Are we heading for a softer Brexit after the Conservatives’ electoral setback? Piers Ludlow doubts it. There is little to suggest voters were warning Theresa May off a hard Brexit. The Cabinet reshuffle is unlikely to tip the balance, and even if she returns from Brussels with a softer deal it is far from clear that Labour would back it

Ludlow, N. Piers

LSE Research Online

2017-6-14Hopes of a softer Brexit are probably in vain – though I’dlove to be proved wrongblogs.lse.ac.uk /brexit/2017/06/14/hopes-of-a-softer-brexit-are-probably-in-vain-though-id-love-to-be-proved-wrong/Are we heading for a softer Brexit after the Conservatives’ electoral setback? Piers Ludlowdoubts it. There is little to suggest voters were warning Theresa May off a hard Brexit. TheCabinet reshuffle is unlikely to tip the balance, and even if she returns from Brussels with asofter deal it is far from clear that Labour would back it.Holding a general election just over a week before the Brexit negotiations were due to beginwas always a slightly strange and risky idea.  It now looks laughably unwise.  But while thepersonal rebuff to Theresa May and the damage to her standing is very clear, what is far lessevident is what, if anything, this electoral outcome changes as far as Brexit is concerned.There are three main scenarios in which Britain’s difficult and possibly acrimonious divorce from the EU could take adifferent course. All three remain possible, but none are certain and evidence for two of them is pretty thin. It isnonetheless worth looking at each in detail.The first and most positive scenario – from a Remain perspective – but also the most unlikely, in my view, is that theelection setback might be seen as a public repudiation of the hard Brexit approach. As such, it would beinterpreted by May (or any potential Tory successor) and by the Conservative Party more broadly as a warning shotacross the government’s bows. It would serve as a reminder that there may have been a narrow majority for Leavebut there was little evidence of a majority for a hard Brexit.Michael Gove’s return to the Cabinet does not suggest Theresa May is heading for a softer Brexit. Photo: Number 10 via a CC-BY-NC-ND 2.0 licenceSadly, I’m not sure the election can be convincingly read in this fashion, despite a few pieces of evidence that couldbe spun towards such a conclusion.  And I’m even more certain that it is not being read in this way by those who arelikely to matter most – namely May, her party and those who support her.1/3Superficially, it would be tempting to believe this interpretation. May called the poll, after all, in order to increase hermajority and to gain a convincing mandate for the confrontational and presidential manner in which she planned toapproach the Brexit talks.  She did not get such a mandate.  On the contrary, she was humiliated at the polls and herpersonal authority has been greatly diminished.  Ergo, it might appear, her Brexit policy was also decisively rejected.Yet I don’t see much evidence that Brexit was the main reason why voters deserted May. Rather, the Tories failed toenthuse and mobilise their support as much as they had hoped and expected (although May still received morevotes than Cameron in 2015, it is worth recalling), and, more importantly, they failed to prevent Jeremy Corbyn fromenthusing the Labour ranks and winning over the young in particular with his vision of a fairer, higher-tax and higherspending Britain.  But little of this had much to do with the EU.  On that, both main parties were hopelessly vague. May talked about Brexit incessantly, but said next to nothing substantial, other than trying to persuade voters thatshe was the negotiator that Britain needed and that Corbyn was totally unsuited to the role.  Corbyn, by contrast,avoided the subject almost entirely.  Instead the Tories were put on the defensive over social policies, where theirofferings were perceived as mean-spirited and uncertain (the dementia tax debacle), whereas Labour’s offered amore optimistic vision.  The only tangentially Brexit-related factor that really seems to have mattered is that May’spoor campaign entirely destroyed any claim she had to be the strong and credible leader which Britain needed asthe Brussels talks began.Corbyn, by contrast, substantially outperformed the very low expectations which many had of him when thecampaign began, and did not fall victim to the attack dossier about his colourful and politically questionable past. But even this personal authority issue, while often discussed in relation to Brexit, was as much about the way inwhich the two party leaders would run the country and act on the international stage more generally, rather thanrelated to the way they would handle the EU27.  Europe has rarely been the most salient issue in voters’ minds inBritish general elections, and 2017, despite the Brexit election tag which is was sometimes given, does not strike meas different.In short, the result was not the personal endorsement May had hoped for.  