The elections on Sunday June 7 were the most important general elections in recent Turkish political history. With a huge turnout, more women in parliament, better Kurdish political representation and a clear ‘no’ to a presidential system, the future of Turkish democracy looks promising. However, a hung parliament and potential early elections might jeopardise this. Regrettably, the AK Party’s initial interpretation of the elections, particularly regarding the HDP’s success, is an unfortunate start

Kaya, Zeynep

LSE Research Online

Cautious hope for Turkey: Between a coalitiongovernment and early electionsby Zeynep KayaThe elections on Sunday June 7 were the most important generalelections in recent Turkish political history. With a huge turnout, morewomen in parliament, better Kurdish political representation and a clear‘no’ to a presidential system, the future of Turkish democracy lookspromising. However, a hung parliament and potential early electionsmight jeopardise this. Regrettably, the AK Party’s initial interpretation ofthe elections, particularly regarding the HDP’s success, is an unfortunatestart.Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s (pictured) party did not manage to secure themajority of seats. (UNAOC, flickr.com)The outcome of the elections represents a fascinating push for Turkey tobecome a more pluralist democratic country. A resounding 87% turnoutHome About Guidelines LSE Middle East Experts Links & ResourcesRecent Posts Receive our posts byemailSubscribe  @LSEMiddleEast onTwitterWhy the #Chilcot inquiry is doing the right thing by taking its time ‐ @dr_james_strong on our blog wp.me/p3Khxv‐Qb @LSEpoliticsblogLSE Middle East @LSEMiddleEastShow SummaryDelays to the Chilcot Report may be no bad thing after all  blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2015/09/16 pic.twitter.com/bed0lQyujQLSE Middle East @LSEMiddleEast45Tweets Followshowed Turkish voters’ interest in shaping the political future of thecountry and the majority said ‘no’ to changing the parliamentary systemto a presidential one. The number of female MPs increased from 76 to 96;yet the most important outcome of the elections is the 13.1% of votesthat went to the HDP (Peoples’ Democracy Party). For the first time,Kurdish politicians were present as a party in the parliament not asindependent MPs. Moreover, in the previous parliament there were 36independent MPs affiliated with an earlier incarnation of the HDP (theBDP – Peace and Democracy Party), but today, this number has increasedto 80. Potentially, this is promising for the future of Turkish democracyand the Kurdish peace talks. However, this will very much depend onwhether a new government can be formed and, if so, what shape it takes.Unfortunately, the Justice and Development Party’s (AK Party, also knownas AKP) initial reaction of the HDP’s success does not bode well.The AK Party lost 9% of its vote share, from 49.9% in the 2011 elections to40.8% with its seats decreasing from 327 to 258. The HDP reaching theextremely high 10% threshold (a party needs to receive at least 10% ofthe national vote to enter the parliament) was the biggest blow to the AKParty’s aspirations to form yet another majority government. The deputyPrime Minister Bulent Arinc in his post-election statement claimed thatthe Nationalist People Party (MHP) and the Republican People’s Party(CHP) enabled HDP’s success and he said the HDP was used as aspearhead pushed by these two parties.It is true that the MHP and the CHP saw the benefits of having the HDP inparliament – simply, a smaller number of AK Party seats. The AK Partyneeded at least 276 seats to form a single party government and 367seats to be able to change the constitution and move Turkey towards apresidential system, which is now impossible. During the electioncampaigns, both the MHP and the CHP softened their anti-HDP discourseand used a more consensual language, much to the AK Party’sdisappointment. A proportion of non-Kurdish voters in urban areas votedfor the HDP because of its party programme and rhetoric based ondemocracy, pluralism, gender-equality, LGBT rights andenvironmentalism, but also as an anti-AK Party strategy to help the HDPpass the 10% threshold. However, if what Arinc says was true, the HDPshould’ve received more votes in areas where the AK Party hasconsistently been the biggest party, but this didn’t happen. The outcomeindicates that the HDP barely received 2% of the votes in these areas.ExpandQ&A w/ @Doylech on what #Corbyn's win could mean for the UK's Middle East policy shar.es/170cUj via @MiddleEastEye & @daniaakkadLSE Middle East @LSEMiddleEastShow Summary'Contentious Politics in the Middle East' edited by @FawazGerges is now out! @Palgrave_  palgrave.com/page/detail/co pic.twitter.com/3RRHKlhuxtLSE Middle East @LSEMiddleEastExpand2121Tweet to @LSEMiddleEastRecent Posts Delays to theChilcot Report may beno bad thing after all  The 3000: Why arethousands ofTunisians flocking toThe HDP passed the threshold and the AK Party lost a big proportion ofits support base due to reasons far more influential than supposedsupport from other parties. Basically, people did not want to see anothersingle party government formed by the AK Party. Erdogan’s actions sincehe became president have gone beyond a Turkish president’sconstitutional area of activity. He has been behaving more like a head ofgovernment than a president, which is supposed be a non-partisanneutral position according to the Turkish constitution. For instance, hewas at the centre of the AK Party election campaign, giving speechesevery day in support of the party, bashing