There is a divide between how Remainers and Leavers perceive the UK's economic performance and other policy developments, explain Miriam Sorace and Sara B. Hobolt. A major consequence of this lack of agreement about basic facts is that reaching a consensus on how to navigate Brexit becomes even more complicated

Hobolt, Sara B.

Sorace, Miriam

LSE Research Online

Brexit	identities	play	a	role	in	how	people	view	theeconomy	and	immigrationThere	is	a	divide	between	how	Remainers	and	Leavers	perceive	the	UK’s	economicperformance	and	other	policy	developments,	explain	Miriam	Sorace	and	Sara	B.	Hobolt.	Amajor	consequence	of	this	lack	of	agreement	about	basic	facts	is	that	reaching	a	consensuson	how	to	navigate	Brexit	becomes	even	more	complicated.On	the	23	June	2016,	UK	citizens	voted	to	leave	the	European	Union.	The	vote	came	aftera	heated	referendum	campaign	where	the	Remain	camp	highlighted	the	economic	dangersof	Brexit	and	the	Leave	camp	promised	to	bring	back	control	of	borders	and	reduce	immigration.	The	outcome	of	thereferendum	has	subsequently	triggered	strong	political	identifications	along	Brexit	lines.Is	this	new	fault-line	in	British	politics	also	shaping	beliefs	and	perceptions,	in	line	with	Brexit	campaign	promises?We	know	that	group	identities,	such	as	party	identification,	tend	to	shape	how	people	select	and	interpret	newinformation,	sometimes	leading	to	‘cognitive	illusions’.	Our	study	finds	that	the	new	Brexit	identities	have	indeedresulted	in	distorted	(or	‘biased’)	images	of	the	key	issues	of	the	economy	and	immigration	levels.To	examine	how	Brexit	has	shaped	such	views,	we	use	data	from	the	British	Election	Study	(BES)	2014-2017	panel.This	allows	us	to	compare	assessments	of	the	economy	and	immigration	by	Leavers	and	Remainers	before	and	afterthe	Brexit	vote.	To	the	extent	that	the	referendum	has	led	to	very	different	evaluations	of	the	economic	performanceand	of	immigration	levels	among	the	two	groups,	then	this	is	evidence	that	the	referendum	vote	may	have	distortedperceptions.It	is	worth	noting	that	data	from	the	Office	of	National	Statistics	shows	minimal	changes	in	key	indicators	of	UKgrowth	and	immigration	rates	in	the	2016-2017	period.	Hence,	if	perceptions	were	not	biased	by	the	referendumvote,	we	wouldn’t	anticipate	substantial	changes	in	people’s	views.	However,	if	the	emerging	Brexit	identities	play	arole,	we	expect	people	to	view	changes	in	the	economy	and	in	immigration	in	ways	that	confirm	their	referendumvote:	Remainers	should	become	more	pessimistic	about	the	economy	after	the	vote,	while	Leavers	should	becomemore	optimistic	about	immigration	(i.e.	observe	lower	immigration	levels).To	see	if	that	is	the	case,	we	measure	economic	and	immigration	perceptions	are	using	the	following	survey	items	ofthe	BES:Do	you	think	that	the	economy	is	getting	better,	getting	worse	or	staying	about	the	same?Do	you	think	that	the	level	of	immigration	is	getting	higher,	getting	lower	or	staying	about	the	same?Figures	1	and	2	below	represent	graphically	the	results	(based	on	ordered	logit	panel	regression	models).Figure	1.	Economic	perceptionsLSE Brexit: Brexit identities play a role in how people view the economy and immigration Page 1 of 4		Date originally posted: 2018-09-06Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2018/09/06/brexit-identities-play-a-role-in-how-people-view-the-economy-and-immigration/Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/Note:	Predicted	Probability	Graphs	for	outcomes	0-1	(economy	got	worse);	2	(economy	stayed	the	same)	and	3-4	(economy	got	better).	Covariate	profile	heldconstant	at	modal	categories:	Labour,	46-55	age	bracket,	A-level	educational	attainment,	female,	income:	20-25k.	All	other	variables	held	at	their	mean.	Source:BESFigure	2.	Perceptions	of	immigration	levelsLSE Brexit: Brexit identities play a role in how people view the economy and immigration Page 2 of 4		Date originally posted: 2018-09-06Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2018/09/06/brexit-identities-play-a-role-in-how-people-view-the-economy-and-immigration/Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/Note:	Predicted	Probability	Graphs	for	outcomes	0-1	(decreased	levels	of	immigration);	2	(same	levels)	and	3-4	(increased	levels	of	immigration).	Covariate	profileheld	constant	at	modal	categories:	Labour,	46-55	age	bracket,	A-level	educational	attainment,	female,	income:	20-25k.	All	other	variables	held	at	their	mean.Source:	BES.The	figures	clearly	demonstrate	changes	in	economic	and	immigration	perceptions	(by	Remain	voters	and	Leavevoters,	respectively)	immediately	after	the	referendum.	Remainers	became	noticeably	more	pessimistic	about	theeconomy	after	the	vote,	while	Leavers	perceive	immigration	rates	as	lower,	in	line	with	the	respective	campaignpromises.	We	can	see	very	clear	differences	before	and	after	the	Brexit	vote	in	perceptions	of	the	main	campaignissues,	the	economy	and	immigration	–	holding	constant	partisanship,	gender,	age,	education	and	income.	