexit Page 1 of 3		Date originally posted: 2018-04-03Permalink: https://www.democraticaudit.com/2018/04/03/why-britains-habit-of-cherry-picking-criminal-justice-policy-cannot-survive-brexit/Blog homepage: https://www.democraticaudit.com/The	UK	has	long	been	one	of	the	main	drivers	of	the	EU’s	criminal	justice	policy.	Although	reluctantly	–	there	hasnever	been	much	desire	to	give	up	sovereignty	regarding	criminal	law,	which	touches	on	the	core	of	statehood	–the	UK	saw	an	urgent	need	for	European	states	to	enhance	cooperation	in	criminal	justice	matters	in	the	face	ofincreasing	cross-border	crime,	not	least	because	of	the	freedoms	the	EU	guarantees.	Therefore	the	UK	came	upwith	the	idea	of	transferring	the	principle	of	mutual	recognition,	which	had	proven	successful	in	the	internal	market,to	the	area	of	criminal	law.	In	1999,	the	Tampere	European	Council	proclaimed	that	mutual	recognition	was	tobecome	the	‘cornerstone	of	judicial	cooperation	in	criminal	justice’.	It	still	is	today,	and,	despite	difficulties,	thesuccess	of	the	EAW	–	at	least	from	a	law	enforcement	perspective	–	is	undeniable.	The	latest	frontier	in	the	mutualrecognition	era	is	the	European	Investigation	Order	on	the	gathering	and	exchange	of	evidence,	and	UK	lawenforcement	is	more	than	keen	to	participate	in	this	instrument.	The	UK	has	moreover	proven	a	major	player	ininformation	and	intelligence	exchange	and	operational	cooperation	through	platforms	and	databasesas	Europol	(the	current	director	of	Europol	is	British)	and	the	Schengen	Information	System.In	addition	to	successfully	pushing	forward	mutual	recognition	instead	of	more	intrusive	harmonisation,	the	UK	haslong	enjoyed	opt-outs	regarding	justice	and	home	affairs	matters,	which	culminated	in	a	broad	arrangement	underthe	Lisbon	Treaty	that	effectively	allowed	the	UK	to	opt	in/out	of	any	measure	it	desires.	This	arrangement,	alsoreferred	to	as	cherry-picking,	has	indeed	been	a	rather	sweet	deal	for	the	UK	and	allows	it	to	participate	in	thosemeasures	that	are	regarded	as	domestically	beneficial,	and	avoid	anything	else.	That	deal	will	now	end.	Arguably	–more	than	in	any	other	area	–	the	UK	has	managed	to	shape	EU	criminal	law	to	its	desires.	So	it	seems	fair	toconclude	that	if	the	EU	were	merely	a	‘security	union’,	Brexit	would	never	have	happened.A	shared	interest	in	continuing	cooperation,	but	what	about	trust?The	desire	to	maintain	close	security	ties	is	therefore	high	on	the	UK’s	agenda,	with	an	emphasis	on	lawenforcement	measures	like	the	EAW.	The	EU	in	turn	also	wishes	to	maintain	as	close	a	relationship	as	possiblewith	the	UK	across	justice	and	security	(see	for	example	the	European	Council’s	Guidelines).	Could	this	be	onearea	where	an	early	deal	could	be	reached,	based	on	shared	interests?	The	answer	should	be	yes.	The	interests	atstake	are	simply	too	high	for	political	games,	and	this	is	far	from	a	zero-sum	game.	However,	there	are	a	number	ofsnags	that	make	it	more	complicated	than	it	might	seem.The	high	degree	of	cooperation	within	the	EU	on	criminal	justice	matters	is	enabled	by	the	presumption	that	allMember	States	comply	fully	with	fundamental	rights,	including	laws	on	data	protection,	and	more	broadly	complywith	the	EU	acquis.	Two	key	instruments	are	the	EU’s	Charter	of	Fundamental	Rights	and	the	EuropeanConvention	on	Human	Rights	(ECHR).	In	terms	of	EU	criminal	law	this	is	known	as	the	presumption	of	mutual	trust.The	EU	has	taken	active	steps	to	strengthen	this	trust,	for	example	by	adopting	measures	enhancing	fair	trial	rights(here	the	UK	has	a	mixed	record	as	it	has	opted	in	to	some	of	these	measures,	but	not	all),	and	other	flankingmeasures	to	minimise	differences	between	national	legal	systems.A	further	pillar	to	guarantee	mutual	trust	is	the	jurisdiction	of	the	Court	of	Justice	of	the	European	Union	(CJEU),which	is	tasked	with	keeping	Member	States	in	line	with	EU	laws,	but	also	to	safeguard	the	balance	between	rightsand	enforcement.	