Taken how often we use the term, we need to be more accurate in who/what we call populist, writes Luke March. In this analysis he defines the term and explains why, despite what is often said, there is no populist upsurge in the UK

March, Luke

LSE Research Online

Contrary	to	popular	opinion,	there	is	no	populistupsurge	in	BritainTaken	how	often	we	use	the	term,	we	need	to	be	more	accurate	in	who/what	we	call	populist,writes	Luke	March.	In	this	analysis	he	defines	the	term	and	explains	why,	despite	what	is	oftensaid,	there	is	no	populist	upsurge	in	the	UK.It	has	become	a	standard	cliché	that	populism,	like	communism	before	it,	is	the	‘spectre’	hauntingEurope.	There	is	allegedly	a	populist	Zeitgeist,	and	politicians	of	right	and	left,	of	fringe	andmainstream,	from	Le	Pen	to	Macron	and	Mélenchon,	Trump	to	Sanders,	appear	to	evidence	apopulist	surge.	Britain	also	appears	at	the	forefront	of	this	surge,	with	the	rise	of	UKIP	and	its	role	in	Brexit,	andnew	forms	of	‘left	populism’,	from	the	Greens	to	Ed	Miliband	and	now	Jeremy	Corbyn.	Apparently,	we	are	allpopulists.But	is	populism	really	so	ubiquitous?	Does	it	really	unite	politicians	across	the	political	spectrum?	While	analystshave	noted	that	populism	is	‘chameleonic’	and	adaptable,	they	have	also	noted	a	tendency	for	the	term	to	bebandied	about	indiscriminately.	If	the	concept	is	so	promiscuous,	is	it	still	in	any	way	useful?My	recent	study	shows	that,	providing	we	use	accurate	definitions	and	measurement	techniques,	populismremains	a	revealing	and	useful	term.	However,	at	least	in	the	British	case,	populism	is	far	less	omnipresent	thanoften	assumed:	it	exists	on	the	fringes	of	the	party	system	for	sure,	but	its	use	by	mainstream	parties	is	at	bestfleeting,	and	generally	seems	to	exhibit	demoticism	(closeness	to	the	ordinary	people),	which	is	necessary	but	notsufficient	for	populism.	Many	observers	who	find	populism	are	arguably	seeing	demoticism	instead.In	this	study,	I	analysed	the	manifestos	of	key	left-	and	right-wing	parties	in	Westminster	and	Scottish	electionsfrom	1999-2015,	comparing	the	mainstream	(Labour	and	the	Conservatives)	and	the	allegedly	populist	parties(Respect	and	the	Scottish	Socialist	Party	[SSP],	UKIP	and	the	British	National	Party	[BNP]).	The	Scottish	focuswas	chosen	to	maximise	data,	because	the	SSP	was	(once,	before	an	acrimonious	and	tawdry	split),	one	ofEurope’s	better	performing	populist	radical	left	parties.A	profusion	of	techniques	for	measuring	populism	have	emerged	in	recent	years.	These	can	be	criticised	forreplicating	the	problem	they	claim	to	solve,	i.e.	instead	of	helping	accurately	identify	populism,	they	end	uparguing	that	populism	is	a	matter	of	degree,	and	because	they	provide	only	an	aggregate	populism	score,	theydon’t	sufficiently	focus	on	how	populism	and	mainstream	parties	differ.In	order	to	obviate	such	criticisms,	I	adapted	one	of	the	most	robust	content	analysis	schemes	originated	byMatthijs	Rooduijn	and	Teun	Pauwels.	I	made	it	more	fine-grained	and	discerning,	by	focussing	on	sentences,	notparagraphs,	and	added	a	category	(popular	sovereignty),	so	that	three	populist	sub-components	were	examined(people-centrism,	anti-elitism,	and	popular	sovereignty).	This	makes	my	schema	match	more	closely	one	of	themost	influential	definitions	of	populism	in	the	literature:	‘a	thin-centered	ideology	that	considers	society	to	beultimately	separated	into	two	homogeneous	and	antagonistic	groups,	‘the	pure	people’	and	‘the	corrupt	elite’,	andwhich	argues	that	politics	should	be	an	expression	of	the	volonté	générale	(general	will)	of	the	people’.	I	alsoexamined	the	party	manifestos	in-depth,	to	avoid	relying	simply	on	numerical	data	for	questions	requiringnuanced	interpretation.British Politics and Policy at LSE: Contrary to popular opinion, there is no populist upsurge in Britain Page 1 of 3		Date originally posted: 2017-07-06Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/populisms-in-britain/Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/The	analysis	results	(Figure	1)	show	the	utility	of	breaking	populism	into	components	rather	than	relying	onaggregate	populism	scores,	as	do	many	other	scales.	So	doing	is	not	especially	revealing,	and	even	misleading	–after	all,	the	overall	scores	of	some	populist	and	mainstream	parties	are	little	different.	The	table	clearly	showsthat	the	populist	parties	score	consistently	and	(mostly)	equally	across	each	of	the	three	core	populistcomponents,	whereas	the	mainstream	parties	scores	load	very	heavily	on	the	people-centrism	scale,	with	lowpopular	sovereignty	scores	and	negligible	anti-elitism	scores.The	scale	proves	accurate	in	showing	that	only	the	supposedly	populist	parties	truly	fulfil	the	full	ideologicaldefinition	of	populism.	Focussing	on	the	results	over	time	further	indicates	that	there	is	no	real	upsurge	ofpopulism	–	the	only	consistent	increase	is	in	the	people-centrism	scores	of	the	mainstream	parties.	