This	isdespite	the	fact	that	the	UK	had	yet	to	leave	the	EU,	and	actual	changes	were	limited.What	about	differences	in	the	perceptions	of	Leavers	and	Remainers?	Have	they	converged	or	diverged	in	theaftermath	of	the	vote?	In	the	case	of	economic	performance	evaluations,	Leavers	and	Remainers	shared	very	similarassessments	before	the	referendum,	but	started	diverging	immediately	after	the	vote.	There	is	a	clear	contrast	whenit	comes	to	the	immigration	issue:	the	two	camps	held	starkly	different	perceptions	of	immigration	rates	before	thereferendum,	but	they	started	converging	afterwards,	with	Leavers	approaching	Remainers’	evaluations.In	addition	to	this	panel	regression	analysis,	we	also	ran	a	survey	experiment	run	in	July	2018	to	examine	howRemainers	and	Leavers	respond	to	economic	facts.	The	experimental	results	confirm	the	patterns	above	and	furtherreveal	that	these	biases	are	not	simply	due	to	Leavers	and	Remainers	receiving	different	types	of	information;instead,	we	find	that	they	interpret	the	same	new	information	in	radically	different	ways.Figure	3	shows	how	UK	economic	growth	was	ranked	in	comparison	with	other	developed	economies	by	Leaversand	Remainers	after	respondents	were	given	information	about	growth	rates.	The	results	clearly	demonstrate	thateven	when	provided	with	information	on	UK	growth	from	the	Office	of	National	Statistics,	Leavers	and	Remainers	stillrank	the	performance	of	UK	growth	vis-à-vis	the	other	34	OECD	economies	significantly	differently.	Leavers	rank	theUK	economy	more	optimistically	(placing	the	UK	15th	out	of	34)	than	Remainers	(placing	the	UK	18th	out	of	34).These	differences	are	even	greater	when	we	remind	(‘prime’)	individuals	about	the	Brexit	referendum.LSE Brexit: Brexit identities play a role in how people view the economy and immigration Page 3 of 4		Date originally posted: 2018-09-06Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2018/09/06/brexit-identities-play-a-role-in-how-people-view-the-economy-and-immigration/Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/Figure	3.	Economic	perceptions	–	Survey	ExperimentNote:	Answer	to	the	survey	question	“How	do	you	think	the	UK’s	economic	growth	rate	currently	ranks	in	comparison	to	other	the	34	developed	countries	part	ofthe	OECD?	Please	give	a	ranking	from	1	to	34,	where	1	means	that	you	consider	the	UK	to	currently	be	the	best	performing	economy	in	the	developed	world,	while34	means	that	the	UK	is	the	worst	performing	one.		If	you	don’t	know	the	answer,	please	make	your	best	guess”.	Source:	Hobolt	&	Sorace	–	YouGov,	July	2018.Our	study	highlights	that	in	the	aftermath	of	the	referendum,	citizens	view	economic	and	immigration	politics	throughnew	Brexit-tinted	glasses.	Leavers	and	Remainers	immediately	responded	to	the	referendum	result	by	updating	theiropinions	in	line	with	the	respective	referendum	campaign	promises	and	beliefs.	Similar	to	party	identity,	the	Brexitreferendum	has	thus	biased	people’s	view	of	key	political	issues.This	divide	between	Remainers	and	Leavers	in	their	economic	perceptions	is	likely	to	make	any	attempt	to	fosternational	unity	around	an	eventual	Brexit	negotiation	outcome	more	difficult,	as	Remainers	will	focus	on	the	negativeeconomic	consequences,	while	Leavers	will	see	the	developments	in	a	very	different,	and	more	positive,	light.	Whenthere	is	no	agreement	about	the	basic	facts	of	economic	and	policy	developments,	it	becomes	far	more	difficult	tofind	a	consensus	about	appropriate	policy	solutions.	It	also	complicates	matters	for	those	who	advocate	a	secondreferendum	on	the	basis	of	“what	we	now	know	to	be	the	consequences	of	Brexit”.	Given	the	divergence	in	views,	asecond	referendum	would	likely	lead	to	another	clash	between	‘project	fear’	and	‘project	hope’	strategies,	potentiallydeepening	the	divide.The	above	first	appeared	on	LSE	British	Politics	and	Policy.	It	gives	the	views	of	the	author(s),	and	not	the	position	ofLSE	Brexit,	nor	of	the	London	School	of	Economics	and	Political	Science.	Miriam	Sorace	is	LSE	Fellow	in	EU	Politics,	having	joined	the	European	Institute	in	September	2017.	She	earnedher	PhD	in	Political	Science	in	April	2017	from	Trinity	College,	Dublin.Sara	B.	Hobolt	is	the	Sutherland	Chair	in	European	Institutions	at	the	European	Institute	and	the	Department	ofGovernment	at	the	LSE.	She	is	also	an	Associate	Member	of	Nuffield	College,	University	of	Oxford,	and	a	Fellow	ofthe	British	Academy.		LSE Brexit: Brexit identities play a role in how people view the economy and immigration Page 4 of 4		Date originally posted: 2018-09-06Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2018/09/06/brexit-identities-play-a-role-in-how-people-view-the-economy-and-immigration/Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/

Brexit identities play a role in how people view the economy and immigration

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Brexit identities play a role in how people view the economy and immigration

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