The	EU’s	Area	of	Freedom,	Security	and	Justice	(which	is	far	from	complete)	aims	to	become	abalanced	judicial	space,	under	the	guardianship	of	the	Commission,	and	with	the	ultimate	supervision	of	the	CJEU.The	emphasis	on	security	rather	than	justiceThis	reality	might	pose	a	number	of	difficulties	for	the	UK	government.	The	EU	Charter	of	Fundamental	Rights	willnot	form	part	of	retained	EU	law,	and	the	future	of	the	ECHR	is	at	best	uncertain	(dubbed	‘Brexit	2’	by	EstellaBaker).	Moreover,	the	protection	of	data,	required	for	access	to	EU	databases,	is	a	concern	on	the	EU	side.	Morebroadly,	the	terminology	used	by	the	government,	which	emphasises	security	rather	than	freedom	and	justice,indicates	that	negotiators	are	less	interested	in	the	latter.This	may	very	well	prove	the	main	stumbling	block.	An	absolute	prerequisite	for	applying	instruments	as	the	EAW	ismutual	trust,	which	cannot	be	ensured	by	a	third	state	if	it	does	not	comply	with	the	EU’s	Charter,	nor	any	of	itsprocedural	rights	measures	or	the	other	relevant	EU	acquis.	To	illustrate	this,	the	EAW	deal	with	Norway	andIceland,	two	states	that	are	within	the	single	market	and	Schengen	(the	UK	will	not	be	in	either),	took	ten	years	tonegotiate	and	is	still	not	operational.Democratic Audit: Why Britain’s habit of cherry-picking criminal justice policy cannot survive Brexit Page 2 of 3		Date originally posted: 2018-04-03Permalink: https://www.democraticaudit.com/2018/04/03/why-britains-habit-of-cherry-picking-criminal-justice-policy-cannot-survive-brexit/Blog homepage: https://www.democraticaudit.com/Moreover,	if	the	jurisdiction	of	the	CJEU	is	indeed	a	red	line	–	as	argued	by	some	hard-line	Brexiters	–	this	will	bedifficult	to	reconcile.	If	two	parties	sign	an	agreement,	this	will	raise	issues	of	interpretation	for	which	a	judicial	bodyis	needed.	It	appears	from	May’s	speech	in	Munich	as	though	that	she	has	opened	the	door	(albeit	reluctantly)	toaccepting	CJEU	jurisdiction	where	necessary.Overall,	no	matter	what	form	an	ultimate	cooperation	agreement	will	take,	it	will	be	less	than	what	is	currently	inplace:	an	‘EAW	minus’	at	best.	How	much	it	differs	will	depend	upon	the	commitment	the	UK	is	willing	to	maketo	meet	EU	fundamental	rights	law.	As	Valsamis	Mitsilegas	has	noted,	this	has	created	the	paradoxicalsituation	where	in	order	to	maintain	current	levels	of	cooperation,	the	UK	might	have	to	accept	more	EU	law	than	itcurrently	does	as	a	Member	State.An	early	end	to	UK	participation	in	the	EAW?The	recent	case	of	O’Connor	might	serve	to	show	how	central	the	EU’s	acquis	is	to	the	EAW,	and	the	consequentimpact	of	Brexit.	The	Irish	Supreme	Court	refused	to	surrender	Joseph	O’Connor	to	the	UK	due	to	its	concernsabout	Brexit,	in	essence	because	his	rights	could	be	curtailed	once	the	UK	leaves	the	EU	(the	sentence	soughtwould	continue	post-Brexit).	Accordingly,	the	Irish	Supreme	Court	referred	the	matter	to	the	CJEU.	This	case	will	bea	major	test,	as	the	CJEU	could	potentially	render	the	precious	EAW	ineffective	already	as	of	now,	rather	than	afterBrexit.	It	underlines	the	need	to	find	a	solution	that	satisfies	the	rights	requirements	that	are	needed	to	operate	theEU’s	enhanced	model	of	cooperation	in	criminal	justice	matters.Considering	the	difficulties	that	lie	ahead	in	reaching	a	deal	acceptable	to	both	the	UK	and	the	EU27	which	wouldnot	deteriorate	either	security	or	rights,	the	words	of	Wolfgang	Ischinger	at	the	Munich	Security	Conference	cut	rightto	the	chase:	‘Things	would	be	so	much	easier	if	you	stayed’.This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	Democratic	Audit.	It	first	appeared	on	the	LSE	Brexitblog.About	the	authorAuke	Willems	is	a	Fellow	in	EU	Law	at	the	LSE’s	European	Institute.	He	tweets	@WillemsAuke.			