The German federal elections scheduled for 24 September are widely expected to produce another victory for Angela Merkel's CDU/CSU. As Fabian G. Neuner and Christopher Wratil highlight, however, Merkel's dominant position in the polling has potentially masked some interesting developments during the campaign. Chief among these is that there has been a rise in populist sentiment in Germany, which is fuelling support for the right-wing Alternative for Germany (AfD) and damaging the CDU/CSU more than any other party

Neuner, Fabian G.

Wratil, Christopher

LSE Research Online

The	myth	of	the	‘boring	election’:	Populism	and	the2017	German	electionThe	German	federal	elections	scheduled	for	24	September	are	widely	expected	toproduce	another	victory	for	Angela	Merkel’s	CDU/CSU.	As	Fabian	G.	Neuner	andChristopher	Wratil	highlight,	however,	Merkel’s	dominant	position	in	the	polling	haspotentially	masked	some	interesting	developments	during	the	campaign.	Chief	amongthese	is	that	there	has	been	a	rise	in	populist	sentiment	in	Germany,	which	is	fuellingsupport	for	the	right-wing	Alternative	for	Germany	(AfD)	and	damaging	the	CDU/CSUmore	than	any	other	party.As	Germany	goes	to	the	polls	this	Sunday,	the	election	has	been	widely	decried	as	a	“boring”	contest	with	AngelaMerkel	perceived	as	virtually	certain	to	win	her	fourth	successive	chancellorship	since	2005.	What	this	popularview	misses,	however,	is	that	despite	the	continued	dominance	of	the	CDU/CSU,	the	German	party	system	isexperiencing	a	profound	transformation.	According	to	recent	polls	and	forecasting	models,	the	populist	Alternativefor	Germany	(AfD)	is	set	to	enter	the	Bundestag	with	about	9-12%	of	the	popular	vote.	Together	with	the	Leftparty	(Die	Linke)	that	established	itself	as	the	successor	of	the	Socialist	Unity	Party	after	1989,	two	populistparties	–	one	with	a	left-wing	and	one	with	a	right-wing	ideology	–	are	slated	to	be	represented	in	the	Germanparliament,	together	accounting	for	about	a	fifth	or	even	a	quarter	of	all	seats.To	understand	this	transformation,	we	conducted	one	of	the	first	studies	of	the	influence	of	populist	attitudes	onvoting	behaviour	in	Germany	in	a	joint	project	with	the	Bertelsmann	Stiftung	(see	recent	report	here)	based	on	arepresentative	panel	survey	of	eligible	voters	between	2015	and	2017.	In	particular,	we	aimed	to	ascertain	howdifferent	political	positions	and	priorities	may	have	differential	impacts	on	populist	versus	non-populist	voters.	Forthis	purpose,	we	recently	fielded	a	survey	experiment,	in	which	respondents	had	to	rate	hypothetical	politicalcandidates	running	in	their	district	in	the	2017	election.	Candidates	randomly	varied	in	their	political	positions	onthe	refugee	crisis,	the	future	of	the	European	Union,	redistribution	(taxes),	and	trade	and	globalisation.Candidates	also	promoted	two	out	of	thirteen	randomly	drawn	political	priorities,	ranging	from	classical	calls	to“strengthen	social	justice”	and	“promote	economic	growth”	to	populist	priorities	such	as	“overthrowing	the	politicalelite”	or	“strengthening	direct	democracy”.The	results	in	Figure	1	present	Average	Marginal	Component	Effects	(AMCE)	for	our	two	sub-groups:	non-populists	and	populists.	We	determine	these	groups	based	on	respondents’	answers	to	an	eight	item	populistattitudes	battery,	which	measures	support	for	populism	as	an	ideology	pitting	the	‘corrupt	political	elite’	againstthe	‘pure	people’	without	any	right-wing	or	left-wing	connotations.	For	each	attribute,	the	estimate	shows	thechange	in	probability	that	a	candidate	will	be	preferred	if	said	candidate	were	to	adopt	a	given	position	whencompared	to	the	baseline	position.Figure	1:	Effects	of	political	positions	and	priorities	on	candidate	supportLSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog: The myth of the ‘boring election’: Populism and the 2017 German election Page 1 of 5		Date originally posted: 2017-09-20Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2017/09/20/the-myth-of-the-boring-election-populism-and-the-2017-german-election/Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/Note:	Average	marginal	component	effects	(Hainmueller	et	al.	2014)	with	95%	confidence	intervals.LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog: The myth of the ‘boring election’: Populism and the 2017 German election Page 2 of 5		Date originally posted: 2017-09-20Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2017/09/20/the-myth-of-the-boring-election-populism-and-the-2017-german-election/Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/At	first	glance,	the	figure	reveals	that	the	key	issues	affecting	vote	choice	differ	between	the	two	groups	of	voters.Most	prominently,	the	treatment	of	refugees	is	much	more	important	for	populist	voters.	While	admitting	manymore	refugees	is	apparently	a	losing	issue	among	all	voters,	positions	in	favour	of	deporting	refugees	increasecandidate	support	by	up	to	29	percentage	points	among	populist	voters	(from	the	baseline	of	admitting	manymore	refugees).	In	contrast,	non-populist	voters	are	most	supportive	of	candidates	advocating	the	admission	ordeportation	of	only	some	refugees,	but	the	effect	of	these	positions	is	at	most	14	percentage	points.In	contrast,	candidates’	positions	on	how	the	EU	should	be	developed	strongly	move	non-populist	but	not	populistvoters.	