Last week was the first time that the heads of Britain’s security services have appeared in public in front of the newly reformed Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC). Andrew Defty argues that although the session was in and of itself significant, in future the ISC members must exert a greater degree of scrutiny if the committee is to be an effective check on the security services

Defty, Andrew

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demo crat icaudit .co m http://www.democraticaudit.com/?p=1818Are we on route to greater scrutiny of the security services? Credit: Mattbuck4950, CC BY 2.0)By Democratic AuditHaving security chiefs give evidence to Parliament isprogress, but future sessions must dig deeperLast week was the first time that the heads of Britain’s security services have appeared in public in front of thenewly reformed Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC). Andrew Defty argues that although the sessionwas in and of itself significant, in future the ISC members must  exert a greater degree of scrutiny if thecommittee is to be an effective check on the security services. The signif icance oflast week’sappearance ofintelligence agency heads bef ore the parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC), f aroutweighed anything that actually emerged f rom the evidence session itself . The ISC, which wasestablished in 1994, has until this point met entirely in secret. Its membership was appointed by the PrimeMinister and its reports are subject to scrutiny and excisions in the Cabinet Of f ice bef ore publication.Recent ref orms under the Justice and Security Act, which enhanced the powers of  the ISC andreconstituted it as a committee of  parliament, were designed in part, to present the committee as a morepowerf ul and independent investigator. As such, this f irst public evidence session was as much a test f orthe ISC as it was f or those appearing bef ore it.The ISC has been crit icised in the past f or being too close to the agencies, and f or the unchallengingnature of  its reports. Last week’s evidence session was a f airly anodyne af f air, which did litt le to relievethose concerns. Witnesses appearing bef ore parliamentary select committees are not usually given aplatf orm to make broad statements in support of  their posit ion, and those who attempt to do so aregenerally cut short by select committee Chairs. The ISC’s treatment of  the heads of  Britain’s threeintelligence and security agencies was somewhat dif f erent. The witnesses were asked a series of  broadopen questions, which invited broad and at t imes predictable responses. They were asked, f or example, tocomment on the nature of  the threat f acing Britain today, what impact new technology had on their work,and whether they f elt the agencies they represented were too powerf ul and of f ered good value f or money.Some of  the questions were clearly designed to allow the agency heads to make prepared statementsdispelling popular myths about their work. It is hardly tenable, f or example, that Sir Malcolm Rif kind reallybelieves that GCHQ collects inf ormation on ‘the majority of  the public’ but his suggestion that they did,allowed the head of  GCHQ to ref ute the notion. Julian Lewis’s question about whether everyone was stillspying on everyone else, invited a similarly short and predictable denial. A more illuminating approach mighthave been to ask about what distinction, if  any, the agencies make between hostile and f riendly powers.Hazel Blears went somewhat f urther then her colleagues in making the case f or the agencies, telling themthat in seeking to balance the needs of  privacy and security they were clearly between ‘a rock and a hardplace’, which may well be the case, but it would have been more appropriate if  the witnesses, rather than amember of  the committee, had made the point. When she later added that most of  the public seemed tosupport the agencies and that some would like them to be given more powers, she was interrupted by theChair, who clarif ied that this was ‘not necessarily the view of  this committee.’It is, nevertheless, important to remember that this was the ISC’s f irst public session and rather thanproviding a snapshot of  the committee’s day-to-day work, much of  the questioning was clearly designed todraw out contextual inf ormation f or the benef it of  the watching public. However, the concern will be that thequestions are no more taxing when the committee meets in private. It would have been helpf ul if  the ISC hadpushed a litt le f urther, and at least identif ied more of  those areas about which it will be seeking answers inprivate session. As it was, the only area in which the agency heads were f orced to say that they wouldpref er to give more details in closed session, related to the manner in which terrorists had benef itted f romrecent newspaper revelations