Similar	PostsMost	populist	radical	right	parties	across	Europe	are	not	eager	to	leave	the	EUPopulist	politicians	on	both	sides	of	the	Atlantic	are	plundering	history	for	persuasive	purposesBrexit	is	happening	–	are	EU	citizens’	rights	finally	a	done	deal?Brexit	and	election	advertising:	an	asset	for	some,	a	liability	for	othersA	great	or	Pyrrhic	victory?	The	dangers	ahead	for	Boris	JohnsonDemocratic Audit: Why Britain’s habit of cherry-picking criminal justice policy cannot survive Brexit Page 3 of 3		Date originally posted: 2018-04-03Permalink: https://www.democraticaudit.com/2018/04/03/why-britains-habit-of-cherry-picking-criminal-justice-policy-cannot-survive-brexit/Blog homepage: https://www.democraticaudit.com/

English

Why Britain’s habit of cherry-picking criminal justice policy cannot survive Brexit

Why	Britain’s	habit	of	cherry-picking	criminal	justicepolicy	cannot	survive	BrexitThe	European	Arrest	Warrant	is	important	to	Theresa	May.	But,	as	Auke	Willems	(LSE)	explains,it	will	be	difficult	to	negotiate	the	pan-European	security	co-operation	she	wants	unless	Britain	isprepared	to	cross	the	‘red	line’	of	recognising	the	European	Court	of	Justice,	as	well	as	the	Charterof	Fundamental	Rights.Cooperation	on	matters	of	police	and	criminal	law	–	or	security	cooperation,	as	the	UK	governmentprefers	to	call	it	–	is	high	on	the	list	of	Brexit	priorities.	In	particular,	the	European	Arrest	Warrant(EAW),	the	EU’s	flagship	instrument	for	fast-track	extradition,	is	highly	valued	by	Theresa	May.	The	government	hasgiven	some	insight	into	how	it	wants	this	relationship	to	take	shape	in	a	Future	Partnership	Paper	on	Security,	lawenforcement	and	criminal	justice,	as	well	as	in	May’s	speech	at	the	Munich	Security	Conference	where	sheunderlined	the	importance	of	cooperation	in	this	area:	“Extradition	outside	the	European	Arrest	Warrant	can	cost	fourtimes	as	much	and	take	three	times	as	long.”	While	these	put	forward	a	strong	case	for	why	cooperation	shouldcontinue,	they	leave	much	to	be	desired	in	terms	of	how	this	should	be	achieved.Absent	from	public	debate,	but	not	from	the	negotiating	tableBelgian	police	in	Brussels,	2013.	Photo:	Antonio	Ponte	via	a	CC-BY-SA	2.9	licenceSurprisingly,	criminal	justice	cooperation	has	received	relatively	little	attention	in	public	debate	when	compared	to	theblockbuster	files	of	the	divorce	bill,	the	Irish	border,	citizens’	rights,	and	future	trade	relations.	Surprising,	becausethe	interests	at	stake	concern	such	fundamental	values	as	security,	freedom	and	rights.	But	despite	the	lack	of	public	attention,	it	is	no	surprise	that	criminal	justice	is	one	of	the	government’s	priority	areas.	It	is,	after	all,	a	coretask	of	a	state	to	provide	security	for	its	citizens,	and	in	a	rapidly	globalising	world	it	is	impossible	to	do	this	alone.Certain	forms	of	serious	crime	are	cross-border	by	nature	–	drug-trafficking,	human	trafficking,	and	terrorism	–	butalso	‘new’	forms	of	crime	such	as	cybercrime	necessitate	a	joint	and	coordinated	response.	The	prospect	that	the	UKwould	fall	outside	the	EU’s	criminal	justice	framework	and	become	a	safe	haven	for	criminals	and	terrorists	is	not	anappealing	thought.The	UK’s	central,	and	privileged,	position	in	EU	criminal	lawLSE Brexit: Why Britain’s habit of cherry-picking criminal justice policy cannot survive Brexit Page 1 of 3		Date originally posted: 2018-03-29Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2018/03/29/why-britains-habit-of-cherry-picking-criminal-justice-policy-cannot-survive-brexit/Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/The	UK	has	long	been	one	of	the	main	drivers	of	the	EU’s	criminal	justice	policy.	Although	reluctantly	–	there	hasnever	been	much	desire	to	give	up	sovereignty	regarding	criminal	law,	which	touches	on	the	core	of	statehood	–	theUK	saw	an	urgent	need	for	European	states	to	enhance	cooperation	in	criminal	justice	matters	in	the	face	ofincreasing	cross-border	crime,	not	least	because	of	the	freedoms	the	EU	guarantees.	