The current crisis in the Maldives can be seen as an opportunity for India to regain its lost influence in the country, and subsequently in the region. Although challenges are far greater than opportunities writes Sarral Sharma

Sharma, Sarral

LSE Research Online

Maldives	Crisis:	A	Catch-22	Situation	for	India	The	current	crisis	in	the	Maldives	can	be	seen	as	an	opportunity	for	India	to	regain	its	lost	influence	inthe	country,	and	subsequently	in	the	region.	Although	challenges	are	far	greater	thanopportunities	writes	Sarral	Sharma.Despite	outpouring	domestic	and	international	pressure,	the	Abdulla	Yameen	government	on	20February	approved	a	30-day	extension	of	the	state	of	emergency	in	the	Maldives.President	Yameen	has	not	budged	under	growing	domestic	politico-economic	concerns	and	possible	diplomaticalienation	from	the	international	community.	His	authoritarian	posturing	continues	while	the	oppositionlegislators	defy	security	restrictions	to	protest	against	hisruling.	Former	Maldivian	leaders	have	called	for	interventionfrom	India,	and	other	countries,	to	restore	democratic	system	in	the	country.	However,	with	the	apparent	Chinese-backing	and	the	local	support	to	Yameen,	India	would	preferably	use	diplomatic	means,	overcoercive	actions,	to	express	its	“deep”	dismay	over	the	emerging	political	crisis	in	the	Maldives.	New	Delhi	would	tryto	avoid	a	confrontation	with	the	Yameen	government,	which	seems	unlikely	in	the	coming	months.So	far,	the	Indian	opinion	remains	divided	on	what	role	should	it	play	in	the	island	country	to	safeguard	its	strategicinterests	in	the	Indian	Ocean	region.	Persistent	diplomatic	pressure	over	a	possible	military	intervention	remains	NewDelhi’s	policy	approach	under	the	given	circumstances.	Also,	India	would	require	both	domestic	(in	the	Maldives)support	and	international	backing	before	taking	any	coercive	action.	Moreover,	it	would	be	bit	naive	to	compareIndia’s	military	intervention	in	1988	with	the	current	political	crisis	in	the	Maldives.	This	time	the	aggressor	is	theauthoritarian	regime	of	President	Yameen,	an	insider.	Whereas,	in	1988,	the	Maldivian	government	faced	an	externalaggressor,	and	India’s	intervention	had	the	local	support.	Still,	New	Delhi’s	policy	might	change	as	the	situationevolves	in	the	island	country.	Thwarting	China’s	growing	influence	and	placing	a	pro-India	government	mayremain	New	Delhi’s	topmost	priority	in	the	Maldives.Image	credit:	memorypixel/Flickr/	CC	BY-NC	2.0It	is	possible	that	the	Yameen	government	has	abandoned	the	“India	first”	policy	over	a	moreChina	focussed	one.	Male’s	priorities	should	not	startle	India	as	the	current	dispensation	has,since	the	beginning,	shown	averseness	to	the	latter’s	role	in	the	island	country.	Not	surprisingly,	Indian	PrimeMinister	Narendra	Modi	has	not	visited	the	Maldives.	Whereas	Chinese	President	Xi	Jing	ping	made	the	visit	in	2014.South Asia @ LSE: Maldives Crisis: A Catch-22 Situation for India Page 1 of 3		Date originally posted: 2018-03-30Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/southasia/2018/03/30/maldives-crisis-a-catch-22-situation-for-india/Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/southasia/Moreover,	New	Delhi	seems	concerned	about	its	fast	losing	influence	over	South	Asian	Association	of	RegionalCooperation	(SAARC)	countries.	China’s	growing	economic	clout	in	South	Asia	has	fostered	this	fear.	Despite	India’sdeep	historical	ties	with	the	member	countries,	it	appears	Beijing’s	increasing	economic	influence	has	shifted	thebalance	of	power	in	the	region.	Nepal,	the	Maldives,	SriLanka	and	to	an	extent	even	Bangladesh	are	getting	into	theChinese	grip.	Therefore,	it	is	indispensable	for	India	to	take	measures	to	keep	its	interests	intact	in	South	Asia.The	current	crisis	in	the	Maldives	can	be	seen	as	an	opportunity	for	India	to	regain	its	lost	influence	in	thecountry,	and	subsequently	in	the	region.	Although	challenges	are	far	greater	thanopportunities.	A	politically	unstable	Maldives	could	also	prove	to	be	a	major	security	challenge	for	India.	Thereare	already	fertile	grounds	for	religious	fundamentalism	in	the	country	by	taking	into	account	the	number	of	localMaldivians	travelled	to	Syria	to	join	the	ISIL(some	reports	suggest	around	200	Maldivians	joined	the	ranks	of	thegroup).Other	crimes	such	as	drug	trafficking,	piracy	and	smuggling	may	also	add	to	India’sinsecurity.	Additionally,	the	persistent	political	churn	in	the	island	nation,	after	the	first	democratic	elections	in	2009and	the	overthrew	of	the	former	President	Mohammed	Nasheed’s	government	in	a	coup	in	2012,	remains	a	concernfor	India.On	the	other	hand,	China	has	rapidly	expanded	its	deep	footprint	in	the	Maldives,	even	though	itopened	the	embassy	only	in	2011.	