Using the term 'hate preachers' to describe jihadist extremist speakers is problematic, writes Katharine Gelber, with serious implications for counter-terrorist policymaking. One of the outcomes of this confusion is a misconception that policy designed to address hate speech can be used to address terrorism

Gelber, Katharine

LSE Research Online

Why	‘hate	speech’	and	‘hate	preachers’	are	distinctphenomenaUsing	the	term	‘hate	preachers’	to	describe	jihadist	extremist	speakers	is	problematic,	writesKatharine	Gelber,	with	serious	implications	for	counter-terrorist	policymaking.	One	of	the	outcomesof	this	confusion	is	a	misconception	that	policy	designed	to	address	hate	speech	can	be	used	toaddress	terrorism.To	date,	scholarly	analysis	of	these	provisions	has	suggested	that	their	primary	purpose	is	to	protectvulnerable	communities.	Analysing	the	context	and	justifying	discourse	of	key	policymakers	duringdebates,	I	argue	by	contrast	that	their	primary	purpose	is	as	a	counter-terrorism	measure,	and	that	both	the	publicdebate	and	the	provisions	themselves	evince	and	entrench	an	enduring	epistemic	confusion.In	the	2017	UK	election	campaign,	the	Conservatives	promised	that,	if	elected,	they	would	seek	to	introduce	newmeasures	to	counter	terrorist	extremism.	A	focus	of	these	measures	was	the	activities	of	‘hate	preachers’,	by	whichwas	meant	religious	leaders	who	preach	radical	extremism	that	can	contribute	to	the	risk	of	terrorist	attacks.	Theterm	hate	preachers	has	been	used	before,	but	it	is	confused.	It	is	a	misleading	and	unhelpful	term,	and	unlikely	toassist	in	the	development	of	policy	that	can	successfully	curb	the	risks	of	terrorist	violence.The	primary	reason	for	this	confusion	is	that	the	term	‘hate	preachers’	suggests	that	what	radical	jihadist	preachersare	doing	is	akin	to	the	more	common	way	in	which	the	term	‘hate’	is	used	in	public	policy,	namely	in	regard	to	hatespeech.	It	suggests	that	the	phenomenon	of	radical	extremist	preaching	is	like	the	phenomenon	of	hate	speech,	andcorrelatively	that	policy	designed	to	address	one	can	be	used	to	address	the	other.Why	‘hate	speech’	and	‘hate	preachers’	are	distinct	phenomenaHate	speech	policy	is	designed	to	enhance	social	cohesion	by	providing	protection	to	vulnerable	communities	fromharmful	speech.	When	used	in	this	way,	hate	speech	means	speech	that	is	directed	against	individuals	who	areidentified	by	targets	as	being	members	of	a	group	which	has	suffered	from	historically	identifiable,	systemicdiscrimination	on	the	basis	of	an	arbitrary	feature.	Hate	speech	instils,	or	incites,	discrimination	against	members	ofthe	group,	and	in	doing	so	harms	the	individual	who	is	targeted.	By	extension,	it	also	harms	the	community	to	whichtargets	are	perceived	to	belong.	It	is	critical	to	the	capacity	of	hate	speech	to	harm	its	targets	that	it	re-enactsprejudice,	marginalisation	and	discrimination	in	this	way.	This	is	the	defining	feature	of	hate	speech,	as	distinct	fromother	forms	of	offensive	speech.Contemporary	radical	religious	extremist	speech	of	the	kind	engaged	in	by	‘hate	preachers’	stands	in	contrast	to	this.The	kinds	of	things	that	hate	preachers	say	do	not	target	systemically	marginalised	groups	in	society.	Rather,	hatepreachers	reserve	their	virulence	for	an	anti-Western	ideology	that	can	encourage	and	incite	hatred	against	innocenttargets	in	the	West.	This	means	that	the	two	phenomena	target	quite	different	kinds	of	people,	and	target	people	forvery	different	reasons.	This	suggests	that	they	require	discrete	explanatory	tools,	and	that	effective	policy	designedto	address	either	or	both	of	these	phenomena	ought	to	take	this	differentiation	into	account.Eliding	the	differences	between	hate	speech	and	religious	extremismTo	examine	this	topic,	it	is	helpful	to	look	at	the	debates	surrounding	the	introduction	of	a	recent	hate	speech	law	inthe	UK,	the	Racial	and	Religious	Hatred	Act	2006.	There	was	a	range	of	arguments	cited	as	the	impetusunderpinning	this	law.	The	three	most	common	suggest	that	it	was	introduced	to	ameliorate	hate	speech	againsttargets	who	were	from	vulnerable	groups	in	the	community.	In	other	words,	on	the	face	of	it,	it	looks	like	a	lawdesigned	to	ameliorate	hate	speech	against	the	vulnerable,	precisely	the	way	a	hate	speech	law	is	designed	to.British Politics and Policy at LSE: Why ‘hate speech’ and ‘hate preachers’ are distinct phenomena Page 1 of 3		Date originally posted: 2018-03-12Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/why-hate-speech-and-hate-preachers-are-distinct-phenomena/Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/The	first	argument	cited	as	the	reason	for	the	introduction	of	this	law	was	that	it	would	remedy	existing	gaps	in	thecoverage	of	hate	speech	laws	with	regard	to	religion.	Extending	coverage	to	all	religious	groups	would	render	thelaws	fairer.	