The recent attack on the Hazara Shiite community was claimed by ISIS, revealing the growing penetration of its Afghan affiliate Wilayat Khorasan. In this article, Sajjan Gohel discusses the significance of the latest attack, outlines the origins of Wilayat Khorasan and discusses the escalating rivalry between the new group and the Afghan Taliban

Gohel, Sajjan

LSE Research Online

2016-8-2As the Taliban increase the tempo of violence inAfghanistan they face new competition from the risingWilayat Khorasanblogs.lse.ac.uk /southasia/2016/08/02/as-the-taliban-increase-the-tempo-of-violence-in-afghanistan-they-face-new-competition-from-the-rising-wilayat-khorasan/The recent attack on the Hazara Shiite community was claimed by ISIS, revealing the growing penetrationof its Afghan affiliate Wilayat Khorasan. In this article, Sajjan Gohel discusses the significance of the latest attack,outlines the origins of Wilayat Khorasan and discusses the escalating rivalry between the new group and the AfghanTaliban.On 23 July 2016 80 people from the minority Hazara Shiite community were killed and 230 injured after two suicidebombers struck a peaceful gathering in Afghanistan’s capital, Kabul, who were protesting over government plans fora power project to bypass Bamiyan, a predominantly Hazara province in central Afghanistan.Responsibility for the attack was claimed by ISIS via the group’s news agency, Amaq, which said it had sent twofighters with suicide belts to detonate among “a Shiite gathering”. The incident marks the first attack by ISIS inKabul, and its largest ever in Afghanistan. Previously, the worst attack on the Hazaras was in 2011 when twin blastsin Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif killed as many as 80 worshippers, who had gathered to commemorate the holy Shiiteday of Ashura.The attack is also the deadliest in Kabul since 2001 and raises fears of sparking a sectarian conflict. SinceAfghanistan’s civil war in the 1990s the country has proved largely immune to widespread sectarian violence thatpersists in Pakistan as well as Iraq and Syria, where ISIS has deliberately tried to stoke communal tensions.In addition to the attack on the Hazaras, security in Kabul has become increasingly unstable since the massiveAfghan Taliban attack on 12 April, 2016 which killed 64 people. That attack was in close proximity to the AfghanPresidential Palace as well as the British and U.S. Embassies.View over Kabul. Credit: William John Gauthier CC BY SA 2.0ISIS, through its Afghan affiliate, Wilayat Khorasan, has concentrated attacks in a few districts in the country’seastern provinces, where they have also fought with the Afghan Taliban over territory. Their fighting force of around1/33,000 fighters is relatively small, but the fact that it was non-existent three years ago and after the attack on theHazaras attack, it will stoke fears that Wilayat Khorasan is gaining strength in the country. Indeed, Wilayat Khorasanis an entity that should not be ignored as it quietly and steadily grows across Afghanistan, especially in Kabul.Origins of Wilayat KhorasanConfirmation of ISIS’s expansion in Afghanistan can be pinpointed to a January 2015 audiotape message issued byAbu Muhammad al-Adnani, the head of ISIS’s external operations, who officially announced the group’s ‘expansion’into the ‘lands of Khorasan.’ The new entity would be called Wilayat Khorasan and led by Hafiz Saeed Khan whowas a student at the Dar-ul-Ulum Islamia, a madrasa in Hangu Town Pakistan, which has produced many Talibanleaders.Khan had initially joined the Afghan Taliban after Operation Enduring Freedom. In 2007, Batiullah Mehsud formedthe Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and made Khan an Emir and religious leader for Orakzai Agency, Pakistan.Following the deaths of Batiullah Mehsud and his successor Hakimullah Mehsud, Khan grew disillusioned with theTTP under its current leader Mullah Fazullah and along with several other ex-TTP commanders, he pledgedallegiance to ISIS in October 2014. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, once an affiliate of al-Qa’ida, also defectedto ISIS and aligned itself with Wilayat Khorasan.As a result of these origins, Wilayat Khorasan also has a strong presence in parts of Pakistan, especially the tribalareas, where they have co-opted local militant groups like Jundallah who were once associated with the TTP. Theleadership is predominantly Pakistani-Pashtun, but there are Afghans like Sheikh Muhskin, their Emir in KunarProvince who pledged allegiance to ISIS in January 2015.On 18 April 2015 Wilayat Khorasan announced their presence in Afghanistan by carrying out a suicide attack inJalalabad when one of their fighters on a motorbike blew himself up in front of a bank, killing 33 people and injuringmore than 100 others. The group initially developed a presence in the eastern provinces of Afghanistan, notablyNuristan, Kunar, Nangarhar, Ghazni and Zabul, but there has also been a slow creep to other parts of the country.For example, they have