The standoff between Spain and Catalonia raises fundamental questions about the rights of citizens to self-determination, and how demands for separatism or greater autonomy should be dealt with by a nation state. Michael Keating writes that the Catalan crisis has emerged from a series of missed opportunities, a lack of dialogue between the two sides, and a disappearing centre ground. He argues that the time may have come for some better European and international principles on who has the right to self-determination and how

Keating, Michael

LSE Research Online

The	lesson	from	Catalonia:	We	need	betterprinciples	on	who	has	the	right	to	self-determinationand	howThe	standoff	between	Spain	and	Catalonia	raises	fundamental	questions	about	the	rights	of	citizensto	self-determination,	and	how	demands	for	separatism	or	greater	autonomy	should	be	dealt	with	bya	nation	state.	Michael	Keating	writes	that	the	Catalan	crisis	has	emerged	from	a	series	of	missedopportunities,	a	lack	of	dialogue	between	the	two	sides,	and	a	disappearing	centre	ground.	Heargues	that	the	time	may	have	come	for	some	better	European	and	international	principles	on	whohas	the	right	to	self-determination	and	how.Credit:	Adolfo	Lujan	(CC	BY-NC-ND	2.0)Following	Spain’s	transition	to	democracy	in	the	1970s,	Catalan	nationalism	was	marked	by	moderation,	cautionand	gradual	progress.	In	a	longer	perspective,	the	Catalan	movement	has	eschewed	separatism	in	favour	of	aplurinational	and	decentralised	vision	of	Spain,	itself	anchored	in	Europe.	What,	then,	explains	the	polarisation	ofthe	last	few	years	and	the	confrontation	seen	on	1	October	between	a	nationalist	movement	set	on	anindependence	referendum	and	a	Spanish	state	determined	to	stop	it?This	is	a	tale	of	missed	opportunities,	a	lack	of	dialogue	and	a	disappearing	centre	ground.	The	Spanishconstitution	of	1978	represented	a	compromise	between	centralist	forces	from	the	Franco	regime	and	nationalistand	regionalist	forces	on	the	periphery.	It	declared	both	the	indissoluble	unity	of	Spain	and	the	right	to	autonomyof	the	‘regions	and	nationalities’	that	compose	it,	while	carefully	avoiding	defining	what	a	nationality	is.Catalans	could	live	with	this	ambiguity	but	hankered	after	a	recognition	of	their	own	distinct	status	as	a	‘nation’(like	Scotland	in	the	UK),	especially	after	some	of	the	ordinary	regions	declared	that	they	too	were	‘nationalities’.Another	complaint	was	about	provisions	in	the	autonomy	law	that	allowed	Spain	to	set	restrictive	frameworks	indevolved	matters.	So	a	part	of	the	education	curriculum	is	set	by	Madrid	and	the	rest	in	Barcelona,	a	verysensitive	matter.	The	UK	devolution	settlement	has	very	few	such	provisions.LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog: The lesson from Catalonia: We need better principles on who has the right to self-determination andhowPage 1 of 3		Date originally posted: 2017-10-09Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2017/10/09/the-lesson-from-catalonia-we-need-better-principles-on-who-has-the-right-to-self-determination-and-how/Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/A	third	issue	concerned	finance.	Catalonia	contributes	heavily	to	the	Spanish	exchequer.	It	has	expanded	its	owntaxation	powers	but	this	comes	short	of	the	provision	that	allows	the	Basque	Country	to	collect	its	own	taxes	andthen	pass	on	a	share	to	Madrid	for	common	services.	This	is	an	issue	that	has	become	acute	in	all	Europeandecentralised	states.In	2006,	a	new	statute	of	autonomy	was	drawn	up	by	a	coalition	of	nationalists	and	socialists	in	Catalonia	andpassed	by	both	Catalan	and	Spanish	parliaments	and	in	a	referendum	in	Catalonia.	Opponents,	including	theSpanish	Popular	Party,	appealed	to	the	Constitutional	Court	which,	after	a	long	process,	struck	down	some	keyprovisions	and	subjected	others	to	a	restrictive	interpretation.	The	Popular	Party	started	to	use	anti-Catalanrhetoric	to	gather	support	elsewhere	in	Spain.	They	even	supported	a	provision	in	a	new	autonomy	law	forAndalucia	that	was	identical	to	a	Catalan	provision	they	claimed	was	unconstitutional.	The	financial	crisisprecipitated	further	arguments	about	finance	and	the	scene	was	set	for	confrontation.Polarisation	was	accentuated	by	the	presence	of	weak	leadership	in	both	Madrid	and	Barcelona.	The	PopularParty,	regaining	power	in	Spain,	reverted	to	intransigent	Spanish	nationalism.	The	historically	dominant	party	inCatalonia,	Convergència	(now	called	PDeCAT)	moved	to	independence,	lining	up	with	the	Republican	Left	and	afar	left	party,	CUP.	This	movement	covered	a	wide	political	spectrum	but	united	on	the	demand	for	anindependence	referendum.	Both	the	Popular	Party	and	Convergència	were,	meanwhile,	mired	in	corruptionscandals.Many	academic	lawyers	in	Catalonia	(and	some	elsewhere)	have	argued	that	Spain	could	have	found	a	way	tohave	a	consultative	referendum	by	choosing	the	right	form	of	words.	