Over the past few years, the EU’s monetary woes have placed Germany’s central role within the European project in the limelight. Its sheer economic weight made its agreement to the various bail-outs and rescues mandatory; the Merkel government’s insistence on austerity over stimulus, and the over-ruling of elected governments have further weakened the Union’s claims to democratic legitimacy, already on shaky ground because of the weight of its unwieldy, powerful Brussels bureaucracy

Oskanian, Kevork

LSE Research Online

Eurocrisis in thePress9/24/2013Taming the Bear? Germany and Europe’s Fragile EasternFrontierblogs.lse.ac.uk /eurocrisispress/2013/09/24/taming-the-bear-germany-and-europes-fragile-eastern-frontier/By Kevork OskanianOver the past few years, the EU’s monetary woes haveplaced Germany’s central role within the European project inthe limelight.  Its sheer economic weight made its agreementto the various bail-outs and rescues mandatory; the Merkelgovernment’s insistence on austerity over stimulus, and theover-ruling of elected governments have further weakenedthe Union’s claims to democratic legitimacy, already onshaky ground because of the weight of its unwieldy, powerfulBrussels bureaucracy.Europe’s Southern troubles, its democratic crisis, and the bynow undeniably prominent role played by Germany withinthem appear not to have diminished the formidable softpower it extends to its east, among the former Soviet states:having been left outside the formal confines of the EuropeanUnion, many have, at the same time, continued to aim for some degree of integration with Brussels.  Six states inparticular – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and the Ukraine – have, since 2009, been part of theEU’s Eastern Partnership, a process aimed at their further integration through a series of bilateral ‘AssociationAgreements’ – including a ‘Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement’ – with the states concerned.Although the Partnership does not promise the participating states outright membership, it does aim to adapt theirregulatory frameworks and political systems to European standards.  Some of the participating states – notablyGeorgia and Moldova – have moreover been more or less forthright about their long-term wish to join the EU: theprospect of loosening their ties with an increasingly authoritarian and regionally assertive Russia therefore seems toamply compensate for the glaring democratic or monetary imperfections within the European project.Berlin’s amalgamation of its ‘Ostpolitik’ within the broader framework of democratisation and EU expansion hasbeen a feature of politics on the continent since the end of the Cold War and German unification.  There are,however, serious questions as to whether the Federal Republic will be able to continue relying on this largely non-confrontational approach, in light of Moscow’s growing unwillingness to accept perceived encroachments onto, whatit regards as, its sphere of influence, even if they are of a purely economic and political nature, by a largely ‘soft-power’ EU.European and German policymakers have often emphasised the politically or strategically neutral status of the EaP:the project, they assert, is not aimed at anyone, without mentioning the elephant, or in this case, bear in the room –Russia.  The Kremlin, in turn, has grown increasingly irritated at what it sees, rightly or wrongly, as an attempt toinfringe on, as it formally calls it, its “sphere of privileged interest”, or, less formally, its “near abroad”.  Whilecarefully adhering to the niceties of Westphalian sovereignty, it has used health concerns, and commercialarguments, intermixed with the occasional threat, to sanction former Soviet states – like Armenia, Moldova, and theUkraine – for their participation.Brussels and Berlin may offer as many assurances as they like; for Moscow, strategic calculations in the FSU arestill very much zero-sum, especially when it comes to integration processes bypassing its control.  Former Soviet1/3states can either associate with the EU, or become members of the Kremlin’s own preferred integration project, theEurasian Union.  Moscow is still very much conscious of the continued dependence of former Soviet republics on itsmarkets and energy supplies, and choices in favour of Europe have usually resulted in rather convenient ‘problems’in the quality standards of agricultural and food products, or ominous references to ‘cold winters’ in the absence ofRussian gas.The EU and the Soviet Union had a similar spat over the alignment of former Soviet republics earlier in the previousdecade.  Following the Ukraine’s ‘Orange’ Westward lurch, Russia’s Gazprom– often seen as an extension of thestate –became particularly insistent on Kiev’s repayment of its overdue gas bills, eventually cutting off its (and, byextension, much of Europe’s) gas supply in the winter of 2009.  Subsequent statements by various Russianpolicymakers have raised suspicions that the Kremlin is considering the use of its Eastern neighbours’ ‘energydependence’ as a weapon against their European aspirations.If history is any guide, Europe will have some difficulty in devising a unified approach to a potential Russianchallenge similar to that of 2009.  At the time, Germany resisted calls by Eastern and Central European states toinvolve the European Union in response to Russia’s cut-off.  Germany was also instrumental in upholdingambiguous, non-committal policies regarding the potential membership of former Soviet states like the Ukraine andGeorgia.  Maintaining a good working relationship with Moscow had been a priority for successive Germangovernments since reunification, as had been a concern with avoiding Russia’s perception of EU expansion as athreat.Germany’s decreased dependence on transit routes through former Soviet States like the Ukraine and Belaruswould seem to have increased the probability of such divisions re-emerging in the event of a similar crisis: with the‘Nord Stream’ pipeline running directly from the Russian to the German pipeline grids under the Baltic sea, any‘disciplinary’ measures imposed by Moscow on states within its ‘near abroad’ would have even more uneven effectswithin the EU than was the case in 2009.  Their impact would mainly be felt by states in the Balkans and South-Eastern Europe, who, with the downscaling and/or delaying of the rival Nabucco pipeline – partly because of officialGermany lack of interest – have been left highly dependent on Russian supplies.Much will depend on the exact composition of the next German government.  Merkel’s administration had becomemore critical of Moscow in the years since 2009.  Several prominent voices within the governing coalition haverecently voiced unusually strong criticism of Putin’s crackdown on NGOs, and Russia’s anti-LGBT legislation, to theconsternation of German business groups; the conservative-liberal coalition has also demonstrated its willingness torun roughshod over Russian interests during the 2012 Cyprus financial crisis. In advocating ‘democratisationthrough engagement’, Merkel’s main opponent – the SPD’s Peer Steinbrück – seems to be adopting a moreconciliatory tone to Russia than many of his right-wing counterparts.  This would also fit into a historical pattern,whereby the SPD generally assumed more dovish attitudes towards Germany’s East than the CDU – with formerchancellor Gerhard Schröder as perhaps the best example of such Russophilia.The voters have now spoken, and first results point to a grand coalition between CDU and SPD as a likely outcome,muddying the waters even further for the EU’s Eastern Partners, who are looking forward to a tense period in theirrelations with Moscow.  Whether Berlin will act as a mitigating influence on Brussels’ response (as it has traditionallydone), or advocate a hardening of policies in response to Russian pressures in Europe’s Eastern frontier very muchremains an open question.  Its answer may very well determine the future of Europe’s Eastern frontier, and itsrelations with Moscow for many years to come.                                                                             Kevork Oskanian is Visiting Lecturer at the University of WestminsterNote: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of the Euro Crisis in the Press blog, nor of theLondon School of Economics.2/33/3

Taming the Bear? Germany and Europe’s fragile eastern frontier

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