Contemporary democracy is often thought to have its roots in ancient Greece and the renaissance, with the long march to truly represented in some parts of the world still incomplete. Here, Jørgen Møller explores democracy’s medieval roots, as well as the history of state building during this period

Møller, Jørgen

LSE Research Online

By Democratic Audit UK 2015-8-17Exploring the medieval roots of democracy and statebuilding in Europedemocraticaudit.com /2015/08/17/exploring-the-medieval-roots-of-democracy-and-state-building-in-europe/Contemporary democracy is often thought to have its roots in ancient Greece and the renaissance, with the longmarch to truly represented in some parts of the world still incomplete. Here, Jørgen Møller explores democracy’smedieval roots, as well as the history of state building during this period. Alnwick Castle: Credit: James*C, CC BY NC 2.0Madame de Staël famously observed that in France liberty is ancient and despotism is modern. The sentimentbehind this observation has been echoed by a large body of scholarship that has identified the roots of key aspectsof modern representative democracy in medieval political institutions. Most important on the list is the medievaldevelopment of representative institutions. As it is frequently pointed out, the most famous modern parliament – theEnglish one convening in Westminster – can be traced in unbroken line to the parliament that arose underPlantagenet kings in the 13th and 14th centuries.The notion that modern democracy has medieval roots was forcefully formulated by the Prussian historian OttoHintze in a series of essay written from 1929 to 1931. Hintze went so far as to argue that the absolutism that sweptaway constitutionalism over much of Latin Christendom following the 16th century military revolution was in fact onlya temporary aberration from a development which led from medieval parliaments to modern, representativedemocracy. More recently, Brian M. Downing has been almost as vocal. He argues that modern democracy evolvedstraight from what he terms “medieval constitutionalism” in the instances where early modern absolutism did notsweep away these medieval institutions (say, in England).Most of us would probably find Hintze’s and Downing’s direct link between medieval institutions and moderndemocracy untenable. Genuine democratisation is a feature of the late 19th and early 20th century, and itpresupposed the removal of a series of political privileges of medieval origins. For instance, the medieval1/3representative institutions had only catered to select elite interests and the introduction of equal and universalsuffrage required mass pressure from below aimed at tearing down the old notions of political hierarchy in favor ofnew notions of political equality. In this sense, modern representative democracy required the great broom which –in Karl Marx’s famous phrase – swept away the medieval trash.Nonetheless, we can still make the case that this this subsequent democratization was easier against the backdropof medieval constitutional institutions than it would otherwise have been. There are at least two reasons for this.First, as the late Robert A. Dahl observed in Democracy and Its Critics, when the modern forces behinddemocratization built up steam, “the design for a ‘representative’ legislature did not have to be spun from gossamerfibers of abstract democratic ideas; concrete legislatures and representatives, undemocratic though they were,already existed”. Second, out of the medieval chrysalis emerged a society with quasi-independent social domains inwhich newly emerging groups could find niches within which to organize, thereby paving the way for the vibrant civilsocieties that came to characterize especially Western Europe. This furthered the ability of these groups to fight fortheir own enfranchisement once democratization began to build up steam.Thus, while the path leading from medieval institutions to modern representative democracy may have been strewnwith obstacles, it still presented a more accessible route than other historical paths. Most students ofdemocratization would probably acknowledge as much today. No similar consensus exists about how medievalinstitutions affected subsequent state-building processes. If we return to Downing’s account, modern state-buildingis construed as a process which consists of removing the medieval institutions of constraints. Where the medievalinstitutions were swept away by state-building, military-bureaucratic absolutism came into existence. In a moresophisticated analysis, Thomas Ertman has pointed out that the survival of constitutionalist institutions had no effecton whether state-building was based on bureaucratic (aka. ‘Weberian’) or patrimonial templates. These twopositions nicely capture the general views in the literature which might be said to be that the medieval foundations ofdemocracy where either inconsequential or outright negative for a felicitous pattern of state-building, i.e., for theintroduction of modern bureaucratic institutions.Analogously to what has been said about modern democracy, it is correct that modern state-building entailed that anumber of medieval institutions were removed, most particularly local institutions of self-government and privilegesfor estate groups such as tax exemptions. However, the literature has largely ignored that the medieval institutionsthat needed to be transformed to pave the way for modern bureaucratic ones also affected subsequent state-building in a positive way. There are two main reasons for this. First, the medieval institutions and the strong socialgroups which they reflected constantly constrained state-builders, thereby making top-down state-building andarbitrary rule more difficult. To use Michael Mann’s distinction, this facilitated the use of infrastructural power at theexpense of despotic power. Second, many of the medieval institutions provided “transmission belts” for modernstate-building while the strong social groups could be harnessed for state-building. For instance, localbureaucracies owed much to earlier structures of urban self-government and a part of the medieval legacy was theexistence of a stratum of professional groups of corporate origins which could staff the new bureaucratic structures.One reason why these positive effects have been ignored is that most prior scholarship on the development of themodern state has been Eurocentric in the sense that it is variation within Europe that has been addressed. This, forinstance, is the case in both of the above-mentioned analyses by Downing and Ertman – but it also characterizesmost of the more general ‘bellicist’ work on the relationship between war-making and state-making, including theseminal work of Charles Tilly. However, as all of Western and Central Europe embarked on modern state-buildingagainst the backdrop of the medieval institutions this is a sure recipe for emphasizing the blocking aspects of themedieval legacy at the expense of the facilitating aspects.The proper way to appreciate the effects of the medieval legacy is by comparing processes of state-building incases with and without this legacy. Perhaps the most intuitively interesting comparative contrast is Russia. In theRussian case state-building was sparked by the very same factor that spurred state-building in the rest of Europe,namely the geopolitical pressure that had become a ubiquitous feature of the European multi-state system after2/31500. A closer look at the Russian state-building shows just how difficult it is to establish bureaucratic institutionstop-down by unconstrained rulers in the absence of existing “transmission belts” for authority. Not only where thereno extant institutions of self-government to base local government structures on, even the central institutionsestablished by czars such as Peter the Great were constantly undermined because reel power subsided not informal institutions but in patron-client networks centered on the czar. In this sense, Russia serves to put in reliefsome of the facilitating aspects of medieval institutions of constraints for the later development of bureaucraticinstitutions.The study of the medieval foundations has received renewed attention by social scientists in the latest decades.Most important is probably the ambitious research agenda of Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson which, at leasttacitly, rests on the assumption that medieval “institutions of constraints” – whether they arose endogenously orwere transplanted during colonialisation processes – have facilitated modern democratisation and moderneconomic growth. A next step for this research agenda is to, in a more detailed manner, analyse the importance ofthese medieval institutions for state-building. If we wish to understand which lessons can be derived from theEuropean development of modern democracy, the modern state, and the modern market economy we need tounderstand both blocking and facilitating aspects of the legacy bequeathed by medieval institutions. Only thus canwe derive lessons from the European development, which might then serve to shed some new light on ongoingprocesses of political change and state-building elsewhere.—For a longer discussion of the topic covered in this article see the author’s recent article in Journal ofDemocracy. It represents the views of the contributors and not those of Democratic Audit UK or the LSE. Pleaseread our comments policy before posting.— Jørgen Møller is Professor at the Department of Political Science, Aarhus University. His researchinterests include processes of democratization, processes of state-building, and comparativemethodology.3/3

