One largely overlooked consequence of states competing in globalised markets is the incentive for political authorities to use marketing techniques to create a coherent ‘brand’ for individual countries. Melissa Aronczyk writes on this type of nation ‘branding’, noting that it has three largely negative consequences: the involvement of relatively unaccountable marketing experts in decision-making; the downplaying of components of national identity which do not project the desired image; and the reduction of national identity to a single configuration, neglecting the fact that there may be competing conceptions of what a state’s national identity consists of

Aronczyk, Melissa

LSE Research Online

Credit: Håkan Dahlström (CC-BY-SA-3.0)22/01/2014Nation ‘branding’ to promote states in the global market hasserious consequences for social diversity within Europeancountriesblogs.lse.ac.uk /europpblog/2014/01/22/nation-branding-to-promote-states-in-the-global-market-has-serious-consequences-for-social-diversity-within-european-countries/One largely overlooked consequence of states competing in globalised markets is the incentive for politicalauthorities to use marketing techniques to create a coherent ‘brand’ for individual countries. MelissaAronczyk writes on this type of nation ‘branding’, noting that it has three largely negativeconsequences: the involvement of relatively unaccountable marketing experts in decision-making;the downplaying of components of national identity which do not project the desired image; and thereduction of national identity to a single configuration, neglecting the fact that there may becompeting conceptions of what a state’s national identity consists of.Over the last two decades, national leaders in Europe and beyond have turned to brandingconsultants, PR advisers and strategic communications professionals to help them make their jurisdiction ‘matter’ ina globally integrated world. Nation branding is seen as a form of soft power: gentler than sticks, less coercive thancarrots, the creation of a conscious strategy that draws on a nation’s territorial, cultural, and commercial specificitypromises to attract broader international legitimacy than the use of traditional power resources.But what actually happens to the nation when it isreconfigured as a ‘brand’? What are the implications forgovernance, policy making, and citizenship whencommercial tools, techniques and expertise are broughtto bear on national belonging?At one level, my book, Branding the Nation, is anaccount of the political, cultural and economicconditions in which the idea of nation brandingdeveloped. I trace the rise of competitiveness policies,the commercialisation of culture, and the wideningapplication of corporate strategy to non-marketinstitutions, documenting the transformation of businessin the articulation of national identity over the past forty-five years.But my ultimate goal is to demonstrate the troublingeffects of this practice on national sovereignty. If thepurported aim of nation branding is to reassert theimportance of the nation-state in a so-called borderlessworld, its overemphasis on investment, tourism andtrade has the potential to eclipse national obligations tosocial equality, diversity or solidarity.Based on an analysis of branding efforts in twelvecountries, I identify at least three consequences ofbranding the nation. First, there is a general lack of accountability by branding consultants. Second, branding effortshave led to the creation of an environment of zero-sum competitiveness, where only the aspects of a culture that are1/3deemed economically viable are promoted as part of the branded national identity. Finally, nation branding cannotembrace multiple identities.Lack of accountabilityNation branding exercises typically begin by proxy: national leaders hire specialised consultancies to educate themand their constituencies about the benefits and processes of branding. But consultancy, even at its best and mostethical, is by definition not a long-term commitment. The absence of oversight or   responsibility by nation brandingconsultants results in a systematic lack of accountability for their decisions.Nation branding consultants do not see themselves as responsible for either the implementation of their visions orthe success of the effort. The kinds of skills required for governance and those required for corporate managementmay overlap, but they are not always well aligned, and serious divisions exist between public and private sectoractors at the level of ethical commitment, as well as in the basic understanding of what resources ought to form thebasis of collective wealth.Zero-sum competitivenessNation branding projects are frequently justified on the basis of global competition. In a global marketplace of limitedresources, both material and symbolic, so the argument goes, national citizens must adopt a ‘competitive identity’that promotes their authentic and unique cultural values and distinguishes them from their national counterparts.In a nation branding paradigm, however, only those cultural values and attitudes which are deemed economicallyviable are acceptable. Successful nation branding is largely understood in terms of capital- and investment-friendlypolicies, tourist infrastructures and intellectual property regimes. These policies and regimes are frequentlyaccompanied by the reduction of state provisions; and they orient economic activity toward growth at any cost – anorientation that recent experience has taught us is wholly unsustainable.The spirit of competition that is promoted as the basis of national legitimacy is a distorted Darwinism, in which somenations are ‘effective’ for globalisation (deregulated, open for business, entrepreneurial) and others are not(parochial, backward, radical). Nation branding determines a system of values that privileges certain traits as moreevolved than others, with those nations at the bottom of the rungs forced to move upward along a uni-linearmodernist path rather than considering alternative directions for development.Living the brandIn the eyes of nation branding experts, the ultimate responsibility for the success of the branded national identity lieswith the nation’s citizens. It is they who must ‘live the brand’ – that is, perform attitudes and behaviours that arecompatible with the brand strategy and that reinforce the tenets of the ‘new and improved’ national character.There are two problems with this way of looking at national identity. The first is that it assigns responsibility fornational success or failure to national citizens rather than to government, industry or infrastructure. It downplays thevery notion of representative government and furthers the justification for the retrenchment of state provisions.The second problem with this approach to national identity is that it presumes the existence of a single andhomogenous national ‘essence’: a core set of values that can be recognised and agreed upon by all citizens. Whilenation branding pays lip service to public participation and the diversity of opinions, its reliance on a ‘core idea’ torepresent a national population comes at the cost of recognising internal differentiation, resistance, or conflict.To illustrate these points, consider the case of Poland. In December 2003, the Polish Ministry of Commerce, incollaboration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, retained the services of a British branding firm to create a newPolish national identity on the eve of the country’s accession to the European Union. Polish participants saw thecreation of a ‘brand’ identity as part of its drive toward economic, political, and cultural normalcy after 1989. But they2/3also saw it as a continuation of a project started long before: to return to their rightful place in Europe, to reclaimtheir history and cultural memory, to reassert their national spirit in the face of the multiple antagonisms that hadplagued their centuries-long history.These mythopoetic tropes infusing Poland’s national narrative were tightly bound up with the Polish participantsinvolved in the branding project; but the themes of integration, normalcy and return were interpreted very differentlyby the branding consultancy. To the branding consultants, these themes were indices of economic change, nothistorical continuity. Any elements of Poland’s past that might counter the market-oriented, EU-friendly image theconsultants were trying to instill were to be sidelined.Thus the rhetoric of inclusion of the national brand was countered by a barely veiled politics of exclusion – of thesymbolic legacies of Solidarność, for example; and of the older generation in Poland, whose historical experiencewas anathema to the brand propositions.What is revealed in this thinking is the recognition of what branding cannot do: account for the plurality of voices,legacies, and competing visions of the nation-state. But indeed, this is the very point. Branding erases theprominence of those attributes which might compromise the legitimacy of the nation-state in a global marketdemocracy.Global market legitimacy and national sovereignty should not be opposed, as though one can only exist at the costof the other. But neither should they be made synonymous. In order for the nation to continue to matter, we needmore sensitive interventions that recognise both the value of alternative imaginaries and the possibilities contained indiverse visions of modern globalisation.Please read our comments policy before commenting .Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, norof the London School of Economics.Shortened URL for this post: http://bit.ly/1eQ6gjl_________________________________About the authorMelissa Aronczyk  – Rutgers UniversityMelissa Aronczyk is Assistant Professor in the School of Communication and Information at RutgersUniversity. She is also Secretary for the Popular Communication Division of the InternationalCommunication Association. 3/3

Nation ‘branding’ to promote states in the global market has serious consequences for social diversity within European countries

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