All	in	all,evidence	for	a	British	populist	Zeitgeist	is	meagre,	although	demotic	rhetoric	is	increasingly	evident.A	more	detailed	focus	on	the	manifestos	reinforces	this.	It	indicates	that:	1)	only	the	allegedly	populist	partieshave	a	detailed,	coherent	populist	critique	which	consistently	attacks	a	range	of	elites	(political,	economic,international)	and	focuses	on	measures	designed	to	empower	a	broad	homogeneous	people;	and	2)	left	and	rightpopulisms	are	not	substantially	similar,	but	are	clearly	distinguishable	by	the	nature	of	their	core	ideology.	That	is,they	attack	different	elites	(economic	vs.	cultural),	have	different	conceptions	of	the	people	(more	inclusive	andpluralist	for	the	left,	more	exclusive	[against	immigrants]	and	monocultural	for	the	right).	In	other	words,	theirpopulism	has	little	substantive	content	separate	from	the	parties’	core	ideological	positions.In	contrast,	the	mainstream	parties’	focus	on	popular	sovereignty	and	(in	particular)	anti-elitism	is	very	fleeting,vague,	and	tokenistic	(e.g.	providing	more	accessible	public	services,	or	attacking	‘remote	politicians’).	But	theirpeople-centrism	is	ubiquitous	–	they	repeatedly	speak	in	the	name	of	the	people	to	emphasise	common	projects(the	2010	Conservative	claim	that	‘we	are	all	in	this	together’	is	typical).British Politics and Policy at LSE: Contrary to popular opinion, there is no populist upsurge in Britain Page 2 of 3		Date originally posted: 2017-07-06Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/populisms-in-britain/Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/This	indicates	that,	in	the	UK,	apart	from	the	obvious	electoral	rise	of	UKIP	(until	its	dramatic	collapse	in	the	2017elections),	there	is	no	real	populist	upsurge.	There	are	populist	parties	to	the	left	and	right	of	the	party	system,	buttheir	fundamental	programmatic	differences	make	them	hardly	examples	of	the	same	phenomenon.	The‘populism’	of	the	mainstream	parties	exists	only	in	a	handful	of	vague	phrases,	but	for	the	most	part,	such	partiesare	demotic,	which	is	arguably	mainly	a	product	of	catch-all	parties	operating	in	a	majoritarian	party	system	thanany	consistent	mainstream	populism.At	first	glance,	such	findings	seem	counterintuitive	given	the	Brexit	referendum.	Focussing	on	party	manifestoscertainly	doesn’t	exclude	that	populism	is	a	major	feature	of	some	of	the	British	press	or	that	it	is	used	periodicallyby	individual	politicians	(e.g.	Michael	Gove’s	attack	on	experts,	or	Theresa	May’s	post-Brexit	insistence	onfulfilling	the	‘will	of	the	people’).	Yet,	it	does	show	how	the	UK	party	system	acts	to	confine	genuine	populism	tothe	fringes.	In	this	respect,	the	populism	associated	with	Brexit	is	arguably	far	more	a	product	of	the	referendumcampaign	than	anything	whose	prior	rise	made	the	referendum	inevitable.Certainly,	the	2017	election	campaign	shows	more	continuity	than	change,	not	least	because	of	the	demise	ofUKIP	and	the	Conservatives’	un-populist	(and	unpopular)	campaign.	Although	Jeremy	Corbyn	is	often	portrayedas	a	left-wing	populist,	the	2017	Labour	Manifesto	contains	only	a	handful	of	invocations	against	the	‘riggedsystem’,	and	its	central	slogan	(‘For	the	Many	not	the	Few’)	is	authentically	Blairite.	So	seeing	Corbyn	as	apopulist	is,	at	best,	a	half-truth.As	a	consequence,	we	clearly	need	to	be	more	accurate	and	judicious	in	who/what	we	call	populist,	especially	bynoting	substantial	left/right	differences,	and	distinguishing	populism	from	demoticism.	Manifestly,	populism	worksas	a	general	category,	but	like	the	similar	term	‘Euroscepticism’,	it	is	not	always	particularly	revealing.	To	define,observe,	clarify,	and	delimit	populism	further	does	not	necessarily	mean	that	it	is	an	unimportant	term;	it	is	merelyto	note	that	it	is	often	the	most	observable,	but	not	necessarily	the	most	significant,	of	several	concurrentphenomena.	For	instance,	the	central	campaign	slogan	of	the	victorious	Leave	campaign,	‘Take	Back	Control’was	evidently	populist	(seizing	control	from	remote	EU	elites)	but	equally,	and	perhaps	even	more	importantly,	itwas	demotic	(emphasising	individual,	community	and	national	empowerment	and	sovereignty).	This	explains	whyit	was	so	effective	at	the	time.	Certainly,	subsuming	all	such	elements	beneath	the	catch-all	label	of	populismthreatens	to	oversimplify	and	obscure,	rather	than	illuminate._______About	the	AuthorLuke	March	is	Professor	of	Post-Soviet	and	Comparative	Politics	and	Deputy	Director	of	thePrincess	Dashkova	Russia	Centre	at	the	University	of	Edinburgh.			Featured	image	credit	asi24	Pixabay/Public	Domain.British Politics and Policy at LSE: Contrary to popular opinion, there is no populist upsurge in Britain Page 3 of 3		Date originally posted: 2017-07-06Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/populisms-in-britain/Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/

Contrary to popular opinion, there is no populist upsurge in Britain

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