While	stronger	EU	cooperation	markedly	mobilises	those	who	do	not	hold	populist	attitudes,	populistvoters	are	swayed	neither	by	pro-EU	nor	anti-EU	positions.	Even	more	interestingly,	positions	on	free	trade	andglobalisation	do	not	seem	to	move	either	type	of	voters	much.These	findings	thus	run	counter	to	widespread	arguments	that	populist	parties	and	politicians	are	able	to	mobilisevoters	with	populist	attitudes	due	to	their	anti-EU	and	anti-globalisation	rhetoric.	While	such	arguments	may	applyin	different	contexts,	at	least	in	the	German	case,	we	find	that	globalisation	is	a	non-issue	and	EU	integration	anissue	that	garners	support	among	mainstream	voters	but	not	populists.In	addition	to	issue	positions,	we	also	varied	the	political	priorities	associated	with	each	candidate.	Theoverarching	take-away	here	is	that	changes	in	political	priorities	had	little	influence	on	candidate	choice,especially	when	compared	to	the	three	major	issues	discussed	above.	The	first	five	priorities	are	supposed	tomimic	populist	talking	points	and	allow	us	to	test	whether	adopting	populist	themes	is	a	winning	strategycompared	to	more	traditional	political	priorities.	Somewhat	surprisingly	perhaps,	there	is	only	a	small	amount	ofmovement	induced	by	these	priorities.	Perhaps	the	most	interesting	exception	is	the	populist	call	to	overthrow	thepolitical	elite:	even	those	who	are	predisposed	toward	populist	ideas	reject	this	notion.	This	contrasts	with	populistvoters	in	countries	such	as	the	US,	where	Donald	Trump	ran	a	whole	campaign	on	“draining	the	swamp	inWashington”	and	notions	of	“crooked	Hillary”.Looking	beyond	our	conjoint	experiment,	we	also	examined	whether	populist	attitudes	are	correlated	with	votingfor	actual	political	parties.	Figure	2	plots	the	average	marginal	effect	of	a	one	unit	increase	on	the	populism	scale(which	ranges	from	zero	to	eight)	on	the	probability	of	voting	for	each	of	the	major	parties	(controlling	for	gender,age,	education,	income,	and	left-right	self-placement).Figure	2:	Populist	attitudes	and	probability	to	vote	for	partyLSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog: The myth of the ‘boring election’: Populism and the 2017 German election Page 3 of 5		Date originally posted: 2017-09-20Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2017/09/20/the-myth-of-the-boring-election-populism-and-the-2017-german-election/Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/Note:	Average	marginal	effects	for	one	unit	change	in	populist	attitudes	(0-8	scale).LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog: The myth of the ‘boring election’: Populism and the 2017 German election Page 4 of 5		Date originally posted: 2017-09-20Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2017/09/20/the-myth-of-the-boring-election-populism-and-the-2017-german-election/Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/This	reveals	that	populist	attitudes	are	key	correlates	of	vote	choice	in	these	elections,	even	when	controlling	forsociodemographic,	socioeconomic,	and	political	factors.	The	prime	beneficiary	of	populist	attitudes	is	the	AfD.	Aone	unit	increase	on	the	populist	attitudes	scale	is	associated	with	around	a	five	percentage	point	higherprobability	of	voting	for	the	AfD.This	mainly	comes	at	the	expense	of	the	CDU/CSU,	which	is	highly	unpopular	among	populist	voters	and	losesabout	7	percentage	points	per	unit	increase	in	populist	attitudes.	The	effects	for	the	second	“populist”	party,	theLeft	party,	are	much	more	muted.	It	gains	about	one	percentage	point	per	unit	increase	on	the	populist	attitudesscale,	while	the	Greens	loose	one	percentage	point.	The	SPD	and	the	FDP	are	about	equally	strong	amongpopulist	and	non-populist	voters,	and	therefore	the	level	of	populist	attitudes	barely	affects	their	results.In	this	view,	the	2017	German	elections	are	anything	but	boring.	Angela	Merkel	may	just	win	her	fourthchancellorship	in	a	row,	but	anti-establishment	and	populist	attitudes	have	been	powerfully	activated	in	thiscampaign	and	they	are	not	only	reshaping	the	party	system,	but	it	is	the	CDU/CSU	that	is	most	negativelyaffected	by	them.Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	authors,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	orthe	London	School	of	Economics.	Featured	image	credit:	Markus	Spiske	(CC	BY	2.0)_________________________________About	the	authorsFabian	G.	Neuner	–	University	of	Michigan	Fabian	Neuner	is	a	PhD	Candidate	at	the	University	of	Michigan	and	currently	a	visiting	scholar	asArizona	State	University.	His	research	focuses	on	political	psychology,	political	communication	andpublic	opinion.Christopher	Wratil	–	University	of	CologneChristopher	Wratil	is	currently	a	Thyssen	Postdoctoral	Fellow	at	the	Cologne	Centerfor	Comparative	Politics.	His	research	focuses	on	the	study	of	political	representation,public	opinion	and	populism	in	the	European	Union.LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog: The myth of the ‘boring election’: Populism and the 2017 German election Page 5 of 5		Date originally posted: 2017-09-20Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2017/09/20/the-myth-of-the-boring-election-populism-and-the-2017-german-election/Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/

The myth of the 'boring election': populism and the 2017 German election

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