The	Indian	Ocean	archipelago	officially	joined	China’s	Maritime	Silk	Roadinitiative	last	year	and	signed	a	Free	Trade	Agreement(FTA)	in	December	despite	the	opposition’sdisapproval.	Interestingly,	the	1,000-page	document	of	the	agreement	was	pushed	through	the	Maldivian	parliamentwithout	any	discussion.	It	reflects	Yameen’s	keenness	to	embolden	relations	with	Beijing	at	any	cost,	andinadvertently	(or	even	knowingly)	jeopardising	ties	with	India.	China	is	investing	on	variousinfrastructure	projects	such	as	the	famous	Maldives-China	Friendship	bridge	linking	Male	to	Hulhule	Island	or	a1,000-apartment	housing	project.	No	wonder,	China	also	accounts	for	most	tourists	visiting	the	Maldives.But,	all	is	not	lost	for	India	as	it	still	holds	good	ties	with	the	Maldivian	opposition	leaders	and	is	apparently	on	thesame	page	with	countries	such	the	United	States,	the	United	Kingdom,	among	others	on	the	current	politicaldevelopments.	More	importantly,	Yameen	has	started	to	feel	heat	from	within	after	two	of	his	ministers	resignedsince	the	announcement	of	the	emergency.	Although	Yameen	has	finally	removed	the	45-day	long	emergency	on	22March,	he	may	continue	to	face	backclash	from	the	opposition	leaders,	rights	activists	andaffected	local	population.	The	country’s	economy	has	been	hit	substantially	amid	growing	instability	in	the	tourismindustry	—	roughly	contributes	more	than	quarter	of	the	Maldives’	Gross	Domestic	Product	(GDP),	generating	70	percent	of	the	countries	forex	earnings	and	accounting	for	30	per	cent	of	the	Government	revenues	—	due	to	theongoing	political	crisis.	It	may	take	long	time	for	it	to	recover	fully.	On	the	other	hand,	affected	locals	continue	touse	social	media	tools	to	call	for	external	support	against	the	Yameen	government’s	autocratic	ruling.	Amid	growingdiscontent	in	the	Maldives,	New	Delhi	may	consider	upping	the	ante	against	Yameen.For	now,	the	Modi	government	may	avoid	taking	coercive	actions	such	as	imposing	economic	sanctions	or	restrictingtrade	of	essential	commodities	which	could	prove	counter-productive	and	might	fuel	long-term	antagonism	againstIndia	in	the	Maldives.	Nepal’s	antagonistic	behaviour	towards	India,	after	the	trade	blockade	over	the	Madhesi	issuein	2016,	serves	as	a	recent	example	of	possible	strategic	repercussions	of	any	suchattempt.	Furthermore,	Yameen	may	possibly	cash	in	on	the	opportunity,	if	India	provides	it,	to	win	votes	in	theupcoming	presidential	election	(if	it	takes	place	on	time).But	there	are	signs	of	growing	concern	amongst	locals	against	burgeoning	Chinese	investments	in	the	Maldives.	Therecent	“sell-out”	of	Sri	Lanka’s	Hambantota	port	to	China	on	a	99-year	lease	under	Beijing’s	famous	“debt-trapdiplomacy”	and	rumours	of	naval	base	in	the	country	might	have	added	to	insecurity	among	Maldivians.	Still	thoseconcerns	have	not	yet	materialised	into	an	outright	opposition	against	China.	Moreover,	Beijing	is	aware	thatthe	Yameen	government	is	the	best	bet	for	them	in	the	long-run	and	vice-versa.	Whereas,	New	Delhi	is	possiblylooking	for	a	regime	change	in	the	Maldives.	Therefore,	it	is	handling	the	matter	through	diplomacy	and	avoiding	anyinterventionist	approach	to	circumvent	the	tag	of	an”intruder”	country.This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	authors,	and	not	the	position	of	the	South	Asia	@	LSE	blog,	nor	of	the	LondonSchool	of	Economics.	Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	posting.About	The	AuthorSouth Asia @ LSE: Maldives Crisis: A Catch-22 Situation for India Page 2 of 3		Date originally posted: 2018-03-30Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/southasia/2018/03/30/maldives-crisis-a-catch-22-situation-for-india/Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/southasia/Sarral	Sharma	is	a	researcher	at	the	Centre	for	Internal	and	Regional	Security	(IReS)	programme,Institute	of	Peace	and	Conflict	Studies	(IPCS),	a	New	Delhi-based	think	tank.	Hisresearch	areas	include	political	and	armed	conflicts	in	South	Asia,	India	and	Pakistan	relations,	India’sinternal	security	threats,	and	radicalisation	propaganda	in	India.	He	holds	an	M.Phil	degree	in	EnglishLiterature	from	the	University	of	Delhi.	He	is	also	a	member	of	the	Delhi	team	of	Aaghaz-e-Dosti	(Beginning	of	Friendship),	an	India-Pakistan	conflict	resolution	and	peace	building	initiative.	Hetweets	@sarral_sharma	South Asia @ LSE: Maldives Crisis: A Catch-22 Situation for India Page 3 of 3		Date originally posted: 2018-03-30Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/southasia/2018/03/30/maldives-crisis-a-catch-22-situation-for-india/Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/southasia/

Maldives crisis: a catch-22 situation for India

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Maldives crisis: a catch-22 situation for India

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