Therefore	the	UK	came	upwith	the	idea	of	transferring	the	principle	of	mutual	recognition,	which	had	proven	successful	in	the	internal	market,	tothe	area	of	criminal	law.	In	1999,	the	Tampere	European	Council	proclaimed	that	mutual	recognition	was	to	becomethe	‘cornerstone	of	judicial	cooperation	in	criminal	justice’.	It	still	is	today,	and,	despite	difficulties,	the	success	of	theEAW	–	at	least	from	a	law	enforcement	perspective	–	is	undeniable.	The	latest	frontier	in	the	mutual	recognition	erais	the	European	Investigation	Order	on	the	gathering	and	exchange	of	evidence,	and	UK	law	enforcement	is	morethan	keen	to	participate	in	this	instrument.	The	UK	has	moreover	proven	a	major	player	in	information	andintelligence	exchange	and	operational	cooperation	through	platforms	and	databases	as	Europol	(the	current	directorof	Europol	is	British)	and	the	Schengen	Information	System.In	addition	to	successfully	pushing	forward	mutual	recognition	instead	of	more	intrusive	harmonisation,	the	UK	haslong	enjoyed	opt-outs	regarding	justice	and	home	affairs	matters,	which	culminated	in	a	broad	arrangement	underthe	Lisbon	Treaty	that	effectively	allowed	the	UK	to	opt	in/out	of	any	measure	it	desires.	This	arrangement,	alsoreferred	to	as	cherry-picking,	has	indeed	been	a	rather	sweet	deal	for	the	UK	and	allows	it	to	participate	in	thosemeasures	that	are	regarded	as	domestically	beneficial,	and	avoid	anything	else.	That	deal	will	now	end.	Arguably	–more	than	in	any	other	area	–	the	UK	has	managed	to	shape	EU	criminal	law	to	its	desires.	So	it	seems	fair	toconclude	that	if	the	EU	were	merely	a	‘security	union’,	Brexit	would	never	have	happened.A	shared	interest	in	continuing	cooperation,	but	what	about	trust?The	desire	to	maintain	close	security	ties	is	therefore	high	on	the	UK’s	agenda,	with	an	emphasis	on	lawenforcement	measures	like	the	EAW.	The	EU	in	turn	also	wishes	to	maintain	as	close	a	relationship	as	possible	withthe	UK	across	justice	and	security	(see	for	example	the	European	Council’s	Guidelines).	Could	this	be	one	areawhere	an	early	deal	could	be	reached,	based	on	shared	interests?	The	answer	should	be	yes.	The	interests	at	stakeare	simply	too	high	for	political	games,	and	this	is	far	from	a	zero-sum	game.	However,	there	are	a	number	of	snagsthat	make	it	more	complicated	than	it	might	seem.The	high	degree	of	cooperation	within	the	EU	on	criminal	justice	matters	is	enabled	by	the	presumption	that	allMember	States	comply	fully	with	fundamental	rights,	including	laws	on	data	protection,	and	more	broadly	comply	withthe	EU	acquis.	Two	key	instruments	are	the	EU’s	Charter	of	Fundamental	Rights	and	the	European	Convention	onHuman	Rights	(ECHR).	In	terms	of	EU	criminal	law	this	is	known	as	the	presumption	of	mutual	trust.	The	EU	hastaken	active	steps	to	strengthen	this	trust,	for	example	by	adopting	measures	enhancing	fair	trial	rights	(here	the	UKhas	a	mixed	record	as	it	has	opted	in	to	some	of	these	measures,	but	not	all),	and	other	flanking	measures	tominimise	differences	between	national	legal	systems.A	further	pillar	to	guarantee	mutual	trust	is	the	jurisdiction	of	the	Court	of	Justice	of	the	European	Union	(CJEU),which	is	tasked	with	keeping	Member	States	in	line	with	EU	laws,	but	also	to	safeguard	the	balance	between	rightsand	enforcement.	The	EU’s	Area	of	Freedom,	Security	and	Justice	(which	is	far	from	complete)	aims	to	become	abalanced	judicial	space,	under	the	guardianship	of	the	Commission,	and	with	the	ultimate	supervision	of	the	CJEU.The	emphasis	on	security	rather	than	justiceThis	reality	might	pose	a	number	of	difficulties	for	the	UK	government.	The	EU	Charter	of	Fundamental	Rights	willnot	form	part	of	retained	EU	law,	and	the	future	of	the	ECHR	is	at	best	uncertain	(dubbed	‘Brexit	2’	by	Estella	Baker).Moreover,	the	protection	of	data,	required	for	access	to	EU	databases,	is	a	concern	on	the	EU	side.	