The	second	is	that	there	was	a	need	for	government	policy	to	respond	explicitly	to	increases	in	attacksagainst	Muslims	in	the	context	of	terrorist	concerns.	Providing	protection	in	the	form	of	a	new	religious	hatred	lawwas	said	to	send	a	message	to	the	Muslim	community	that	the	government	was	concerned	to	protect	their	interests.The	third	is	that	the	law	was	needed	to	ameliorate	the	disproportionate	impact	of	counter-terrorism	policy	on	theMuslim	community,	including	in	increased	surveillance,	tracking,	and	scrutiny.These	rationales	are	convincing	to	a	point.	However,	these	explanations	overlook	a	fourth	argument	located	in	abroader	rationale	that	was	extant	in	policy	discourse	at	the	time.	Law-making	was	(and	arguably	still	is)	taking	placein	the	context	of	a	strong	counter-terrorism	mandate:	a	strategy	in	which	the	government	explicitly	and	repeatedlystated	its	desire	to	devise	policy	that	could	intervene	against,	and	prevent,	the	indirect	enablers	of	terrorism.Analysis	of	counter	terrorism	policy	making	debates	over	time	in	the	UK	supports	this	conclusion.	During	counterterrorism	debates	from	2001	onwards,	policymakers	wished	to	be	able	to	intervene	against	those	engaged	inextremist	speech,	and	they	perceived	a	measure	prohibiting	religious	hatred	to	be	a	vehicle	which	might	make	thispossible.	In	addition,	drawing	on	the	idea	of	‘hate’	as	the	defining	feature	of	the	speech	they	wished	to	prohibitallowed	policymakers	to	draw	on	widespread	public	support	for	the	prevention	of	racial	and	religious	(and	other	formsof)	hatred,	in	the	context	of	justifying	new	and	controversial	counter-terrorism	measures.The	linking	of	these	two	phenomena	can	be	traced	through	counter-terrorism	discourse	over	time.	After	the	2001terrorist	attacks	in	the	United	States,	UK	political	leaders	linked	racist	and	religious	hatred	with	extremist	terroristspeech.	In	2005	Prime	Minister	Tony	Blair	did	so	again,	stating	that,	‘time	and	again	…	I’ve	been	asked	to	deal	firmlywith	those	prepared	to	engage	in	…	extremism’,	while	announcing	new	comprehensive	policies	to	tackle	terrorismthat	would	include	the	proposal	to	make	‘fostering	hatred,	advocating	violence	…	or	justifying	such	violence’	groundsfor	deportation.	Prime	Minister	Brown,	similarly,	engaged	in	debate	that	linked	the	need	to	tackle	racial	and	religioushatred	with	the	need	to	combat	terrorist	recruitment.After	the	election	of	the	Cameron	government	in	2010,	then	Home	Secretary	Theresa	May	signalled	that	she	wasaware	of	some	problems	in	this	juxtaposition,	saying	the	previous	government	had	‘muddled	up	work	oncounterterrorism	with	the	normal	work	that	needs	to	be	done	to	promote	social	cohesion’.	However,	her	PrimeMinister	continued	to	warn	against	hate	preachers.	As	Prime	Minister,	May	has	continued	to	use	the	language	of‘hate	preachers’	when	discussing	attempts	to	devise	new	policy	to	counter	radical	extremism.In	policy	debate,	the	incitement	of	hatred	against	the	systemically	vulnerable	and	the	incitement	of	hatred	againstWesterners	have	been	treated	as	synonymous.	‘Hatred’	is	viewed	as	the	defining	element	of	harmful	speech,although	this	does	not	accord	with	the	literature	on	how	and	why	hate	speech	can	harm.	Hate	speech	againstvulnerable	minorities	is	regarded	as	the	same	policy	puzzle	as	terrorist	speech	against	Westerners.Yet,	in	light	of	the	argument	that	the	two	phenomena	are	distinct,	this	demonstrates	confusion.	More	worryingly,	itraises	serious	questions	about	the	likely	efficacy	of	extant	laws	in	achieving	either	policy	goal._______Note:	the	above	draws	on	the	author’s	published	article	in	Parliamentary	Affairs.About	the	AuthorKatharine	Gelber	is	Professor	of	Politics	and	Public	Policy	at	the	University	of	Queensland.				British Politics and Policy at LSE: Why ‘hate speech’ and ‘hate preachers’ are distinct phenomena Page 2 of 3		Date originally posted: 2018-03-12Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/why-hate-speech-and-hate-preachers-are-distinct-phenomena/Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/All	articles	posted	on	this	blog	give	the	views	of	the	author(s),	and	not	the	position	of	LSE	British	Politics	and	Policy,nor	of	the	London	School	of	Economics	and	Political	Science.	Featured	image	credit:	Pixabay	(Public	Domain).British Politics and Policy at LSE: Why ‘hate speech’ and ‘hate preachers’ are distinct phenomena Page 3 of 3		Date originally posted: 2018-03-12Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/why-hate-speech-and-hate-preachers-are-distinct-phenomena/Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/

Why 'hate speech' and 'hate preachers' are distinct phenomena

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Why 'hate speech' and 'hate preachers' are distinct phenomena

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