Exploring the medieval roots of democracy and state building in Europe

Contemporary democracy is often thought to have its roots in ancient Greece. However as Jørgen Møller writes, many of the key aspects of modern representative democracy can be traced to the medieval period. He argues that while genuine democratisation was a feature of the 19th and 20th centuries in Europe, this transition took place against the backdrop of medieval constitutional institutions

8/18/2015Exploring the medieval roots of democracy and state building inEuropeblogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2015/08/18/exploring-the-medieval-roots-of-democracy-and-state-building-in-europe/Contemporary democracy is often thought to have its roots in ancient Greece. However as JørgenMøller writes, many of the key aspects of modern representative democracy can be traced to themedieval period. He argues that while genuine democratisation was a feature of the 19th and 20thcenturies in Europe, this transition took place against the backdrop of medieval constitutionalinstitutions.Madame de Staël famously observed that in France liberty is ancient and despotism is modern. Thesentiment behind this observation has been echoed by a large body of scholarship that hasidentiﬁed the roots of key aspects of modern representative democracy in medieval political institutions. Mostimportant on the list is the medieval development of representative institutions. As is frequently pointed out, the mostfamous modern parliament – the English one convening in Westminster – can be traced in an unbroken line to theparliament that arose under Plantagenet kings in the 13th and 14th centuries.The notion that modern democracy has medieval roots was forcefully formulated by the Prussian historian OttoHintze in a series of essay written from 1929 to 1931. Hintze went so far as to argue that the absolutism that sweptaway constitutionalism over much of Latin Christendom following the 16th century military revolution was in fact onlya temporary aberration from a development which led from medieval parliaments to modern, representativedemocracy. More recently, Brian M. Downing has been almost as vocal. He argues that modern democracy evolvedstraight from what he terms “medieval constitutionalism” in the instances where early modern absolutism did notsweep away these medieval institutions (say, in England).Most of us would probably ﬁnd Hintze’s and Downing’s direct link between medieval institutions and moderndemocracy untenable. Genuine democratisation is a feature of the late 19th and early 20th century, and itpresupposed the removal of a series of political privileges of medieval origins. For instance, the medievalrepresentative institutions had only catered to select elite interests and the introduction of equal and universalsuﬀrage required mass pressure from below aimed at tearing down the old notions of political hierarchy in favour ofnew notions of political equality. In this sense, modern representative democracy required the great broom which –in Karl Marx’s famous phrase – swept away the medieval trash.Nonetheless, we can still make the case that this this subsequent democratisation was easier against the backdropof medieval constitutional institutions than it would otherwise have been. There are at least two reasons for this.First, as the late Robert A. Dahl observed in Democracy and Its Critics, when the modern forces behinddemocratisation built up steam, “the design for a ‘representative’ legislature did not have to be spun from gossamerﬁbres of abstract democratic ideas; concrete legislatures and representatives, undemocratic though they were,already existed”. Second, out of the medieval chrysalis emerged a society with quasi-independent social domains inwhich newly emerging groups could ﬁnd niches within which to organise, thereby paving the way for the vibrant civilsocieties that came to characterise especially Western Europe. This furthered the ability of these groups to ﬁght fortheir own enfranchisement once democratisation began to build up steam.Thus, while the path leading from medieval institutions to modern representative democracy may have been strewnwith obstacles, it still presented a more accessible route than other historical paths. Most students ofdemocratisation would probably acknowledge as much today. No similar consensus exists about how medievalinstitutions aﬀected subsequent state-building processes. If we return to Downing’s account, modern state-building1/3Credit: Nick Rowland (CC-BY-SA-3.0)is construed as a process which consists of removing the medieval institutions of constraints. Where the medievalinstitutions were swept away by state-building, military-bureaucratic absolutism came into existence.In a more sophisticated analysis, Thomas Ertmanhas pointed out that the survival of constitutionalistinstitutions had no eﬀect on whether state-buildingwas based on bureaucratic (i.e. ‘Weberian’) orpatrimonial templates. These two positions nicelycapture the general views in the literature whichmight be said to be that the medieval foundations ofdemocracy were either inconsequential or outrightnegative