Can global governance through organisations such as the United Nations and the World Trade Organization ever be made properly democratic? In an interview with EUROPP’s editor Stuart Brown, Robert O. Keohane discusses the problems with establishing global democratic governance, the distinction between liberal constitutionalist achievements and democracy, and why we should be sceptical of claims that a global democracy is just around the corner

Brown, Stuart A.

Keohane, Robert O.

LSE Research Online

05/11/2014Five minutes with Robert O. Keohane: “We shouldn’t foolourselves by believing that global governance will soon bemade democratic”blogs.lse.ac.uk /europpblog/2014/11/05/five-minutes-with-robert-o-keohane-we-shouldnt-fool-ourselves-by-believing-that-global-governance-will-soon-be-made-democratic/Can global governance through organisations such as the United Nations and the World TradeOrganization ever be made properly democratic? In an interview with EUROPP’s editor StuartBrown, Robert O. Keohane discusses the problems with establishing global democraticgovernance, the distinction between liberal constitutionalist achievements and democracy, and whywe should be sceptical of claims that a global democracy is just around the corner.You’ve written on the problems associated with implementing democratic principles inglobal governance. What specifically prevents us from creating proper democraticstructures at the global level?It’s important to distinguish between liberal constitutionalism and democracy. There has in fact been a lot ofprogress made in global governance on the legal side. There are more regular adjudication arrangements – mostnotably in the World Trade Organization, but also in a number of other areas such as human rights – than therewere 30 or 40 years ago, providing better ways to settle disputes. Strengthening the rule of law in this way is theliberal side of global governance and there has been remarkable progress in this respect over recent decades.However the democratic side involves people having an effective voice and feeling connected to theirrepresentatives. This is hard enough in any big country because bureaucracies are strong, there are millions ofpeople and there’s therefore a remote connection between citizens and their government. We see this around theworld in democracies: in the US, in the UK and with the rise of populist movements in Europe.These problems are magnified immensely at the global level. This is partly a result of the sheer size of the polity, butit also occurs because there is no national or global identity. The emotional connection that nationalism represents isentirely lacking. As Robert Putnam has shown, democracy requires a degree of civic association: people whointeract with each other on a social basis, rather than specifically in the polity. That is not the case cross-nationally.Very few people have these kinds of ties with people in other countries.So the sociological base and the emotional base for a global democracy simply don’t exist. When you combine thatwith the huge size of any constituency which would be required, it’s clear that anything paralleling a ‘globalparliament’ just isn’t going to happen, at least not for a long time. It’s safe to say the academics who talk aboutcreating such a system haven’t really thought it through.One of the specific examples you’ve mentioned of the tension between the aims of global governance anddemocracy is climate change. How does democracy influence attempts to solve climate change?Climate change is one of the hardest issues to deal with. It’s a hard issue even for national governments to address.In solving climate change by cutting emissions, you pay for your actions but you get almost no benefit individually.Everybody benefits unconditionally from a cut in emissions, so the incentive for any given actor to actually dosomething about it is very small.Now it’s not so much that democracy undermines efforts to tackle climate change – autocracy isn’t the answer to theproblem either – it’s simply that democracies have been unable to make progress on the issue, with the partialexception of Europe. The main reason for this is that people are not willing to pay the costs on a global basis. They1/4think about immediate concerns such as paying higher fuel prices rather than some far off distant gain for otherpeople in the future. Moreover, these are people spread all across the world who they have no affinity with and haveno association with.The standard way in which national governments deal with public goods issues, such as paying for defence, is bysummoning national solidarity, particularly through the emotion of nationalism. This is powerful enough that peoplewill die for their country in wars, which is also a public good. But that kind of sentiment is completely absent at theglobal level. You’re helping everyone around the world, as opposed to just your own compatriots, and there’s noemotional or sociological base for doing that.So there are three main reasons why democratic global governance is unlikely to emerge in the near future. Theproblems associated with solving climate change are an example of an ‘interest-public goods’ gap. The contributor isnot receiving any specific benefit from their contribution because it’s watered down over billions of people – which iseven more of a problem than if it’s watered down over 60 million people, as occurs in a nation state like the UK orFrance.Climate change also illustrates the ‘emotional’ gap in global governance by highlighting the lack of any mobilisingsentiment analogous to nationalism at the global level. Perhaps if there were an attack by extra-terrestrials we mighthave a different feeling about this! But short of that scenario happening, the symbolism isn’t there. There is no globalnational anthem – and indeed the European national anthem, Ode to Joy, has no words, given that any singlelanguage would be divisive.Finally, there is also an ‘infrastructure’ gap. This is the lack of any