But it is hard to see it as being a clear-cutmessage about Europe – and it is not being interpreted as such in government, in the Conservative Party or in themedia. Most of them are still locked into a mindset based upon entirely unrealistic expectations about the relativestrengths of Britain and the EU, and therefore view the approaching negotiations as the moment when a triumphantBritain turns the tables on its continental neighbours (who are on the road to disaster anyway) – and secures eithera highly beneficial deal, or a clean break which will open up countless mouthwatering prospects.  The electionoutcome has not really dented such hopes – all it has done is open up greater doubts than before over whether Mayis the right person to be allowed to lead Britain’s negotiating troops into this glorious anticipated victory.The second possible scenario in which the general election might affect the Brexit negotiations would be if it alteredMay’s own stance, the team that surrounds her, and the balance around the cabinet table. Here there are afew encouraging signs.  The Prime Minister herself, if she retains her job, will almost certainly have to behave in aless aloof manner.  This could make her a little more receptive to realistic advice about the balance of power in theBrussels negotiations, although whether there are enough such voices within Whitehall or Westminster any longermust be open to doubt.  Nick Timothy and Fiona Hill’s departures may also help, particularly if some of their role maynow be taken by Damian Green.  And Philip Hammond’s survival as Chancellor means that there will be a constantcabinet-level reminder of the economic risks that a hard Brexit deal would entail.More generally, a weaker PM will be less able to go on riding personal hobby horses.  Her refusal to exclude foreignstudents from the immigration numbers may now be dropped.  But such is the balance within the Cabinet that I don’tnecessarily see a move towards more collective decision-making as helping the soft Brexit cause.  Michael Gove’sreturn, for instance will ensure a highly articulate and forceful voice in favour of the type of hard Brexit which DavidDavis, Liam Fox and Boris Johnson support.  A weaker PM more dependent on Cabinet backing might actually beworse for those hoping for a soft Brexit.The third optimistic scenario (from a Remain perspective) is that the new Parliamentary arithmetic will oblige2/3May to take a more cautious approach to the negotiations. This strikes me as the most plausible of the three. After all, the DUP line on Brexit is encouragingly soft.  Similarly the newly elected Scottish Tories may boost thedwindling ranks of those within the Conservative Party prepared to take a less than Europhobic line.  And it is notbeyond the bounds of possibility that May might be tempted to do a deal in Brussels which would be rejected by theEurosceptic ultras within her own party, but which might be able to secure support from the Labour Party and eventhe SNP.  As a minority government, May will have to look beyond her own party in order to secure the parliamentarybacking for any deal done, and in doing so she could, if she chose, seek to build a basis for support that isolated thehardliners in her own ranks by obtaining support from across the floor.Nonetheless, this may be over-optimistic. How many of her own party could a diminished May persuade to back asoft Brexit deal, especially one dependent on opposition votes?  The depth of anti-European sentiment within theConservative Party, especially at its grassroots, is such that any MP who took this course would be in danger ofincurring lasting resentment from the party organisation, the activists and their constituency – to say nothing ofmany of their colleagues.  And they would be rallying around a PM who is unlikely to be leading the party at the nextelection.  It is thus a risk that only the genuine pro-Europeans within the party – of whom relatively few remain – arelikely to take.  Nor does it seem likely to me that Labour will necessarily extend a helping hand to May.  Labour’sposition on Brexit is still pretty opaque, but is probably somewhat ‘softer’ than that of most of the ConservativeParty.  But whether their convictions on the matter are strong enough to persuade them to vote with May rather thanseize an opportunity to defeat the government and thereby potentially precipitate its fall is another matter entirely.  Ihave my doubts.I struggle to read the electoral outcome in a very optimistic fashion.  It is a setback for May and for theConservatives. It will almost certainly lead to a weaker and more unstable government.  And it is likely to prolongindefinitely Corbyn’s position as the leader of the opposition. But evidence it will change the manner of Brexit is hardto discern.  I’d love to be proved wrong; but I have a feeling that I won’t be.This post represents the views of the author and not those of the Brexit blog, nor the LSE.Piers Ludlow is Associate Professor in the Department of International History at the LSE.Copyright © 2015 London School of Economics3/3

Hopes of a softer Brexit are probably in vain – though I’d love to be proved wrong

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