about the work of  GCHQ. This was also the part of  their evidence whichreceived most widespread coverage in subsequent media reports.There was, nevertheless, some interesting material in this session. The most signif icant comments relatedto oversight and control. What was clear, and probably is under-appreciated more widely, was the extent towhich the agencies are aware of  the legal f ramework within which they operate. Andrew Parker, the head ofMI5, reminded the committee that the legislative mandate of  the agencies is drawn directly f rom theEuropean Convention on Human Rights, while GCHQ head, Sir Iain Lobban, in response to a questionabout whether the legislation had kept pace with technological developments, emphasised that thef undamental principles of  necessity and proportionality, were not af f ected by technological change. Lobbanalso ref erred several t imes to the value of  the Commissioners who oversee the issue of  warrants tointercept communications and enter property. Litt le is known about the work of  the Commissioners, but onthe basis of  the evidence presented here, in addition to overseeing the warranting procedure, they alsoappear to be providing ongoing legal guidance on surveillance methods, which suggests a role more akin tothat of  legal counsel or inspectors general, which are used widely in the US intelligence community.Perhaps the most interesting evidence related to the sharing of  intelligence with states who may use it inthe interrogation and torture of  terrorist suspects. The head of  SIS, Sir John Sawers, suggested that insuch circumstances ‘we seek clear assurances that when we provide intelligence, it will be used lawf ully andthat if  anybody is detained or questioned…it is done to our standards.’ Yet the ISC’s own investigation intorendition in 2007 revealed that there are signif icant problems in establishing the veracity of  suchassurances, even when provided by partner countries, such as the United States. It is a shame that thiswas not f ollowed up by the committee last week. Another area previously examined by the ISC was theinterrogation of  terrorist suspects by Brit ish personnel abroad, which was the subject of  an ISC report in2005.Interestingly, in his evidence last week Sawers conceded that at that t ime the training and guidance f orBrit ish personnel were not suf f icient to provide ‘clear direction to us, as heads of  Agencies, and to ourstaf f  in the f ield about what they can and cannot do.’ This somewhat contradicts assurances given to theISC in 2005 both by SIS and MI5, that in relation to interrogation techniques their ‘general ethics,methodology and training’ was sound. While Sawers was quick to assert that ‘rigorous complianceprocedures’ are now in place, including with new guidance approved by the ISC, admissions aboutdef iciencies in the relatively recent past, and questions about the ISC’s ability to ef f ectively hold theagencies to account f or them, have the potential to damage conf idence both in the agencies and thecommittee.The witnesses all emphasised that in their view there was no need f or more legislative restraint, but theyalso made it clear that this was a question f or the polit icians and that they would work within whateverlimits were placed upon them. This apparent def erence to polit ical control perhaps underestimates theinf luence these powerf ul individuals have over the polit ical agenda. It would be unusual f or a Government toseek to introduce f urther restraints against their advice.  Moreover, by making these statements in public,the agency heads have provided ammunition f or those, including within Parliament, who would seek to blockf urther changes to the legislative f ramework within which they operate.As this suggests, there are dangers if  these evidence sessions are simply allowed to become a platf ormf or the agencies, and it is to be hoped that f uture sessions become more routine and more robust. As suchthey may serve to build conf idence which will benef it the agencies and enhance the credibility of  the ISC.Whatever the f laws, this was an important step f orward in terms of  accountability both f or the intelligenceagencies, and the ISC, and it will be interesting to see how it develops.—Note: this post represents the views of the author and not those of Democratic Audit or the LSE. Please readour comments policy before posting. —Dr Andrew Defty  is Reader at the School of  Social and Polit ical Sciences at the University of  Lincoln. Heruns the Who Runs Britain blog at Lincoln University. His book, written with Hugh Bochel and JaneKirkpatrick, also f rom Lincoln, have a book on parliament and the intelligence services, “Watching theWatchers”, to be published by Palgrave in 2014. 

Having security chiefs give evidence to Parliament isprogress, but future sessions must dig deeper

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