More	broadly,the	terminology	used	by	the	government,	which	emphasises	security	rather	than	freedom	and	justice,	indicates	thatnegotiators	are	less	interested	in	the	latter.This	may	very	well	prove	the	main	stumbling	block.	An	absolute	prerequisite	for	applying	instruments	as	the	EAW	ismutual	trust,	which	cannot	be	ensured	by	a	third	state	if	it	does	not	comply	with	the	EU’s	Charter,	nor	any	of	itsprocedural	rights	measures	or	the	other	relevant	EU	acquis.	To	illustrate	this,	the	EAW	deal	with	Norway	andIceland,	two	states	that	are	within	the	single	market	and	Schengen	(the	UK	will	not	be	in	either),	took	ten	years	tonegotiate	and	is	still	not	operational.LSE Brexit: Why Britain’s habit of cherry-picking criminal justice policy cannot survive Brexit Page 2 of 3		Date originally posted: 2018-03-29Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2018/03/29/why-britains-habit-of-cherry-picking-criminal-justice-policy-cannot-survive-brexit/Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/Moreover,	if	the	jurisdiction	of	the	CJEU	is	indeed	a	red	line	–	as	argued	by	some	hard-line	Brexiters	–	this	will	bedifficult	to	reconcile.	If	two	parties	sign	an	agreement,	this	will	raise	issues	of	interpretation	for	which	a	judicial	body	isneeded.	It	appears	from	May’s	speech	in	Munich	as	though	that	she	has	opened	the	door	(albeit	reluctantly)	toaccepting	CJEU	jurisdiction	where	necessary.Overall,	no	matter	what	form	an	ultimate	cooperation	agreement	will	take,	it	will	be	less	than	what	is	currently	inplace:	an	‘EAW	minus’	at	best.	How	much	it	differs	will	depend	upon	the	commitment	the	UK	is	willing	to	maketo	meet	EU	fundamental	rights	law.	As	Valsamis	Mitsilegas	has	noted,	this	has	created	the	paradoxicalsituation	where	in	order	to	maintain	current	levels	of	cooperation,	the	UK	might	have	to	accept	more	EU	law	than	itcurrently	does	as	a	Member	State.An	early	end	to	UK	participation	in	the	EAW?The	recent	case	of	O’Connor	might	serve	to	show	how	central	the	EU’s	acquis	is	to	the	EAW,	and	the	consequentimpact	of	Brexit.	The	Irish	Supreme	Court	refused	to	surrender	Joseph	O’Connor	to	the	UK	due	to	its	concerns	aboutBrexit,	in	essence	because	his	rights	could	be	curtailed	once	the	UK	leaves	the	EU	(the	sentence	sought	wouldcontinue	post-Brexit).	Accordingly,	the	Irish	Supreme	Court	referred	the	matter	to	the	CJEU.	This	case	will	be	a	majortest,	as	the	CJEU	could	potentially	render	the	precious	EAW	ineffective	already	as	of	now,	rather	than	after	Brexit.	Itunderlines	the	need	to	find	a	solution	that	satisfies	the	rights	requirements	that	are	needed	to	operate	the	EU’senhanced	model	of	cooperation	in	criminal	justice	matters.Considering	the	difficulties	that	lie	ahead	in	reaching	a	deal	acceptable	to	both	the	UK	and	the	EU27	which	would	notdeteriorate	either	security	or	rights,	the	words	of	Wolfgang	Ischinger	at	the	Munich	Security	Conference	cut	right	tothe	chase:	‘Things	would	be	so	much	easier	if	you	stayed’.This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.Auke	Willems	is	a	Fellow	in	EU	Law	at	the	LSE’s	European	Institute.	He	tweets	@WillemsAukeLSE Brexit: Why Britain’s habit of cherry-picking criminal justice policy cannot survive Brexit Page 3 of 3		Date originally posted: 2018-03-29Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2018/03/29/why-britains-habit-of-cherry-picking-criminal-justice-policy-cannot-survive-brexit/Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/

Why Britain's habit of cherry-picking criminal justice policy cannot survive Brexit

http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/88914/1/brexit-2018-03-29-why-britains-habit-of-cherry-picking-criminal.pdf

Why Britain's habit of cherry-picking criminal justice policy cannot survive Brexit

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