Others	favoured	changing	the	constitution	ifnecessary.	The	Popular	Party,	supported	by	many	others	in	Madrid,	would	have	none	of	it,	sticking	to	the	narrowletter	of	the	law.	This	issue	was	dealt	with	briskly	in	the	case	of	Scotland.	Without	either	side	conceding	theprinciple,	they	agreed	a	formula	allowing	Westminster	to	grant	the	Scottish	Parliament	the	power	to	hold	aconsultative	referendum.	This	is	not	just	a	matter	of	the	flexibility	of	the	British	constitution	since	UK	law,	likeSpanish	law,	clearly	reserves	issues	of	national	unity	to	the	centre.	Nor	is	it,	as	my	Spanish	colleagues	oftenassume,	a	product	of	historic	British	pragmatism.	In	nineteenth-century	Ireland	and	a	hundred	years	later	inScotland,	UK	governments	dogmatically	opposed	home	rule,	never	mind	separatism.	It	does	seem	that	Britishunionism	has	matured,	for	reasons	that	are	not	at	all	clear.So,	instead	of	having	a	debate	about	the	political,	economic,	social	and	other	merits	of	independence	(as	inScotland),	the	Catalan	argument	has	focused	purely	on	the	‘right	to	decide’	as	a	democratic	principle.	Polls	haveshown	that,	while	support	for	independence	is	around	40-45	per	cent,	support	for	the	right	to	decide	is	muchhigher.	In	Scotland,	interestingly,	polls	show	the	same	level	of	support	for	independence	but	less	appetite	forhaving	a	referendum	any	time	soon.In	the	Catalan	case,	both	sides	have	pursued	confrontation.	The	Catalan	government	staged	an	unofficialreferendum	in	2014	but,	with	unionists	boycotting	it,	this	fell	flat.	They	then	called	‘plebiscitary	elections’	to	gain	amandate	for	independence.	Pro-independence	parties	gained	a	majority	of	seats,	but	not	of	votes.	The	next	stepwas	another	referendum,	to	be	followed	by	a	unilateral	declaration	of	independence.	This	was	accompanied	bysome	wishful	thinking	about	the	prospects	for	European	and	international	recognition	or	the	task	of	governing	andcollecting	taxes.	The	referendum	law	was	pushed	through	the	Catalan	parliament	without	proper	debate	orscrutiny,	using	provisions	designed	for	other	purposes.Spanish	authorities	could	have	ignored	the	vote	and	told	their	electors	to	stay	away.	Instead,	they	opted	forphysical	obstruction.	Public	servants	were	prosecuted	and	barred	for	their	role	in	the	2014	referendum.	Otherswere	arrested	for	organising	the	new	referendum.	Firms	producing	ballot	boxes	and	papers	were	raided.	Postersand	websites	promoting	the	referendum	were	taken	down.	On	the	day,	Spanish	police	were	sent	in	to	manhandlevoters	and	violently	remove	them	from	polling	stations.	The	issue	has	now	shifted	from	prohibiting	an	illegalsecession	movement	to	the	violent	suppression	of	what	was,	in	effect,	a	gesture	of	peaceful	civil	disobedience.Surveys	have	shown	that,	given	the	option	of	more	home	rule,	recognition	of	their	national	identity	and	a	financialcompromise,	most	Catalans	would	not	vote	for	independence.	Being	told	that	they	do	not	have	the	right	to	do	sois	another	matter.LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog: The lesson from Catalonia: We need better principles on who has the right to self-determination andhowPage 2 of 3		Date originally posted: 2017-10-09Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2017/10/09/the-lesson-from-catalonia-we-need-better-principles-on-who-has-the-right-to-self-determination-and-how/Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/Catalan	and	Spanish	leaders	appear	unable	to	resolve	this	issue	among	themselves.	The	European	Union	lacksthe	means	and	the	will	to	intervene.	The	last	President	of	the	Commission	did	not	help	matters	by	declaring	thatScotland,	even	after	an	agreed,	legal,	constitutional	and	democratic	secession,	could	find	it	impossible	to	get	intothe	European	Union.	EU	member	states	are	still	divided	on	the	recognition	of	Kosovo.	The	time	may	have	comefor	some	better	European	international	principles	about	who	has	the	right	to	self-determination	and	how.Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	theLondon	School	of	Economics._________________________________About	the	authorMichael	Keating	–	University	of	Aberdeen	/	University	of	EdinburghMichael	Keating	is	Professor	of	Politics	at	the	Universities	of	Aberdeen	and	Edinburgh	and	Directorof	the	Centre	on	Constitutional	Change.LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog: The lesson from Catalonia: We need better principles on who has the right to self-determination andhowPage 3 of 3		Date originally posted: 2017-10-09Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2017/10/09/the-lesson-from-catalonia-we-need-better-principles-on-who-has-the-right-to-self-determination-and-how/Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/

The lesson from Catalonia: we need better principles on who has the right to self-determination and how

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