been involved in heavy fighting in the western province of Farah and the southern provinceof Helmand and were also behind the execution of nine Afghan employees of a Czech aid organisation in therelatively peaceful northern province of Balkh which borders Uzbekistan and Tajikistan on 2 June 2015. The fact thatthe terrorist outfit can now carry out large mass casualty attacks in Kabul illustrates the level of their proliferation.Disturbingly, Wilayat Khorasan have been more brutal and vicious in their attacks than even the Afghan Taliban andthe TTP. Abdul Rahim Muslim Dost, an ex-Guantanamo Bay detainee, swore fidelity to Wilayat Khorasan in 2014and became a recruiter for them. However, Dost later revoked his pledge to the group because of the intensity oftheir violence towards Afghan civilians.Rivalry with the Afghan TalibanOn 8 June 2015, 10 members of the Afghan Taliban were beheaded by the Wilayat Khorasan in a rural part ofNangarhar province. Wilayat Khorasan wanted to make a statement of intent that they see themselves as a rival tothe Afghan Taliban and also illustrate a show of strength as well as intimidate the Taliban, the Ashraf Ghanigovernment and the West.Wilayat Khorasan has actively been trying to undermine the Afghan Taliban through propaganda, with the assistanceof ISIS’s media machine, and in head-on battles with them due to conflicting beliefs and aspirations. For example, InDabiq #13, ISIS’s online journal, Hafiz Saeed Khan described the Afghan Taliban as relying on Pashtunwali, thetribal code of Pashtuns, in its legal decision-making, whereas, Wilayat Khorasan adopts a warped version ofShari’ah Law. The Afghan Taliban wants an Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan but arguably that is the limit if itsexpansionist goals. Wilayat Khorasan, on the other hand, wants a caliphate beyond the confines of Afghanistan to2/3also include all of Pakistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan as well as Indian administeredKashmir and the Chinese province of Xinjiang which has ethnic Uyghur Muslims.On 12 July 2015, ISIS released an audio statement and then an article in their Dabiq magazine claiming that theenduring Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Omar was dead. This pre-empted the official confirmation of Mullah Omar’sdeath by the Taliban on 29 July, 2015. By seizing the narrative, of Mullah Omar’s death, ISIS helped exacerbateexisting fractures leading to some permanent major divisions within the Afghan Taliban. Akhtar Mansour succeededMullah Omar but the Afghan Taliban began to fracture, resulting in defections to Wilayat Khorasan. When Manosurwas killed in a U.S. drone strike on 21 May, 2016, Mawlawi Haibatullah Akhundzada took over. However, he hasbeen unable to stop the trickle of defections to Wilayat KhorasanWilayat Khorasan’s propaganda and indoctrination is modelled on ISIS. Their outfits in videos are similar to thoseworn by ISIS in its gruesome murder videos. Some videos show the group to be regimental, organised and mobile.In reality, they are more of rag-bag bunch of fighters, but one that has on multiple occasions proved to be deadly andeffective.Just like ISIS, Wilayat Khorasan has its own Caliphate Radio to reach its followers and potential recruits, although itoften experiences transmission problems because of US airstrikes. However, the strikes do not disrupt the group’sFatah Pamphlet which is distributed and circulated by hand and is modelled on the Afghan Taliban’s “night letters”, amethod of communication to rural and urban populations in Afghanistan that expressed their demands, instructions,threats, or warnings.Afghanistan is experiencing a strange paradox where the Afghan Taliban are showing fractures whilst alsoincreasing the tempo of the violence. At the same time they are starting to face increasing competition in theviolence stakes from Wilayat Khorasan who are spreading their tentacles across Afghanistan and Pakistan. As theWest struggles to find a solution to the Taliban insurgency, and with the prospect of reconciliation talks are a distantreality, Wilayat Khorasan will seek to exacerbate tensions by sowing sectarian and communal discord. The 23 Julyattack on the Hazaras is therefore unlikely to be a one-off incident. It’s a prelude to more problems by the terroristgroup.Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of the South Asia @ LSE blog, nor of the LondonSchool of Economics. Please read ourcomments policy before posting.About the AuthorSajjan Gohel is International Security Director at the Asia-Pacific Foundation, Senior Advisor to the Partnership forPeace Consortium’s Combating Terrorism Working Group and a Visiting Teacher in the International HistoryDepartment at the LSE. Read his previous South Asia @ LSE posts here.Copyright © 2016 London School of Economics3/3

As the Taliban increase the tempo of violence in Afghanistan they face new competition from the rising Wilayat Khorasan

Abstract

Similar works

Full text

Available Versions

LSE Research Online