other parties, and openlydeclaring his biased position towards the AK Party. Increasingly, largerproportions of Turkish society find Erdogan and the AK Party’sauthoritarian attitude, their tendency to push the boundaries set by legalnorms and regulations, their polarising rhetoric and their assumptionthat the Turkish electorate can be convinced through populist policiesand discourse very vexing.Contrasting with this arrogant and polarising attitude, the co-leader of theHDP, Selahattin Demirtas has adopted a consensual style and hispluralist, democratic, and egalitarian rhetoric found him many friendlyears among the Turkish society. The ongoing peace talks and the halt ofthe military conflict also have given some level of legitimacy to the partyand facilitated the shift in votes towards the HDP. For example, AK Partysupporters in eastern and southeastern Turkey shifted their support tothe HDP. Similarly, the MHP’s vote share increased from 13% to 16%across Turkey, mainly as a response to the Kurdish peace process. Allthese reasons contributed to the AK Party’s loss of the majority.HDP flags (Julia Buzaud, flickr.com)Clearly, Arinc’s blame of the MHP and the CHP for the HDP’s successDaesh? Towards an Ethicsof Sight: ViolenceScholarship and theArab Uprisings Religious Identityand Social ScienceResearch in theMiddle East Researching the“Un-researchable”:State Politics andResearch EthicsSee all of our blog postsshows that the AK Party does not see the electoral outcome as a reactionto their authoritarian and paternalist single-party rule. Furthermore, itoverlooks the possibility that electors might have chosen to votestrategically rather than ideologically. The AK Party’s insistence onblaming other parties also reveals its top-down and increasingly elitistpolitical mentality – a mentality that underestimates public opinion andperceives the elections through the prism of populism instead ofpluralism.What’s more, the AK Party’s initial response shows an apparentunawareness of the impact of recent events on public opinion. The Geziprotests in mid-2013 and the subsequent severe government and policeresponse to the protestors not only revealed the authoritarianism andintolerance of the AK Party, but also its social engineering attempts tocreate a conservative Turkish society. The corruption scandal, whichbegan in 2013 and involved four ministers and Erdogan’s family,generated also a significant reaction among the Turkish population. Thescandal was initiated by the Gulenists’, a transnational Islamist group ledby Abdullah Gulen who preaches a moderate blend of Islam. In response,the AK Party government heightened pressure on the Gulenists (theparallel state, as the party calls them now). Lastly, the AK Party’saggressive and unconstructive foreign policy in the Middle East, whichhas sectarian tones, and the decline in Turkey’s economic growth areother important factors that led to the decrease in the party’s vote share.In a nutshell, the AK Party’s conception of the HDP’s success as generatedby the MHP and the CHP is unfounded.The response to the Gezi protests revealed the authoritarianism andintolerance of the AK Party (David, flickr.com)In any case, the HDP is now in parliament and for the first time in Turkishpolitical history, Kurds are represented as a party. This will surely impactthe Kurdish peace process and further legitimise Kurdish politics inTurkey. Not being able to pass the threshold would’ve led the Kurds toput emphasis on the high electoral threshold system and further restrainPKK-government relations. However, to what extent the HDP is able toinfluence the peace process depends on how the new governmenthandles the talks. Political representation in the parliament is animportant step in securing the peace process. Although initiated by theAK Party, the peace process was mainly maintained thanks to the publicsupport for peace despite the government’s own sabotaging behaviour attimes and the Turkish nationalist opposition. Hopefully, the nextgovernment will continue the peace talks with the reality of the HDP as amore integral part of Turkish politics in mind.The important determinant will be the new government or whether a newgovernment will form at all. Typical to post-election processes with nooutright majority, a number of scenarios and readings between the linesof leaders’ speeches are dominating media discussions at the moment.The AK Party will now either form a minority government or have to talkto other parties to generate a coalition government. If the new AK Partyleader is not successful in forming the coalition or if a new coalitioncabinet does not pass the confidence vote within 45 days, the Presidentcan call for elections.An early election might potentially disrupt the peace process and thetrust that Kurdish voters have in the Turkish political system. Erdogan andthe AK Party might consider the early election option as a seriouspossibility, and in doing so, may feed into the negative memory ofinstability of coalition governments of the 90s. Still, the elections showedthat most of the population does not appreciate the party’s increasinglyauthoritarian rule, prefers a coalition government and is happy to seeKurds represented in the parliament. These are important lessons for allparties involved. Unfortunately all this may not matter. A cautious hope isin order, as Turkey might be facing a process of instability generated bythe AK Party to show the ‘vices’ of parliamentary systems.

Cautious hope for Turkey: between a coalition government and early elections

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