global civil society of the kind Putnam refers to.The associations that operate not politically, but on a social basis in healthy democratic societies are missing at theglobal level. Even at the national level there are problems with these associations, as Putnam points out, butglobally they are non-existent. As a result there simply isn’t the necessary democratic infrastructure present to havea global democracy.Some academics and politicians in Europe might argue that while what you’re saying is true globally, theEuropean Union has shown that on a regional basis something approaching a supranational democracycan be created. How would you respond to this?The European Union has done a number of wonderful things. First, it has created a Europe which is whole and free,and it has provided incentives for formerly peripheral countries to join it. It’s a voluntary association which almostevery independent and democratic state wants to be part of. That’s a tremendous accomplishment.Second, the EU has achieved its early purpose of creating economic union and trade integration. It has done so in away which has omitted fiscal and banking policies, which has caused some very serious economic problems, but ithas nevertheless created a free trade area with free movement of services and people. Third, it has a very welldeveloped legalised structure. It includes the European Court of Justice, which wasn’t really contemplated in theoriginal treaties, but is now a strong defender of civil liberties and liberal values in Europe. These are also enormousaccomplishments.So the European Union is a very successful, liberal constitutional entity. However it is not a successful democraticentity. It has a European Parliament, but the number of people who vote in European elections has fallensubstantially. There is an extremely weak connection between individuals and their parliamentary representatives,and there is still a much closer attachment between citizens and their nation state than there is between citizens andEurope. So Europe’s great successes are not in democracy, but in liberal constitutionalism.In fact the trouble with EU democracy – the fact that it’s seen as an impersonal bureaucracy in countries like the UK,and the weakness of the European Parliament in terms of the ties between parliamentarians and their constituents –illustrates the difficulties in making democracy work at a supranational level. It also adds weight to my point that you2/4have to distinguish between democracy and liberalism.You have to isolate the huge successes of European governance and the modest but real successes of globalgovernance on the liberal side, and make a distinction with the much more modest European successes and non-existent global successes in terms of establishing genuine democracy. A genuine democracy requires closeconnections between the people and their representatives who are actually making decisions. That doesn’t exist atthe global level.Given the points you’ve raised, is it actively damaging to consider global governance democratic?I think the consequence is essentially hypocrisy: the perpetuation of the belief that there is democracy at some levelwhere it is not actually operating. Now we can live with a fair amount of hypocrisy. There are worse things thanhypocrisy, such as cruelty and destroying other human beings. I don’t think the consequences of our ‘nominaldemocracy’ at the global level are pressingly terrible.But we as analysts and intellectuals shouldn’t fool ourselves into believing that global governance will soon be madedemocratic or that global democratic governance has been attained by any serious measure. There are someacademics who have left that impression or who have proposed things like a world parliament, which would beentirely unrealistic.Despite this, I would end on a much more positive note. I think it’s important to be clear-eyed about democracy andwe shouldn’t pretend there is democracy where there isn’t. But I think making the world more democratic is a noblecause. It’s a cause that’s worthy of attention. It would be a long process and it’s not going to happen quickly, but ifit’s pursued realistically with a long-term agenda then I applaud it.However it’s not going to be achieved simply by rationalising the problem. It can only be achieved with institutional,legal and social infrastructure built up patiently over the years. It has to be achieved by people identifying moreemotionally with other human beings, as opposed to just their nations. And it’s going to require leadership which iswilling to progress step by step and which is willing to be held to account, rather than just to talk aboutaccountability.We can’t think that global democracy is here or that it’s about to arrive, but we shouldn’t give up on it or stopconsidering it a worthy ideal. It is a worthy ideal, but it’s a lifetime’s work for people who are now in their 20s. It’s notsomething that can be achieved in ten years, it will have to be worked at throughout these people’s lives and whenthey’re at the age I am now hopefully we’ll have made substantial progress toward that goal. Although I don’t thinkwe’ll be there yet, even then.For more on this topic, a video of Robert O. Keohane’s recent lecture at LSE is available herePlease read our comments policy before commenting .Note: This article gives the views of the interviewee, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy,nor of the London School of Economics. Featured image: View during of the 25th Session of the UN Human RightsCouncil, Credit: UN Geneva (CC-BY-SA-3.0)Shortened URL for this post: http://bit.ly/1E4aBeu _________________________________About the interviewee3/4Robert O. Keohane – Princeton UniversityRobert O. Keohane is Professor of International Affairs in the Woodrow Wilson School at PrincetonUniversity.4/4

Five minutes with Robert O. Keohane: “We shouldn’t fool ourselves by believing that global governance will soon be made democratic”

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