for a felicitous pattern of state-building: thatis, for the introduction of modern bureaucraticinstitutions.Analogously to what has been said about moderndemocracy, it is correct that modern state-buildingentailed that a number of medieval institutions wereremoved, most particularly local institutions of self-government and privileges for estate groups such astax exemptions. However, the literature has largelyignored that the medieval institutions that needed tobe transformed to pave the way for modern bureaucratic ones also aﬀected subsequent state-building in a positiveway. There are two main reasons for this.First, the medieval institutions and the strong social groups which they reﬂected constantly constrained state-builders, thereby making top-down state-building and arbitrary rule more diﬃcult. To use Michael Mann’s distinction,this facilitated the use of infrastructural power at the expense of despotic power. Second, many of the medievalinstitutions provided “transmission belts” for modern state-building while the strong social groups could beharnessed for state-building. For instance, local bureaucracies owed much to earlier structures of urban self-government and a part of the medieval legacy was the existence of a stratum of professional groups of corporateorigins which could staﬀ the new bureaucratic structures.One reason why these positive eﬀects have been ignored is that most prior scholarship on the development of themodern state has been Eurocentric in the sense that it is variation within Europe that has been addressed. This, forinstance, is the case in both of the above-mentioned analyses by Downing and Ertman – but it also characterisesmost of the more general ‘bellicist’ work on the relationship between war-making and state-making, including theseminal work of Charles Tilly. However, as all of Western and Central Europe embarked on modern state-buildingagainst the backdrop of the medieval institutions, this is a sure recipe for emphasising the blocking aspects of themedieval legacy at the expense of the facilitating aspects.The proper way to appreciate the eﬀects of the medieval legacy is by comparing processes of state-building incases with and without this legacy. Perhaps the most intuitively interesting comparative contrast is Russia. In theRussian case state-building was sparked by the very same factor that spurred state-building in the rest of Europe,namely the geopolitical pressure that had become a ubiquitous feature of the European multi-state system after1500.A closer look at Russian state-building shows just how diﬃcult it is to establish bureaucratic institutions top-down byunconstrained rulers in the absence of existing “transmission belts” for authority. Not only were there no extantinstitutions of self-government to base local government structures on, even the central institutions established byczars such as Peter the Great were constantly undermined because real power subsided not in formal institutions2/3but in patron-client networks centred on the czar. In this sense, Russia serves to put in relief some of the facilitatingaspects of medieval institutions of constraints for the later development of bureaucratic institutions.The study of these medieval foundations has received renewed attention by social scientists in recent decades.Most important is probably the ambitious research agenda of Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson which, at leasttacitly, rests on the assumption that medieval “institutions of constraints” – whether they arose endogenously orwere transplanted during colonialisation processes – have facilitated modern democratisation and moderneconomic growth.A next step for this research agenda is to, in a more detailed manner, analyse the importance of these medievalinstitutions for state-building. If we wish to understand which lessons can be derived from the Europeandevelopment of modern democracy, the modern state, and the modern market economy, we need to understandboth blocking and facilitating aspects of the legacy bequeathed by medieval institutions. Only by doing so can wederive lessons from European development, which might then serve to shed some new light on ongoing processesof political change and state-building elsewhere.Please read our comments policy before commenting .Note: For a longer discussion of the topic covered in this article see the author’s recent article in the Journal ofDemocracy. The article originally appeared at our partner site, Democratic Audit, and gives the views of the author,not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor of the London School of Economics.Shortened URL for this post: http://bit.ly/1MuWiXI _________________________________About the authorJørgen Møller – Aarhus UniversityJørgen Møller is Professor at the Department of Political Science, Aarhus University. His researchinterests include processes of democratisation, processes of state-building, and comparativemethodology.3/3

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Exploring the medieval roots of democracy and state building in Europe

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